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ABSTRACT  
   
For many years, difference scholars, such as Cornel West, Iris Marion 
Young, and Janet Atwill have been reminding humanities scholars that if social 
equity is ever to be realized, difference needs to be reconfigured and reframed. As 
Janet Atwill puts it, "difference can no longer be the anomaly, the enemy, or the 
problem to be solved. Difference is the condition" (212). While these scholars 
insightfully recognize that difference needs to be accepted, welcomed and loved 
rather than merely tolerated, they have not sufficiently addressed the perceptual 
change that must occur worldwide if difference as an intrinsic underlying 
condition of human existence is to be embraced. This project provides a point of 
departure for carrying out such a dramatic epistemic change by arguing that 
hierarchical thinking, not difference, is the real agent underwriting societal 
violence and discord. Hierarchical thinking delineates a more appropriate critical 
space than does difference for social justice inquiry, invention, and intervention.  
This project also rhetorically theorizes the realm of intersubjectivity and 
provides two novel contributions to contemporary rhetorical theory: 1) privilege 
as a rhetorical construct and 2) the untapped inventional potential of the 
postmodern understanding of intersubjectivity. To illustrate the embodied and 
performative aspects of hierarchical thinking, this work draws upon the writings 
of Lillian Smith, a white southerner (1897-1966) whose descriptive analyses of 
the Jim Crow South allude to large systems of privilege of which Jim Crow is 
merely representational. Illustrating the invidious nexus of privilege, Smith's 
writings describe the ways in which individuals embody and perform practices of 
  ii 
exclusion and hate to perpetuate larger systems of privilege. Smith shows how 
privilege operates much as gender and power—fluidly and variously and 
dependent upon context. Viewing privilege as a rhetorical construct, operating 
dynamically, always in flux and at play, provides rhetoricians with a theoretically 
important move that un-yokes privilege from specific identities (e.g., white 
privilege). When viewed through this more dynamic and precise lens, we can 
readily perceive how privilege functions as a colonizing, ubiquitously learned, 
and variegated rhetorical practice of subordination and domination that, as a 
frame of analysis, offers a more fluid and accurate perspective than identity 
categories provide for discussions of oppression, social justice, and democratic 
engagement. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Our Unwitting Collusion in a Culture of Violence 
“To witness abuse is itself a human rights violation and an injury one can 
claim in U.S. courts” writes Andrea Smith, a Native American scholar and social 
activist (51). Each time I read this statement, I am struck by its startling 
implication: Everyone has witnessed abuse, right?  If witnessing abuse is a 
violation claimable in court, then U.S citizens conceivably could storm the court, 
for who among us has not been violated?  
The first time I read the opening quote, a rush of childhood memories 
flooded my imagination, all seeming to belie what I would consider my well-
protected and privileged upper-middle-class white background, one absent of any 
obvious or visible abuse. Inundated with one repulsive scene after another, my 
mind’s eye watched a gut-wrenching spectacle in which my pre-school teacher 
jerks a male classmate by the arm to the nearest sink where she unleashes a 
torrential lecture about “bad words” while simultaneously trying to ram a bar of 
Ivory soap into a mouth too small to accommodate it. I remember the educator 
fiercely rotating the bar of soap while adding water to the four-year-old boy’s 
mouth until he gagged and sobbed in a sudsy mess. Another disturbing scene 
surfaces of myself as a five-year-old watching Saturday morning cartoons with 
my siblings and cousins. Frequently, my older siblings and cousins hooted and 
guffawed while I bawled, befuddled and horrified, that Tom and Jerry’s and the 
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Roadrunner and Wiley Coyote’s perennially violent relationships constituted 
grounds for laughter and amusement. Still another scene surfaces in which the 
boys’ junior high-school phys. ed. teacher stands on the edge of the athletic field 
smirking while his class fulfills the requirement for its assignment of the day—to 
“smear the queer”—the “queer” being, invariably it seemed, the most un-athletic 
boy on the field, whose terrified and trembling pudgy or scrawny body 
desperately scrambles to outrun a horde of boys hell bent on tackling him. The 
poor target knows the inevitable outcome; at the very least he would be pinned 
down and smothered, bruised and aching for days afterward. These and other 
scenes streamed as vivid recollections until at last their sheer disquieting force 
provoked metacognition—in this case, an appreciation for the power of logos to 
jumpstart the engine of memory and to elicit pathos. Thankfully, thinking halted 
my recollection. 
Yanked from my reverie, I began to think about the incredible hold 
violence has on each one of us, a hold that has yet to be analyzed from a rhetorical 
perspective. One of my favorite professors used to say that “violence is the 
absence of rhetoric.” For years I accepted her pithy aphorism as a truism. It 
certainly has traction if rhetoric is seen as an art of public deliberation, as when 
two or more nations halt negotiations and at least one opts to war against the 
other. Yet the study of rhetoric has a much deeper and broader purview than that 
of public deliberation and includes the epistemological as well as the 
performative. With this in mind, I have undertaken what might be generally 
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considered a rhetorical analysis of violence, a project prompted by my deep 
interest in social justice and a desire to understand why all the diligent efforts and 
organizations dedicated to social justice have not made more inroads than they 
have. I hope to show in subsequent chapters that myriad manifestations of 
violence have achieved a nearly ubiquitous scope and reach; that violence is 
predominantly culturally-constructed and constructive; and that violence is 
maintained and perpetuated via individual and collective perception, learned by 
each of us during childhood, prior to self-reflexive thought and well-developed 
metacognition. That is, the learning of violence toward oneself and others, which 
occurs via narrative immersion in systems of privilege (e.g., gender, race), 
coincides with the learning of language.  
The claim that each and every one of us has not only experienced abuse 
but has grown up under abusive conditions might strike many readers as absurd. 
However, I hope that after reading this dissertation many of those same readers 
will not consider this claim at all odd, and might even, in recognition of the 
incredible depth and breadth of the problem elucidated in the following chapters, 
invest their time and talents in addressing the issues raised. At this point, 
however, I ask readers only to consider the idea that within the legal terms of the 
United States Court, most of you have been abused. Despite variegations in 
personal experience, everyone can claim to have witnessed hate, bullying and 
cruel insensitivity to others—at the very least. These types of preventable 
violence and trauma are commonplace to childhood experience, yet both are 
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generally and too easily dismissed as unavoidable, part and parcel of a normal 
childhood. This dissertation challenges that perspective.  
It is a commonplace notion that violence is endemic to human nature. 
Endemic violence is promoted representationally on T.V., the Internet, in games 
and music, and is embedded in language. If the idea of endemic violence might be 
acceptable to many readers, why, then, would a primary contention of this work—
that all of us were and are victims of abuse who have, as a result of that abuse, 
learned to dehumanize ourselves and others—not be as easily accepted? 
Even at first glance there are simple markers that suggest the validity of 
my argument. For instance, the fact that during my and many other people’s 
“evolution” to adulthood there arises the need to learn to “thicken one’s skin” in 
many ways is a red flag that dehumanization is taking place. For example, as an 
adult I have not only acquired the ability to watch violence as a form of 
entertainment, but I have also learned how to function on a daily basis despite 
knowing that I am constantly surrounded by suffering—of a variety and 
magnitude that defies belief, and most, if not all, of it is socially-constructed. Full 
knowledge of the extent of suffering of my fellow human beings and other 
animals would have immobilized me as a child, yet as an adult, I knowingly 
function amidst this ubiquitous pain, emotional anguish, violence, and distress 
well enough to attend to my personal goals and responsibilities. My doing so 
requires that I “turn off” to a certain extent, to inure myself to the fact that 
millions are—at this moment—victims of violence and injustice who are starving, 
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being raped, or are suffering in other horrific ways. This “turning off” reflects an 
aspect of intersubjective training that will be more fully discussed in chapters 
three and four.  
That violence is both structural and cultural is not a new idea. In 2002 The 
World Health Organization (WHO) issued a report declaring violence a “global 
public health problem,” the roots of which are structural in nature, involving state, 
institutional, and individual participation. Arguing for an “ecological” model of 
violence, the report indicates that we do not have to live in a violent world 
because violence is preventable: “The factors that contribute to violent 
responses—whether they are factors of attitude and behavior or related to larger 
social, economic, political, and cultural conditions—can be changed” (13).  
Interestingly, one of the report’s primary concluding recommendations 
refers to the need to attend to a pervasive sense of complacency about violence, 
institutionally and individually. Implicating complacency as “a formidable 
obstacle in responding” to violence, the report notes that complacency is an 
attitude “closely related to the problem of gender inequality—as something that 
has always been present in human society and will therefore always continue to 
be so” (251). The issue of complacency is an important one and is integral to the 
subject of this dissertation, particularly how complacency flourishes in, and 
functions to maintain, a culture of violence (see chapter four).  
To facilitate a richer introduction to the main subject of this dissertation, I 
return to the context of Andrea Smith’s statement that witnessing abuse 
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constitutes abuse. Smith uses the implementation of the Indian boarding school 
system (circa 1870), the effects of which are still widely felt in and beyond native 
communities. I draw on features of the Indian boarding school system here to 
illustrate critical concepts that are closely examined in the chapters that follow. 
The boarding school system exemplifies a colonizing ideology that is based upon 
what I refer to throughout this work as “hierarchical thinking,” a concept I borrow 
from political sphere theorist Iris Marion Young in Justice and the Politics of 
Difference. Hierarchical thinking is based upon adherence to (or deviation from) a 
norm in which the norm always functions as superior to positions outside the 
norm, that is, as a position of privilege. As my work makes clear, hierarchical 
thinking is an episteme into which most everyone in the world has been 
socialized. While hierarchical thinking reflects an orientation often encapsulated 
as “Western,” throughout this work I will argue that hierarchical thinking extends 
to all cultures grounded in it.  
The role hierarchical thinking plays in violent interpersonal and 
intrapersonal interaction is well illustrated in the case of Indian boarding schools. 
During her discussion of the fact that many survivors of Indian boarding schools 
who witnessed abuse claim that they themselves were not abused, Smith 
challenges this perspective and argues that these boarders were not spared from 
abuse but were indeed abused themselves by their forced acculturation into a 
culture based upon hierarchical thinking. Her research on boarding schools shows 
a direct correlation between the emergence of violence in native communities and 
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the instantiation of the Indian boarding school system, implemented in response to 
native resistance to “‘civilizing’ instruction” (A. Smith 35). She explains, “I have 
attended several Native wellness workshops in which participants are asked to 
draw a family tree that shows the generation in their family in which violence, 
substance abuse, and other related problems develop. Almost invariably, these 
problems begin with the generation that first went to boarding school” (44).  
Smith’s extensive analysis of boarding schools in Conquest: Sexual 
Violence and American Indian Genocide notably shows that the implementation 
of such large-scale cultural change was accomplished by forced ideological 
assimilation to a hierarchical culture—not by beatings, murder, and sexual abuse 
alone. Abusive actions like these are merely the visible markers and performance 
of a hierarchical culture of dominance. Smith writes, “in order to colonize a 
people whose society was not hierarchical, colonizers must first naturalize 
hierarchy through instituting patriarchy. She writes, “[p]atriarchal gender violence 
is the process by which colonizers inscribe hierarchy and domination” (23). 
Gendered hierarchies are possibly, and arguably, the progenitor of all hierarchical 
dominations.1 In the case of native peoples, Smith refers to Paula Gunn Allen who 
similarly contends that gendered hierarchies are indispensable to colonization. 
Smith writes, “Allen argues that colonizers realized that in order to subjugate 
indigenous nations they would have to subjugate women within these nations. 
Native peoples needed to learn the value of hierarchy, the role of physical abuse 
in maintaining that hierarchy, and the importance of women remaining 
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submissive to their men” (A. Smith 23). Each of these tenets clearly shaped 
Indian boarding school “education.”  
This example of forced acculturative training provided by the Indian 
Boarding School system and the subsequent emergence of multiple forms of self-
directed and other-directed violence serve to show the damaging extent to which 
immersive training in hierarchical valuing (and de-valuing) of life itself fosters 
climates of violence and abuse, even if the participants only partially acculturate 
to such training. Drawing upon the works of Homi Bhabha and Edward Said, 
Andrea Smith summarizes the value of, indeed the need for, partial assimilation 
when colonizing others: 
[I]f the colonized group seems completely different from the 
colonists, they implicitly challenge the supremacy of colonial rule, 
because they are refusing to adapt the ways of the colonizers. 
Hence, the colonized must seem to partially resemble the colonists 
in order to reinforce the dominant ideology, and establish that the 
way colonizers live is the only good way to live. However, the 
colonized group can never be completely assimilated—otherwise, 
they would be equal to the colonists, and there would be no reason 
to colonize them. (26) 
Here it is important to note that assimilation has traditionally been held out by 
colonizers as a reward that brings to the colonized “the benefits of the dominant 
society” (A. Smith 26). Whether or not this “reward” is embraced or resisted by 
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the colonized, Smith reminds us, “the colonized group can never be completely 
assimilated” (26). Assimilation, then, represents a spurious promise of equality in 
a hierarchically-oriented society. Hierarchies are well served by narratives of 
equality and democracy. Everyone has an equal opportunity to work hard and 
become a billionaire, right?  
Postcolonial and transnational scholars have insightfully examined the 
relationships among global economic and institutional practices and the symbolic. 
In “‘Under Western Eyes’ Revisited,” Chandra Talpade Mohanty argues that 
“political shifts to the right [e.g., increasing global militarization and the U.S. 
prison industrial complex] accompanied by global capitalist hegemony, 
privatization, and increased religious, ethnic, and racial hatreds, pose concrete 
challenges for feminists. “In this context,” she asks, “what would it mean to be 
attentive to the micropolitics of everyday life as well as to the larger processes 
that recolonize the culture and identities across the globe?” (229). 
It is in the spirit of responding to Mohanty’s query that I write this 
dissertation. In it, I take a detailed look at the politics of everyday life that 
recolonizes the thinking, actions, and worldviews of most, if not all of us. While 
hierarchical thinking constitutes an ideology to which few are immune, as Smith’s 
research on Indian boarding schools shows, most anti-subordination scholarship 
has paid more attention to the material, social, and political repercussions of 
hierarchical thinking than to its rhetorical and epistemic dimensions. My project, 
however, focuses upon the work of another Smith—Lillian Smith (1897-1966)— 
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to draw our attention to how hierarchical training works rhetorically and 
epistemically (even among those who resist it) to create attitudes and behaviors 
that make all of us complicit in a culture of violence. I use the writings of Lillian 
Smith to closely examine the normative logic underlying hierarchical thinking and 
the epistemic “knowledge” hierarchical thinking produces, particularly the ways 
that this knowledge predisposes us to deal with others as well as ourselves. As my 
analyses will demonstrate, hierarchical conditioning thwarts social justice efforts 
by producing a web of affects, complacency being but one of many affectual 
productions. Hierarchical conditioning pervades life in that it traverses domains, 
serving as an overarching system in intersubjective training. By this I mean the 
ways we learn to perceive and relate to others as well as the ways we are trained 
(or not trained) to conceive of the collective and of ourselves as collective beings. 
This training, which I will refer to as “dispositioning” throughout the remainder 
of this text has not yet been adequately examined. My project begins a careful 
analysis of this system, and the purpose of this work is to de-naturalize 
hierarchical dispositioning by showing it to be an amazingly damaging and 
rhetorically productive cultural construct that is learned and, therefore, 
preventable. The social-constructedness of hierarchical training, for example, is 
neatly demonstrated in the case of the Indian boarding school system.  
 Lillian Smith’s vivid intersectional and historical descriptions and 
analyses of the Jim Crow South and the ways in which it worked as a system of 
privilege that depended upon the collusion of all individuals and their varying and 
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context-dependent positions of privilege (with respect to gender, ability, sexual 
orientation, religion, business and so on) guided me in the direction of seeing our 
current social, political, and cultural problems from the perspective of what 
Margaret Rose Gladney describes as Lillian Smith’s “psychocultural critique.” 
Smith considered privilege systems with their interlocking nature to be a 
debilitating cancer that damages everyone immersed in them. Gladney explains 
that Smith’s “intense interest in child psychology and psychoanalysis informed 
not only her understanding of racism but also her entire political analysis”(103). 
The accuracy of Gladney’s observation is evidenced in much of Smith’s 
correspondence. In one letter to a friend Smith writes that “All the movements in 
the world, all the laws, the drives, the edicts will never do what personal 
relationships can do and must do” (How 75). In another letter to her editor at 
W.W. Norton, Smith writes that “what to do about race is tied up with what to do 
about EVERYTHING” (How 126).  
Few scholars have examined how intersubjectivity itself is a social-
construct that predisposes people to interact with others in specific ways, ways 
that frequently traverse most group-specific differences. Although Smith never 
directly made such a claim, repeated readings of Lillian Smith’s works have 
directed my attention to thinking about privilege and to my making the claim that 
privilege underwrites every hierarchically dispositioned individual’s relationships 
to others; privilege traverses all domains. Such traversal un-tethers privilege from 
specific contexts (e.g., white privilege), a theoretically important move that 
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challenges us to reconsider the scholarly focus on systems over individuals, a 
move, then, that calls for both bottom-up and top-down social justice approaches. 
Although Lillian Smith’s work is remembered and respected for its civil 
rights advocacy and for its attention to multiple issues of difference, this 
dissertation aims to additionally recognize Smith as an important feminist and 
rhetorician whose public sphere writings and speeches deserve reclamation for 
their much larger and comprehensive social justice agenda, particularly for their 
attention to the fluidity of privilege as a rhetorical construct damaging to and 
performed by all subject positions. In a letter to her life partner Paula Snelling, 
Smith describes her participation in a joint interview on NBC and the resistance 
she commonly received when calling attention to the damaging effects of 
privilege systems upon the privileged. She writes, “white people don’t want to 
think whites are hurt by segregation: that fact isn’t as “important” to them or as 
dramatic as Ann’s [the other interviewee] being hurt as a Negro. Smith directs our 
attention to the damage that privilege enacts upon all subject positions, not merely 
upon those positions that are subordinated. Smith herself sees Jim Crow as 
representative of “the West” (“Extracts” 217). She explains, “the situation I lived 
in, and still live in, is one of great importance to the earth’s future, because 
segregation as I knew it and others in the South knew it is both symbol and 
symptom of the deep malaise which the human race is suffering from,” which, she 
contends throughout her works, “dehumanizes” all of us. Smith’s focus on and 
description of the epistemic knowledge produced by ordinate positions is one her 
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greatest contributions.  
In drawing upon Smith’s psychocultural observation of “a deep malaise 
which the human race is suffering from” to explore a deeply-engrained and 
pervasive perceptual grounding that cross-cuts cultures and contexts to sustain 
systems of injustice, I look at the ways in which our hierarchical dispositioning 
has become so engrained as to have become naturalized and, consequently, 
invisible in many ways, shaping our perception of ourselves and others. Of 
perception, Merleau- Ponty writes, “Perception is not a science of the world, it is 
not even an act, a deliberate taking up of a position; it is the background from 
which all acts stand out and is presupposed by them (qtd. in Alcoff Invisible 187). 
Perceptual practices are integrated into organized bodily movements and habits 
that become so habitual that the process of interpretation that constitutes 
perception, Alcoff writes, “is skipped in an attenuated process of perceptual 
knowing” (188). Redacting Merleau-Ponty’s work, Alcoff forcefully reminds us 
that “perceptual practices are dynamic even when congealed into habit” (189) and 
that consciously challenging our perceptual habits fosters change. In fact, Alcoff 
suggests, “Merleau-Ponty’s analysis [of perception] helps to provide a more 
accurate understanding of where—that is, at what level of experience—change 
needs to occur” (189). This dissertation project attends to the level of experience 
and perception of which Merleau-Ponty speaks. 
Many feminist theorists have advocated the “epistemic privilege” 
(Crenshaw, Alcoff) of marginalized groups whose group-specific ways of 
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knowing the world should form the starting points of social justice projects. In 
contrast, Smith’s work has directed me to attend to the ways that privilege 
functions rhetorically as a mechanism that, although context-dependent, 
constitutes all of our subject positions across domains—as well as how privilege 
challenges us to look carefully at the epistemic productions of hierarchical 
dispositioning (itself premised upon the concept of privilege), which constrains all 
subject positions. Despite the fact that Lillian Smith lacked the contemporary 
theoretical vocabulary to theorize fully, in both her fiction and autobiographical 
non-fiction, Smith describes the Jim Crow South from multiple standpoints to 
illustrate the epistemic effects of a system based in hierarchical thinking, and she 
backs up her descriptions with insightful analyses of specific aspects of Southern 
life. Smith’s analyses with respect to what I interpret as her overarching 
philosophy are somewhat vague, however. To elaborate upon and extend her 
work, I import feminist theories from moral psychology, rhetoric, and public 
sphere philosophy. Nevertheless, I thank Smith for turning my attention to 
fundamental concepts critical to my analysis of hierarchical thinking.  
Perhaps most importantly, Smith helped me to think through a question 
that has always perplexed me, and that is, despite incredibly strong grass-roots 
movements mobilizing millions of humans at a time in numerous social 
movements during the past 150 years, movements that aimed to eradicate 
significant amounts of suffering and instantiate social justice, why has this 
democratic momentum never truly taken hold and become more effective? This 
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dissertation’s analysis of hierarchical dispositioning helps to answer this question 
by examining the hegemonic force of hierarchical thinking and the ways in which 
it accommodates what Smith calls “cultural schizophrenia”—the simultaneous 
flourishing of competing discourses, such as democracy and Jim Crow or 
Christian values of kindness and compassion and war (military and economic).  
Hierarchical dispositioning, I argue, trumps the competition—that is, 
discourses of interconnectedness rather than separation, cooperation rather than 
competition, and the valuing of difference. Nevertheless, even though hierarchical 
dispositioning forms the gestalt, the grounding of all discourse, its 
accommodation of a variety of alternative discourses also enables us to 
experience truly non-hierarchical moments, moments that are commensurate with 
joy, love, sharing, and empathy. Hierarchical dispositioning is paradoxical in that 
it forms an overarching “terministic screen” (Burke) that is porous enough to 
allow for performances of its own dissolution while keeping the screen intact.  
Methodologically, the metaphor of colonization and the idea of partial 
assimilation serve to explain both the co-existence of competing discourses and 
the seeming hegemony of inequity and strife in this world. Resistance and 
Derridean sense of play ironically become intrinsic to the maintenance of a 
hierarchical disposition since each of us only partially assimilates to the full 
regime of hierarchical thinking. Understanding hierarchical dispositioning’s 
reliance upon competing alternatives assuages two of feminist philosopher Linda 
Martín Alcoff’s concerns about theorizing that essentializes. First, my theory of 
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hierarchical dispositioning acknowledges the “complexity, inevitable cultural 
hybridity, and multiplicity of the contemporary self” and thus theoretically 
supports a pluritopic hermeneutic, which Alcoff and other postcolonial theorists 
rightfully expect (Alcoff 124). Second, my theory addresses Alcoff’s concern that 
the “Western tradition of hermeneutics is itself monotopic and monologic,” 
presupposing “a single coherent tradition that is dynamic through history but 
unchallenged by alternative horizons competing in a given space or time frame” 
(124). Hierarchical dispositioning accomodates the multiplicity of traditions at 
play and explains how alternative horizons that are in direct competition with 
hierarchical thinking can circulate without gaining the prominence that might be 
expected of them. Hierarchical thinking, therefore, deserves continued scrutiny 
for all those interested in social justice projects. Indeed, I argue now that 
difference scholars have fully conveyed difference as an intrinsic underlying 
condition of human existence that needs to be accepted and embraced. It is time 
for scholars to turn their attentions to hierarchical thinking as the next critical 
problem space requiring collective attention. 
Use of Terms 
I choose to use the term “disposition” for three reasons. First, it 
successfully evokes the received learning that is always involved in hierarchical 
dispositioning. In this respect, disposition acknowledges that our perceptions of 
ourselves and others are rhetorical in nature, a function of language and context-
dependent. Secondly, disposition is the Latinate term for the second of the five 
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classical Greek “canons” of rhetoric and is most commonly referred to as 
“arrangement.” Since arrangement is always rhetorical, items can be variously 
arranged, and whatever arrangement is chosen shapes the overall reception of that 
arrangement. Thus, disposition evokes the patterning whereby hierarchical 
dispositioning trumps alternative horizons. Lastly, disposition connotes political 
and social stratification and the subsequent violence that hierarchical 
dispositioning produces. As Susan Jarratt argues in “New Dispositions for 
Historical Studies in Rhetoric,” disposition can be used in an “analogical and 
imaginative way to inquire into the arrangement not only of ideas and language in 
texts but also of people and images in public spaces” (71). “Unlike ethos, which 
refers to the status of the speaking subject in relation to an audience” Jarratt 
explains, “disposition extends the inquiry beyond the immediate rhetorical 
situation to social relations more generally. It is a way to account for the presence 
or absence of difference within historical and geographical spaces, to build into 
our rhetorical terminology a reminder of the fact that history should attempt to 
investigate not only those who spoke but also those who were made silent” (71). 
Used in the way Jarratt suggests, disposition connotes the very real problems that 
hierarchical thinking creates. 
Chapter Distribution 
Chapter two includes biographical information about Lillian Smith (1897-
1966) whose  vividly descriptive intersectional analyses of the Jim Crow South in 
which she lived provide the textual grounding for my discussion of hierarchical 
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politics of difference. Smith, I argue, should be recognized as a pioneer in the 
theorizing of difference. Well before the postmodern critique, Smith was 
incorporating basics of postmodern thought to raise the issue of hierarchical 
thinking. Smith’s descriptions illustrate privilege as a fluid rhetorical operation 
that traverses contexts and is internalized by all. Her metaphor for this cultural 
system is segregation (i.e., in any form, from race, gender, and sexual orientation 
to disability), and she juxtaposes practices of and commonplaces about 
segregation against competing narratives of democracy, respect, and compassion. 
Smith directs attention to segregation as a dehumanizing system in which 
privilege enacts damage upon all subject positions, not merely upon those 
positions that are subordinated, and she historicizes the naturalized to illustrate the 
continuity of systems of privilege and their ongoing, sedimented pasts. 
Chapter three exposes hierarchical conditioning as a foundational flaw 
underlying the ways in which people are socialized to interact with each other, a 
flaw that impedes human potential for respectful engagement. The chapter begins 
with an elucidation of Iris Marion Young’s discussion of a politics of difference 
in which she argues that to bring about a more socially-just society the definition 
of difference itself must be reconfigured. She explains that difference, in Western 
epistemology, is generally perceived as deviation from a norm “in which one 
group occupies the position of a norm, against which all others are measured,” an 
act that always valorizes and universalizes the norm by defining as “different” 
that which sits outside it. “In this way the definition of difference as exclusion and 
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opposition,” Young argues, “actually denies difference.” Young, however, does 
little to show how this denial of difference functions on the individual level. The 
second half of the chapter illustrates Young’s argument, drawing upon 
scholarship in moral psychology to show how shame and arrogance are epistemic 
productions of hierarchical conditioning that impede mutual respect. 
Supported by postcolonial scholarship, chapter four argues that 
hierarchical conditioning is a colonizing force, and as such, relies upon partial 
colonization to maintain hegemony. While humans are the inheritors of a 
pluritopic history that includes discourses of empathy, care, and cooperation as 
much as discourses of domination and subordination, this chapter explains why 
the former do not ascend to hegemony despite sustained and concerted social 
justice efforts. Surveying modalities of being that, in addition to shame and 
arrogance, contribute to individual complicity in hierarchical systems that support 
violence and suffering, this chapter argues that the epistemic byproducts of 
hierarchical thinking (fear, denial, entitlement, apathy, despair, and complacency) 
enable socially unjust systems to flourish, attenuate engagement with the social, 
and inhibit the potential for change. It is in this chapter that my epistemology of 
privilege takes shape, demonstrating how individuals unwittingly collude in 
systems that they may not ideologically support.2 
Chapter five draws upon Pierre Bourdieu’s discussion of “theory effect,” 
the narrative power of description to maintain and perpetuate the status quo. An 
explanation of the productive and normalizing force of description suggests the 
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need to substitute an inverse narrative to that which hierarchical thinking 
provides—namely a narrative of non-hierarchical thinking, which is based upon 
the concept of the intrinsic worth of any living being. Narrative change at this 
level, I argue, represents the very means of intervention Janet Atwill advocates in 
Rhetoric Reclaimed: Aristotle and the Liberal Arts Tradition. Substituting a 
poesis equally powerful yet contrary to hierarchical thinking, I argue, would 
establish an equally productive and malleable overarching system as hierarchical 
thinking has imposed, but one that better fit the ideals of an equitable human 
society at all levels. .  
This project is only a beginning to a conversation. Essentially, this work 
does little more than articulate and analyze a problem space. As such this project 
exemplifies Linda Martín-Alcoff’s assertion that “[b]oth phenomenology and 
hermeneutics are necessary for philosophical analysis” because 
“[p]henomenology counsels us to consider how the idea is related to lived 
experience, and hermeneutics instructs us to consider the effects of historical 
context on the interpretation and understanding of ideas” (“Knowing”). My work 
links lived experience with both historical context and ideology to explain how 
hierarchical training works epistemically (even among those who resist it) to 
create attitudes and behaviors that make everyone complicit in a culture that 
underwrites violence. Since articulation often is the first step toward 
disarticulation of a naturalized subject position, my overall analysis identifies a 
place of intervention for social justice agendas. In particular, my project suggests 
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that for individuals to flourish, we, ironically enough, must attend to the 
dispositioning of each individual as part of a larger social organism if dispositions 
are currently underwritten by an epistemologically flawed system of socialization 
that prohibits a gestalt of mutual respect. 
Feminists, particularly indigenous feminists, have long reminded us that 
cultures can indeed cultivate non-violence-centered subjectivities that privilege 
information and subject positions as needed by the community. To that end, I 
conclude this introduction with the American Anthropological Association’s 
contention that “[i]t is a basic tenet of anthropological knowledge that all normal 
human beings have the capacity to learn any cultural behavior.” In epitomizing 
the invaluable contributions that rhetorical study offers for denaturalizing and 
explaining the formidable power of doxa, the following project urges us to 
address the deeply learned perceptual system of hierarchical thinking.  
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CHAPTER 2 
STRANGE FRUIT: REAPING WHAT WE HAVE SOWN 
It is the apathy of white southerners that disturbs me; and may I add, this apathy is 
north and west of our region too. There are so many people who are determined 
not to do wrong but equally determined not to do right. Thus they walk straight 
into Nothingness. Are we—the nation that first embarked on the high adventure 
of making a world fit for human beings to live in—about to destroy ourselves 
because we have killed our dream? Can we live with a dead dream inside us? 
How many dead dreams will it take to destroy us all? (20)    
                                                                         – Lillian Smith Killers of the Dream 
 
As we know, what still links democratization, perhaps more today than ever 
before, to fraternization cannot always necessarily be reduced to patriarchy in 
which the brothers begin by dreaming of its demise. Patriarchy never stops 
beginning with this dream. This demise continues endlessly to haunt its principle. 
At the center of the principle, always, the One does violence to itself, and 
guards itself against the other. 
– Jacques Derrida The Politics of Friendship 
 
These two epigraphs illustrate a disquieting conundrum that further 
complicates the challenges that attend any useful discussion of systems 
underwritten by hierarchical politics of difference. Given the global proliferation 
of democratic ideals among people of all nations, even those subject to severely 
authoritarian regimes, it is important to understand how democratic ideals and 
patriarchal values can co-exist within a single social system that I am 
characterizing by the term “hierarchical.” Democratic values, characterized by the 
term “social equality,” esteem the dignity and worth of every individual in 
contradistinction to patriarchal regimes3 that ideologically support social 
stratification via, for example, class, race, and gender. For reasons I will examine 
more closely in chapter four, people have learned to function within a bipolar 
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system that simultaneously accommodates and incorporates both concepts. How 
are these two systems intertwined and what are the epistemic productions of their 
inevitable interactions? If democratic discourses somehow support and reinscribe 
the subordination, domination, and exclusion enacted within the patriarchal 
regimes they seek to replace, how then do we reinforce democratic values without 
reinforcing systems based upon domination? 
 The epigraph by Jacques Derrida suggests that patriarchal systems rely 
upon the ideal of fraternization, which “endlessly haunts” the principle of 
patriarchy. The epigraph by Lillian Smith, a white southern woman who wrote 
scathingly of the Jim Crow South in which she grew up and lived until her death 
from cancer in 1966, demonstrates that, like Derrida, she was fascinated by the 
human ability to internalize competing and contradictory discourses of democracy 
and exclusion. But unlike Derrida’s analysis, which invokes an eternal pairing of 
component parts that nevertheless maintain their discreteness (one discourse 
forever “haunts” the other), Smith’s analysis refers to the genesis of a new thing 
—white apathy—as a hybrid material reality generated by competing discourses 
of Jim Crow and democracy. In this regard, Smith’s analyses reflect 
contemporary feminist and postmodern understandings of the co-existent and 
phenomenological nature of human experience, in which the “we” precedes the 
“I” and discourses circulate and intersect, embodied, performed, and individuated 
by the human subject (Butler, Nancy). Thus, the coincidence of two discourses, 
Jim Crow and democracy, produces a “dead dream” synonymous with apathy. 
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Despite the fact that in her work Smith frequently locates herself as a product of 
her time, 4 Smith’s mid-twentieth century writings are trenchantly contemporary, 
consistently taking up and pre-dating current scholarship that examines what 
feminist rhetorical scholar Nedra Reynolds calls “the interconnectedness between 
the material and the metaphorical” (7).  
I draw upon the work of Lillian Smith (1897-1966) because her work 
richly describes the hierarchical politics that this dissertation theorizes. In addition 
to directing an innovative summer girls camp for twenty-five years, Smith was a 
prolific writer devoted to bringing about social equality, publishing seven books 
during her lifetime (several other manuscripts and some 13,000 letters were lost in 
one arson-related fire that destroyed her home). She corresponded heavily, 
delivered several commencement speeches, and, for ten years, edited and 
contributed to a literary journal that she founded with her lifelong partner Paula 
Snelling.5  Devoted to social criticism and social change in the south, the journal 
began with 25 subscribers and had grown to 10,000 when Paula and Lillian 
decided to close the journal a decade later. During its transition through three 
name changes (Pseudopodia, The North Georgia Review, and South Today), the 
journal published many African American writers, including Pauli Murray and 
W.E.B. Dubois. Three collections of Smith’s writings were published 
posthumously.6 An organized rhetor and savvy rhetorician who understood the 
value of historical memory as well as its easy erasure, Smith kept copies of her 
writings, all of which concerned themselves in varying ways with issues of social 
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inequality and the conditions that support and produce it. In Strange Fruit, 
Smith’s banned7 controversial best-selling novel about a 10-year long interracial 
love affair circa World War I, she offers structural and cultural analyses of Jim 
Crow and argues that social stratification and culture are simultaneously socially-
constructed and socially-constructive. For example, in one scene in Strange Fruit, 
the college-educated Black female protagonist Nonnie, who, after an evening of 
lovemaking on the outskirts of Town (barred from the simple privilege of ever 
having sex with her white lover in a bed or a building), declares “‘Race is 
something—made up, to me. Not real. I don’t have to believe in it. Social 
position—ambition—seem made up too” (95). Throughout the novel, Smith races 
gender and genders race while complicating her characters with variations of 
sexual orientation, class, religion and ability. Eileen Boris writes that when 
Strange Fruit is “read in conjunction with Smith’s autobiographical Killers of the 
Dream” (which, contrary to Strange Fruit’s reception, received little critical 
acclaim and sold poorly at the time of publication), Smith “offers a cartography of 
Southern whiteness, an interpretation of bodies essential to understanding the 
Southern political economy” (6) in which “constructions of racialized gender not 
only permeat[ed] the political imaginary but also shap[ed] the body politic” (5). 
Jay Garcia observes that many people consider Smith’s work “a vital resource in 
the work of lifting the yoke of racial oppression in the modern United States” (59)  
While Smith is rightly recognized as a pioneer in whiteness studies who 
brought the topic of whiteness to public attention by critiquing white privilege and 
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by racing those who, in their unmarked positions of white privilege, frequently 
perceived themselves as unraced, Smith’s analyses and social criticism of the Jim 
Crow South extend beyond race and gender to describe larger systems 
underwritten by hierarchical politics of difference, a politics in which the norm 
operates as a position of privilege and everything outside the norm is marked as 
not only different but as inferior and, often, deviant. The characters in Strange 
Fruit dramatically demonstrate, for example, how privilege operates rhetorically, 
fluidly internalized by all. Alma, the stern mother of the white male protagonist in 
Strange Fruit, wields power and privilege by reinscribing the mores of southern 
tradition upon her children (thus exerting a hold over her son’s thoughts and 
actions even when he is not in her presence), yet the very same character, Alma, 
in another scene abdicates that privilege when cowed by her husband’s harsh 
criticism of her. Smith’s white characters are variously beneficiaries and agents of 
an exploitative social order while being bound by the constraints of that same 
order, as in the case of Tracy who, feeling ashamed of his deeply-felt love for 
Nonnie, a black woman, ultimately casts her away and engages himself to an 
appropriate object of his attentions—a vacuous white woman for whom he feels 
nothing but who superficially represents the ideals of southern white womanhood. 
Smith’s descriptions of privilege are valuable because, for one, her descriptions 
do not perpetuate the myth that privilege is a free-floating signifier that offers 
absolute freedom to those in privileged positions (which, nevertheless, are 
context-dependent) and, secondly, because her work alludes to and describes large 
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systems of privilege of which Jim Crow is merely representational, systems that 
enable people to feel intrinsically superior to others, not merely along the lines of 
white superiority, but by any terms of normative judgment, such as class, gender, 
and ability. Systems underwritten by such politics are the focus of this project, 
and, as violence-centered and virtually ubiquitous systems, they pose a 
considerable threat to a sustainable human future. Since the ultimate goal of my 
project is to understand the ideological underpinnings, operations, and epistemic 
productions of systems underwritten by hierarchical politics of difference, Smith’s 
writings serve well to ground and support my analyses of these politics.  
Smith’s writings urged me to re-think a simple oppositional relationship 
between discourses and practices of human rights and social justice (i.e., social 
equality) and those of hierarchal systems (a patriarchal legacy) by bringing into 
relief a complex of subjective and intersubjective relationships constituted by 
their interlocking force. A simple binary relationship doesn’t adequately describe 
the complex network produced by opposing systems that work in tandem and that 
rely upon individual performance for their perpetuation. Smith’s focus on the 
individual, how individuals are socialized to relate to others, or, as Smith might 
say, how individuals have been equally taught to not relate to each other, as well 
as how individual subjectivities are epistemically constrained (e.g., discouraged 
from reflecting upon the larger system of which they are part) is foundational to 
the theory elucidated in this dissertation. Smith deserves credit for her 
groundbreaking attention to systems of privilege and the epistemic collusion that 
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such systems exact from and levy upon individuals—despite an assertion made by 
Anne Loveland in her 1986 biography of Smith: Loveland writes that Smith’s 
“primary significance lies in the role she played in the southern civil rights 
movement of the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s” since Smith’s “philosophical thinking 
was generally derivative and superficial and her literary effort unexceptional” 
(262). 
We can see in Loveland’s statement, however, the modernist influence of 
her time, and in the spirit of contemporary poststructural and feminist lens 
available to me, this dissertation aims to further the recent feminist historiography 
already begun in Smith’s name, particularly with respect to her rhetorical activism 
and theoretical contributions to difference scholarship. Smith was remembered 
until the 1990’s primarily as a fierce civil rights advocate. Even though several 
scholars have since acknowledged the ways in which her work incorporates an 
intersectional view of race reflective of critical race theory and have recognized 
her value as a social critic who attends to the complex tangle of the personal and 
political (Garcia, Gladney, McKay), I hope to make it clear that the richly 
coherent rhetorical and political theory embedded in Smith’s work has yet to be 
sufficiently appreciated or elucidated. Yes, Smith was well ahead of her time in 
making whiteness, the body, and disabilities (physical and emotional) of topical 
interest and for implicating discourse in the construction of racialized and 
gendered subject positions, but her writings encompass a much larger social 
project, one which I’d characterize as nothing less than the abolition of a socially-
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constructed and self-reinscribing violence-centered legacy in which humanity is 
presently mired. In other words, Smith persistently and consistently takes up the 
subject of hierarchical politics of difference. As early as 1949, Smith importantly 
raises the critical issue of making a world fit for all human beings, as noted in the 
epigraph to this chapter.  
If such a world is to be possible, Smith professes that human beings must 
learn to understand themselves as cultural beings whose perceptions are just as 
socially-constructed and materially imbricated as other aspects of culture, and she 
urges her readers to consider the specie-specific ability of humans to consciously 
reflect upon and change themselves and the conditions in which they live. In a 
commencement speech “Ten Years from Today,” Smith writes that man is “the 
only animal who can change himself” because as “a talking animal, he can talk 
about his dreams, and talking about his dreams makes him want those dreams to 
come true, and wanting those dreams to come true gives him the power to change 
himself” (671). While change, like difference, is a given and a constant, the 
human capacity to alter the course and speed of social change may be unique. 
Smith incisively points to the ways certain cultures discourage the critical 
reflexive awareness required to collectively enact positive social change and 
writes about cultures of exclusion such as Jim Crow that “almost completely 
[lack] the self-changing power that comes with honest criticism because in the 
past it forced out its children who saw dangers and tried to avert them, who had 
insight and talents that could have contributed so richly to the South’s recovery; 
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because it bruised those who grimly stayed, unwelcomed, until their energies 
were depleted” (Killers 152). Smith consistently highlights the social-
constructedness of human perception. Cultural reflexivity and individual 
conscience represent key components of human perception, and her discussion of 
the underdevelopment of both encourages readers to ponder how culture 
influences the development, or lack thereof, of human perception, and asks 
readers to think about the affects of stunted perception upon the capacity for 
large-scale societal change that benefits everyone, not just the few. Determining 
the veracity of Smith’s claim that humans are the only animals with the ability to 
transform the conditions of their existence is immaterial to this topic. What 
matters here is Smith’s belief in our own plasticity, a quality that enables humans 
to participate in self and societal transformation. The coherence of her vision 
permeates her corpus—to expose and de-seat all exclusionary systems via 
detailed understanding of their quotidian workings.  
Several scholars have recognized this global aim, particularly Jay Garcia 
who asserts that Smith uses “human” as “a salient moral category, a form of 
cultural address, and a horizon of social transformation” (59) in her “plebian and 
transcultural form of human rights” (60) that “carried transnational dimensions 
even as it analyzed the particularities of region and state” (60). With a nod to the 
importance of the individual (“plebian”), Garcia insightfully recognizes that 
Smith’s appeals to “human” operate as “a salient moral category […and] horizon 
of social transformation” that indicate a global worldview by referring to both the 
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universal (“transcultural”) and local level (“particularities of region and state”). 
I’d argue too that Smith’s categorical use of “human” in these ways 
philosophically distinguishes her use of “human” from the modernist universal 
subject that defines an individual outside subjecthood as the standard of 
interpellation. Subjects are always contextually located in Smith’s work. The 
evident influence of liberal humanism can be traced throughout Smith’s writings, 
locating her in place and time as a mid-twentieth century white educated 
American. Nevertheless, given the time period of the 1930’s-60’s in which Smith 
writes, it is more important to acknowledge the degree to which Smith presages 
contemporary feminist and postmodern discussions of subjectivity and 
intersubjectivity, as well as the recent re-consideration of the importance of “the 
universal” (i.e., serious consideration of commonalities, not merely differences, 
among people. See for example, Benhabib, Mohanty). 
Furthermore, Smith’s corpus has not received the critical acclaim it 
deserves with respect to its rhetorical performance and the variety of rhetorical 
strategies Smith uses in her effort to expose her readers to the absurdity of 
hierarchical systems and the ranking of human beings. Smith encourages readers 
to perceive the socially-constructed nature of hierarchical systems and the beliefs 
and practices they produce, all of which maintain their force through 
naturalization. Smith invests her attention upon human artifice to urge her readers 
to create “profound cultural change” by substituting better images of themselves 
to live by, images of free individuals “growing from childhood steadily toward a 
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full maturity, accepting both freedom and responsibility, accepting all people as 
human beings with the same right to grow and to be different” (“Ten Years” 672). 
Given such a large theoretical problem space, Smith’s larger historical vision 
easily escapes attention, enabling readers to instead focus on the many topics she 
addresses, from tropes of motherhood to segregation, or on the time and location 
in which she writes—the Jim Crow South. Nevertheless, all of Smith’s writings 
address the problem of exclusion and the difficulty societies have with 
accommodating difference.  
Therefore, this chapter examines features of Smith’s rhetorical activism as 
rhetorical technai8 that can be deployed analogously to understand and subvert 
contemporary exclusionary systems. Such technai include explicit discussion of 
underlying theoretical concerns, attention to epistemic productions that emerge 
from hierarchical systems like Jim Crow, and rhetorical strategies intended to 
persuade readers to change their habits as well as their thinking. Smith 
consciously conceived of writing and public speaking as a technē (i.e., as a 
productive art) as a means of both intervention and invention in the world around 
her, clearly demonstrating Janet Atwill’s assertion that “technē is knowledge as 
production, not product, and as intervention and articulation rather than 
representation” (2). Of course, the degree to which Smith herself self-reflectively 
theorized such strategies cannot be known. Given, however, that praxis performs 
theory, consciously or otherwise, I extract rhetorical performances from Smith’s  
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texts to demonstrate their contemporary theoretical relevance as well as to 
recognize how they resonate with current rhetorical theory.  
For example, Smith’s rhetorical performances frequently enact the work 
that Reynolds attributes to cultural geographers who deconstruct the binary 
relations  between “public and private spaces by analyzing the sociospatial 
construction of identities through such concepts of habitus” (8). “Habitual 
pathways,” Reynolds notes, “are characterized by signs that have faded with 
familiarity” as “they are no longer needed when the routine becomes naturalized” 
(81). Smith persistently addresses topics of identity construction, habitus, and the-
personal-as-political to make the naturalized obvious. By marking the naturalized 
as “unnatural” for her predominately white and privileged audience, Smith invites 
readers to examine their own cultural traditions as historically and socially 
constructed legacies. Well in advance of Reynold’s assertion that “[p]laces, 
whether textual, material, or imaginary, are constructed and reproduced not 
simply by boundaries but also by practices, structures of feeling, and sedimented 
features of habitus,” (2) Smith maps the exclusionary boundaries that are daily 
etched and re-etched by individual participation. She demonstrates, for example, 
how privilege and exclusion are learned by rote and ritual to become naturalized 
performances:  
What white southerner of my generation ever stops to think 
consciously where to go or asks himself it if is right for him to go 
there! His muscles know where he can go and take him to the front 
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of the streetcar, to the front of the bus, to the big school, to the 
hospital, to the library, to hotel and restaurant and picture show, 
into the best that his town has to offer its citizens. These 
ceremonials in honor of white supremacy, performed from 
babyhood, slip from the conscious mind down deep into muscles 
and glands and on into that region where mature ideals rarely find 
entrance. (Killers 96)  
Well ahead of current body and performance scholarship, Smith both understands 
such performances as cultural fictions that nevertheless become sedimented and 
naturalized over time through repeated practice, and she makes the familiar 
strange by making visible the daily customs and practices that exclude culturally-
different others. Notably, Smith here also juxtaposes such exclusionary practices 
with contrasting received wisdom, “mature ideals” and thereby adjudges the 
human capacity to segregate realms of life as the basis of hypocrisy. 
Smith focuses on the embodied and performative aspects of hierarchical 
systems, I’d argue, not merely to mirror what she sees, but to urge her readers to 
re-train themselves and their children, in a proto-feminist recognition that positive 
societal transformation necessitates the transformation and flourishing of every 
individual. Smith’s rightfully conceives of culture as participatory in that 
individuals embody, perform, and perpetuate cultural practices and values. If we 
are to sustain human life and provide some semblance of a good life for everyone, 
Smith asserts, then we must take into account the need to socialize people, 
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especially children, with an understanding of themselves as part of a larger whole 
in which their actions have significant ideological and material affects. Such a 
phenomenological perspective, Judith Butler asserts, posits the body as “an 
embodying of possibilities both conditioned and circumscribed by historical 
convention,” via a “complicated process of appropriation” that produces bodies 
that are themselves historical conventions (“Performative Acts” 99).  
Smith repeatedly raises the topic of societal transformation, emphasizing 
that the capacity for change requires individuals who entertain its possibility, an 
idea that harkens back to Michel Foucault’s distinction between classical Greek 
and Christian ethics. While ignoring the realities of the exclusionary and 
hierarchical nature of the Greek polis in which only autochthonous male citizens 
merited the dignity and worth afforded theoretically to the individual, Foucault 
explains in “The Ethics of the Concern of the Self as a Practice of Freedom” that 
ideologically, ethics in classical thought was reflected in a theme—the care of the 
self. Foucault notes that this theme changed during the influence of Christianity 
when the idea emerged that “salvation is attained through the renunciation of self” 
(285). The care of the self, then, incorporates one’s own conduct in relation to 
others and thus includes the social, the culturally determined, and Smith’s work 
importantly raises this ethical consideration, how cultures shape I/thou 
relationships (Buber). That which makes Smith’s work so presciently current is its 
attention to subjectivity, particularly the social conditions conducive to the 
formation of an engaged and inclusive citizenry. Ironically, this is precisely what 
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made her work vulnerable to being so easily dismissed and forgotten, to be 
written off as too psychological and “derivative.”  
Orthodoxy Authorizes Individual Endowments: Material and Cultural 
Capital 
Smith credits a traumatic incident in her childhood for framing her 
lifelong interest in problems posed by difference and her interest in the power of 
doxa to impede social change. Born in 1897 in Jaspar, Florida to a large affluent 
white Southern Christian family (Lillian was the eighth of ten children), Smith 
explains that she was “reared in a small Deep South town whose population was 
about equally Negro and white,” in a large home with a barn, fields, gardens and 
lawns (Killers 30). In Killers of the Dream, her partly autobiographical socio-
cultural-political analysis of Jim Crow, Smith prefaces her telling of this 
milestone childhood event with a description of the cultural capital she had 
accrued through her family’s raced and classed privilege. Her self-disclosure 
intimates the salience of these primary literacies and capacities, formed during her 
early childhood, to her later civic-minded engagement and to her ability to cope 
with risk and uncertainty (30). With “advantages of schooling, music and art as 
were available in the South,” Smith writes, “our world was not limited to the 
South, for travel to far places seemed a natural thing to us, and usually one of the 
family was in a remote part of the earth” (Killers 30). “We knew we were a 
respected and important family of this small town,” Smith continues, “but beyond 
this we gave little thought to status” (Killers 31). Smith’s father, she writes, 
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“made money in lumber and naval stores for the excitements of making and 
losing it—not for what money can buy nor for the security it sometimes gives,” 
and she notes the acceptance of risk in the family, “a mild delight in burning 
bridges, an expectant ‘what next?’” Daily bible reading was a matter of course, 
and family values, Smith explains, were expressed in “excessively Christian and 
democratic terms,” stressing the importance of “people and their welfare,” and, 
above all else, each child’s responsibility to “do something” for society (Killers 
31).  
Having taken these high-minded and empowering discourses to heart, 
Smith wasn’t surprised when her parents took in a little white girl named Janie 
who was found “living with a Negro family in a broken-down shack” (Killers 35). 
Janie lived with the Smith family for three weeks until it was discovered that she 
was indeed African American. At the time of Janie’s “rescue,” however, Janie’s 
adoptive family was suspected of kidnapping her and was ultimately harried into 
releasing Janie, who moved into Lillian’s room in the Smith family home: 
She roomed with me, sat next to me at the table; I found Bible 
verses for her to say at breakfast; she wore my clothes, played 
with my dolls and followed me around from morning to night. She 
was dazed by her new comforts and by the interesting activities of 
this big lively family; and I was happily dazed, for her adoration 
was a new thing to me; and as time passed a quick, childish, and 
deeply felt bond grew up between us. (Killers 35) 
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After three weeks with Janie, Smith recalls frantic and hushed conversations one 
day after “the colored orphanage” telephoned the house to substantiate Janie’s 
“real” identity. Smith remembers her father laughing at the dilemma when he was 
told of it that evening and his saying, “After all, now that you know it is pretty 
simple” (Killer 35-36). In “dreamlike stiffness” Smith recalls, she and her 
younger sister were hurriedly informed by their mother that Janie could keep her 
new dresses and toys but was to return to “Colored Town” the following day.  
When a confused Janie turned to Lillian for some reasonable explanation 
of what was going on, the young Smith found herself in an untenable position. 
With no resource but her mother’s meager and tacit explanation that “white and 
colored people do not live together,” Smith found herself unable to contend with 
the discrepancy between what she was experiencing and what she had been taught 
about people being equal and deserving respect. Young Smith felt compelled to 
side with her parents’ decision, woodenly rebuffing Janie’s embraces and her 
need for comforting. Yet Smith recalls knowing deep down that “something was 
wrong” and that her parents “whom [she] passionately admired had betrayed 
something which they held dear” (Killers 37). “I began to know,” Smith writes, 
“that people who talked of love and children did not mean it,” and that 
“something was wrong with a world that tells you that love is good and people are 
important and then forces you to deny love and to humiliate people” (Killers 39). 
Here we can clearly see Smith’s nascent recognition of a bipolar operating system 
that seemingly embraces opposing models of behavior. Smith’s devout refusal to 
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accept such an arrangement forms the foundation of her belief in an ethics of 
transformation and the human capacity to re-vision and reshape its own practices 
and beliefs.  
Tactical Forgetting and Strategic Remembering  
At least three additional and significant points relating to the operations of 
hierarchical politics of difference can be extrapolated from Smith’s account of 
this childhood memory. First, Smith explains that, formative as it was, she had 
forgotten this incident for thirty years. She remembered the incident when writing 
her 1944 novel Strange Fruit, the setting of which she based upon memories of 
her hometown. Smith’s memory lapse intimates the pain that all children learn to 
camouflage and bury in the process of acculturating to hierarchical systems, pain 
that is real and ubiquitous and that too frequently goes unnoticed and 
unquestioned. Secondly, Smith’s remembering, as part of a process of autonomy, 
intimates the importance of memory to rhetorical invention and social change, as 
a means of critical self and societal analysis that is roughly analogous to the 
consciousness raising (CR) of the 1960s. As a result of CR groups, Ruth 
Frankenberg explains, “the private, the daily, and the apparently trivial in 
women’s activities came to be understood as shared rather than individual 
experiences, and as socially and politically constructed” (7). Thus the personal 
became political. 
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No Child Left Behind 
Smith’s story illustrates a third important point: no subject position within 
a hierarchical system is immune to harm. Smith writes that “the warped, distorted 
frame we have put around every Negro child from birth is around every white 
child also. Each is on a different side of the frame but each is pinioned there. 
What “cruelly shapes and cripples the personality of one” shapes and cripples the 
other. Ultimately, Smith philosophizes, despite growth and development, the 
acquisition of new knowledge, and the examination of old memories, no one 
within such a system will ever know what it is like to “grow straight again any 
more than can a tree, put in a steel-like twisting frame when young, grow tall and 
straight when the frame is torn away at maturity” (Killers 39). Smith’s acutely 
perceptive insight that we cannot know what it would be like to be socialized 
within non-hierarchical systems is a topic that I will take up in the final chapter. 
Salient to the current discussion is the point that hierarchical systems are 
destructive and damaging to everyone subject to them, not merely to those who 
are in subordinate subject positions, but to those in ordinate positions as well. In 
other words, the fight is not against oppression, per se, but against a Manichean 
system that enables its subjects to feel superior (or inferior) to others. 
In “Race, Empire, and Humanism in the Work of Lillian Smith,” Garcia 
attributes Smith’s understanding of the harm done to all subject positions to her 
three-year stay in China where she was influenced by Mahatma Gandhi and other 
anticolonial writers. According to Garcia, “The Gandhian supposition that racist 
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ideologies victimized everyone within a given social order was everywhere 
apparent in Smith’s writing on the American South” (60). Clearly an advocate of 
the principles of noncooperation and non-moderation delineated by Gandhi 
(Smith “The Right Way” 72) and admittedly influenced by Gandhi (Gladney How 
203), Smith does not directly credit Gandhi for her coming to understand that all 
subject positions are victimized within a hierarchical system. An equally plausible 
explanation is that her understanding emerged from self-reflection upon her own 
experience in childhood and, later, in China.  
Smith’s father lost the turpentine mills and the family fortune in 1915 
when Lillian was 17 and moved the family to their summer property on Old 
Screamer Mountain in Clayton, Georgia where, in 1920, he founded Georgia’s 
first private girls’ camp. Working there during the summers, Smith put herself 
through school, spending four years studying to be a concert pianist at the 
Peabody Conservatory in Baltimore (Gladney How 19). Smith then took a three-
year position (1923-1925) as director of music in a missionary school in China 
where her exposure to British imperialism prompted her to reflect upon and 
associate British and American imperialism with the Jim Crow South. She 
realized that all three were authoritarian and unjust regimes founded upon white 
supremacy and arrogance. One of “ten or twelve Westerners—American and 
English—in a city of 250,000 located in a remote area of eastern China” where 
there were “no roads or trains; all travel was by canals” (Gladney How 19), Smith 
was essentially conscientisized in the Paolo Freireian sense. She witnessed cruel 
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and senseless beatings of Coolies, extreme and brutal poverty, and the racist, 
hypocritical behaviors of the Christian missionaries who, she observed, would 
pray with the Chinese but not “play tennis or swim with them” (Loveland 40). 
Segregation: Ideological, Embodied, and Pervasive  
At the request of her father, Smith returned in 1925 to the States to run 
Laurel Falls camp where she began to develop her thoughts about racial practices. 
Segregation, to Smith, was a defining metaphor for all that plagued humankind. 
“Race,” she writes, is only one of society’s problems: “[I]t is very difficult to 
separate it from other aspects of culture and personality” (How 84). Eventually, 
Smith came to theorize segregation as “symbol and symptom” (Killers 21) of all 
that is wrong with human beings who are conditioned within a dehumanizing 
system that maps mental, physical and emotional barriers into discourse and onto 
individual bodies. Segregation was as much an international problem as a regional 
or national problem to Smith, who wrote in 1962 that segregation is “far more 
than a social or economic or political problem” (qtd. in O’Dell 83). “Segregation 
in any of its forms, whether it be racial segregation, or banning of books and 
ideas, or political isolationism, or iron curtains, or concentration camps,” Smith 
writes, reflects “ancient patterns of withdrawal,” “patterns of death and 
destruction” (“Ten Years” 672). Segregation as a controlling metaphor describes 
the underlying conditioning that in later chapters I refer to as hierarchical 
“dispositioning” (“disposition” is the Latinate term for “arrangement,” the second 
rhetorical cannon), which enables people to feel superior to and exclude others. 
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This ability to conceptually segregate enables Othering, Smith shows us, and thus 
produces the conditions for exclusion. Systems of segregation, Smith contends, 
produce strange fruit. All of us are strange, for no one is immune.  
Smith used the term “strange fruit” before Abel Meeropol (under the 
penname Lewis Allan) wrote the lyrics to the song “Strange Fruit,” which Billie 
Holliday famously sang and recorded. Unlike Meeropol’s use of the term to 
signify victims of lynching, Smith used the term to describe those who, as a result 
of their ideological identification with privilege (e.g., white supremacists) 
perpetuated and profited from systems of privilege. In this sense, African 
Americans and other people of color who were subject to brutality and violence 
were not strange. On the contrary, the violence makers were the strange fruit, not 
their victims. White people were thus strange “fruit”, that is, the ideological 
productions of white supremacy and other “strange” privilege systems, such as 
gender and class (i.e., systems underwritten by hierarchical politics of difference). 
Although Smith allowed the publishers of her novel Strange Fruit to give Allan 
credit for the title on the copyright page, Smith regretted her decision, suggesting 
that linking the novel to the song “distorted the theme of the book” (Loveland 67). 
Association with the song emphasizes lynching and the oppression of African 
Americans during Jim Crow, rather than telling, as Smith intended, “the story of 
mankind in its struggle to find a good life” (How 73). Smith explains, “Maybe no 
one but me sees all this in the book; but all the time I wrote it I felt that I was 
writing a kind of world fable” (How 73). Smith’s ascriptions of her own work as 
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representing a “world fable” and “the story of mankind” support my contention in 
this chapter that Smith was indeed tackling the issue of hierarchical politics. 
Maintaining Control of Power: Divide and Conquer 
Smith first uses the term “strange fruit” in her parable “Two Men and a 
Bargain,” published in 1943 in South Today and republished in Killers of the 
Dream. The parable refers to an exploitative bargain struck between Mr. Rich 
White and Mr. Poor White, in which the Mr. Rich White man is permitted to 
continue exploiting Mr. Poor White in exchange for the gift of white supremacy 
and the ability for both misters to exploit African Americans. Compensated for 
his poverty, misery, and lack of educational access with the comforts provided by 
feelings of superiority; legal protection and the impunity to lynch, rape, and inflict 
rage upon non-whites; and the promise of uncontested labor monopolies for low 
wage labor, Mr. Poor White agrees to not rise up against Mr. Rich White: 
      Anything you want to do to show folks you’re boss you’re 
free to do it. You can run the schools and the churches any way 
you want to. You can make the customs and set the manners and 
write the laws (long as you don’t touch my business). You can 
throw books out of libraries if you don’t like what’s in them and 
you can decide pretty much what kind of learning, if any, you want 
southern children to have. If science scares you and you don’t like 
the notion of messing around with it, remember you don’t have to, 
this is God’s country and a free one. Anyway, it’ll tell you things 
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you can’t believe and still believe what you believe now so it’s 
better maybe not to take much stock in it. 
      If you ever get restless when you don’t have a job or your 
roof leaks, or the children look puny and shoulder blades stick out 
more than natural, all you need do is remember you’re a sight 
better than the black man. And remember this too: There’s nothing 
so good for folks as to go to church on Sundays… 
     But if you don’t have much to do, and begin to get worried-
up inside and mad with folks, and you think it’ll make you feel a 
little better to lynch a nigger occasionally, that’s OK by me too; 
and I’ll fit it with the sheriff and the judge and the court and our 
newspapers so you won’t have any trouble afterwards; but don’t 
expect me to come to the lynching, for I won’t be there… 
      And I promise you: Long as you keep the nigger out of 
your unions, we’ll keep him out of our mills. We’ll give you the 
pick of what jobs there are, and if things get too tight you can take 
over his jobs also, for any job’s better than no job at all. Now that’s 
a bargain. (177) 
Alluding to caste and class, this chilling parable refers to systems of social 
stratification and the ways that privilege operates to maintain that stratification. 
Well ahead of critiques of neoliberal corporate business practices (Klein, 
Mohanty) and in understanding that social, economic, and political stratification 
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that excludes some but not others prohibits participatory democracy and free 
access to public spheres of deliberation (Fraser, Young), Smith indicts class as 
much as gender and race in the deliberate maintenance of social inequality.  
Throughout her writing, Smith repeatedly brings up ways in which power 
elites (whom she refers to as “demagogues) mobilize ideology to maintain their 
positions of privilege, thereby raising for contemporary readers the specter of 
“The American Dream” and the globally disseminated spurious capitalistic notion 
of endless growth. Mr. Rich White’s comment that “any job is better than no job” 
rides the split discursive coattails of religion and business, drawing upon the 
discourses of the Puritan work ethic and pride in oneself to occlude the real source 
of individuals’ problems and misery—the hierarchical thinking that enables and 
justifies social inequality. Via Mr. Rich’s seeming support of morality in his 
advocacy of the church, Smith  also implicates religion as a possible source of 
complacency that contributes to the capacity for denial of critical social issues 
(e.g., the deprivations and problems of everyday life). She accuses those in power 
of consciously deploying religion to maintain the status quo, writing here and 
elsewhere that elites “profitably exploit” the “lush meadows of fear and hate and 
ignorance” that are produced and reproduced within systems that value exclusion 
(“Ten Years” 671). Smith importantly addresses an issue that largely presents 
itself alternately as taboo or naturalized (thereby remaining an elephant in the 
room): power elites’ investment in de-contextualized economics (e.g., free-market 
capitalism) that do not place the needs and well-being of every individual on the 
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planet in the center of economic theory.  
Ascension to the top strata, Smith notes in the chapter following the 
parable of the bargain, operates as an ideal. Writing that “for the few the bargain 
paid off in big profits and always one hoped to be one of the few” (Killers 191), 
Smith alludes to the ways in which privilege operates both as an ideal and as 
rhetorical device. Although “one hoped to be one of the few” might strike 
contemporary readers as simplistic and hyperbolic, this claim partially describes 
what I am theorizing as the rhetorical operations of privilege underlying 
hierarchical systems. Privilege, I argue, operates rhetorically and in an analogous 
manner to gender in that the privilege embedded in normative judgment is 
ideologically internalized by all subject positions. Of course, not all individuals 
hope to be one of the few. As we know, rhetorical operations (like gender) shape 
individuals’ perceptual horizons (Alcoff) but do not act as overdetermining 
agents, or else, for example, all women would perform femininity in the same 
way at all times. Moreover, privilege does not necessarily operate on the 
conscious level, and most often operates at the level of the habitual and embodied, 
but the desire for privilege often surfaces to the level of articulation. 
In the parable of the bargain Smith assigns the desire to be better than 
(i.e., the desire for privilege) as that which underlies hierarchal thinking. Without 
directly naming the agent cause for the bargain, Smith nevertheless implicates 
feelings of superiority and entitlement: 
“Yes,” said Mr. Poor White, “I still want to be better than a 
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nigger.” 
“See?” Something said. 
“Yes, but why are folks against us! Everybody’s against us…The 
whole world! Even my own children,” said Mr. Rich White. 
“The southern politician’s for you,” Something said. “And a lot of 
Yankee Republicans. And there are people in Europe for you. 
Plenty of folks are still for you. I’m for you—I’m always for the 
guy who wants to be first; who rides the front seat, always the 
front seat, and won’t let others ride with him.” 
“Who are you?” 
“You know me. Every man knows me until death stops the 
knowledge. But some won’t make the bargain…Who am I? 
Listen, I’ll tell you: I’m that which splits a mind from its reason, 
that splits a people from humanity. I’m the seed of hate and fear 
and greed. You are its strange fruit which I feed on…” 
But Mr. Rich White and Mr. Poor White did not understand the 
words. 
“None but the weak,” said a voice, “crave to be better than. Strong 
men are satisfied with their own strength. There is another way to 
make bargains…” 
“Must be a Communist talking,” said Mr. Rich White, “or 
somebody un-American.” (190) 
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While the parable of the bargain certainly encapsulates the ideology of white 
superiority, Smith here, as I have been arguing, is describing a larger system of 
privilege undergirded by “being better than.” Being better than defies reason, 
Smith notes, splitting people from their humanity. Hierarchical systems, then, 
epistemically produce hate, fear, and greed, upon which normative judgment 
“feeds,” creating subjects who are “strange fruit”—that is, virtually everyone. 
Historicize and Change 
Even as Smith claims that some people “won’t” make the bargain, I’d 
argue that in the parable, Smith attempts to mobilize readers by appealing to their 
sense of intellectual superiority. Readers who understand the parable are 
prompted to disavow themselves from such bargains by “feeling better than” Mr. 
Rich White and Mr. Poor White who do not understand the parable. While Smith 
elsewhere contests the idea that people can “opt out” of their culture, much as no 
one is immune to gender socialization (even those who refuse and subvert 
gendered norms have likewise internalized those norms), she also believes in 
humans’ ability for developmental change. Thus, while indicting hierarchical 
systems and the power of demagogues to sway and control the public (“Must be a 
Communist talking”), she concurrently mobilizes her readers to socially-just 
action, writing elsewhere in Killers of the Dream that “words can arouse a 
conscience as well as baser passions, and that conscience in sane people is a 
determining factor in behavior” (200).  
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Staying true to this belief, in 1955, a year after Brown v. Board of Education, 
Smith welcomed the Supreme Court’s strategic decision to desegregate schools by 
publishing Now Is the Time, a handbook for racial integration. The text begins 
with a structural analysis—an historicizing of Jim Crow—and finishes with 
delineation of concrete practices, hundreds of them that serve as substitutes for 
engrained behaviors, for example, “If you live in the South, perhaps there is not 
too distant from your town a Negro college which you can visit. Take your 
children with you and a group of your friends can visit it” (Now 83). Serving as a 
guide to “transformative praxis”(Flower), Now Is the Time situates these new and 
“better” integrative practices against older practices of segregation citing, for 
instance, the history of disabled individuals in the United States, those with 
cerebral palsy, the hearing impaired, and the blind, among others. Smith reminds 
her readers that humans have barbarically dehumanized and segregated “in the 
name of this difference or that” (26).  
 A recurring strategy that Smith uses to nettle her readers’ consciences is 
to denaturalize hierarchal systems by historicizing them. Doing so reveals not 
only their constructed origins but also our capacity to subvert them. Being a 
constructed, historical subject, Smith understands, is a matter of fact. For 
example, when discussing the limited subject positions available to Southern 
white women who must live up to the expectations of the cult of southern 
womanhood, which is, of course, reserved for white women only, Smith 
simultaneously forgives women and men their socialization. She writes that “[i]t 
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would be unfair to blame the mothers of two or three generations for a way of life 
that began destroying its children long before they were born, as it would be to 
blame the men. Both men and women were born into it and of it” (Killers 152). 
Even as she lifts personal blame, Smith points to mothers’ role in indoctrinating 
their children into Southern Tradition: “They did a thorough job of dishonoring 
curiosity, of making honesty seem a treasonable thing, of leaving in their children 
an unquenchable need to feel superior to others, to bow easily to authority, and to 
value power and money more dearly than human relations and love” (Killers 
153). Smith reminds her readers, however, that blaming individuals not only 
replicates the gendered norms inherited diachronically, but that such blame 
obviates the underlying causes which have been handed down for centuries before 
the cult of southern womanhood or the racialization of skin color had emerged in 
the public imagination: 
Sometimes we blame Mom too much for all that is wrong with her 
sons and daughters 
After all, we might well ask, who started the grim mess? Who 
long ago made Mom and her sex “inferior” and stripped her of her 
economic and political and sexual rights? Who, nearly two 
thousand years ago, said, “It is good for a man not to touch a 
woman…But if they cannot contain, let them marry: for it is better 
to marry than to burn”? Certainly that old misogynist St. Paul was 
no female apostle. Man, born of woman, has found it a hard thing 
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to forgive her for giving him birth. The patriarchal protest against 
the ancient matriarch has borne strange fruit through the years 
(Killers 153) 
Here Smith provides an historical and rhetorical view of gendered culture that, 
even as it assigns the church a dominant role in the replication of gendered 
hierarchy, particularly the inferiority of the female sex, suggests that humans can 
abolish hatred- and fear-based legacies and shake such historical monkeys from 
their backs. “Strangeness” is learned, passed on through centuries, and Smith 
alludes to my argument—that the heart of strangeness is perceptual, constituted 
by the historically constructed and socially replicated notions of superiority that 
discursively permeate and influence human beliefs, behaviors, and dreams. 
 Deregulation: The Personal Is Political 
Unlike John Inscoe who argues that “Smith's interest in Jim Crow and its 
effects were more psychological than political,” I consider Smith’s use of the 
psychological as highly political9 and her art as a mechanism of social activism. 
In both her fiction and non-fiction, she acts as a political philosopher searching to 
understand and explain the pervasive cultural disease of the twentieth century 
whose poverty, fear, greed, racism, hate, and war is represented by the metaphor 
of segregation. Considering social criticism the “responsibility of writers to their 
culture and its problems,” Smith invited Richard Wright to work with her on 
“suggestions for other writers that might encourage them to do more creative 
thinking and writing about our cultural problems, and yet leave them free of any 
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ideological ties,” explaining that she is “not in the least interested in political 
movements or in being any kind of reformer or political leader” (How 84-5). 
Although Smith did participate in various organizations, for example, sitting on 
the board of directors of the Southern Conference for Human Welfare, and did 
wholeheartedly support and encourage political activism, for example, the non-
violent resistance and protest of SNCC and the Montgomery Bus Boycott, she 
was wary of any narrow political ideology. Her talent, as Smith explains it, “is 
that of clarifying issues” (How 62). 
One of the issues that Smith clarifies and that I take up in chapter five of 
this dissertation points to the importance of childhood socialization to societal 
development because external controls will never ensure ethical behavior. Smith 
reminds us “It is a very important thing for us to remember, today, that no 
government can make men good” (“Vital” 670). To harbor the thought that man is 
“an economic or political unit,” is an error of judgment: “To believe that he is, by 
ignoring personality, we over-simplify a complex, subtle, tragically profound 
problem” (How 86). Smith, here, demonstrates the sophistication of her political 
thought by attending to the complex network produced in the nexus of the 
personal and political. According to Darlene O’Dell, Smith borrows from German 
gestalt therapy the idea that “structure or organism could not be analyzed by the 
sum of its parts” and must be understood instead “as a whole” (12). 
Philosophically derivative in this sense, as all scholarship is ultimately derivative, 
Smith enumerates the conditions necessary for the production of “healthy fruit,” 
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what she refers to as “the two most fundamental rights of mankind: the right to 
grow and the right to be different” (“Vital” 672). By addressing conditions 
fundamental to bringing about social equality, Smith perceptively disregards 
distributive models of justice, which often overlook and obscure “social structures 
and relations beyond distribution” that contribute to oppression and domination 
(Young 9). Smith’s disavowal of distributive models of justice can be seen in her 
remark that the “South’s major problems [cannot] be solved by trying to put a loaf 
of bread, a book, and a ballot in every one’s hand,” a perspective echoed in 
political philosopher Iris Marion Young’s assertion that “power is a relation rather 
than a thing” (31). Young also critiques distributive models that consider issues of 
“nonmaterial goods [such as] power, opportunity, or self-respect,” arguing that 
“when metaphorically extended to nonmaterial social goods, the concept of 
distribution represents them as though they were static things, instead of a 
function of social relations and processes” (16). 
 In, at the very least, implicit acknowledgement of the dynamic processes 
underlying the cultivation of cultural capital, including opportunity and self-
respect, Smith used her summer camp as an incubator for her philosophy, working 
to construct the very conditions—the right to grow and be different—that she 
advocates in her writings. When she begrudgingly took over the running of the 
camp from her father, Smith observed what Gladney describes as “the highly 
competitive nature of the sports program and the rather authoritarian atmosphere” 
(“A Chain” 50). Adhering to her philosophy that to change anything, something 
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better needs to be substituted for whatever is being taken away, Smith began by 
studying other camps and read literature about “child development and 
psychological theory” (Gladney “A Chain” 51). After reading about the benefits 
of general camp programs, Smith noted discrepancies between the literature and 
campers’ experiences. Writing that “one child looking pale and worn out after a 
horseback ride…” and another “was too tired to eat lunch,” Smith decided that the 
“business of lumping children and pushing them through a set program as if they 
were inanimate objects was going to end in my camp” (Gladney “A Chain” 51).  
Developing an individualized approach, Smith limited enrollment to 65 
campers (aged six to sixteen), despite a long waiting list, and increased the ratio 
of campers to counselors to nearly 2:1 (Gladney “A Chain” 51). Furthermore, 
Smith incorporated curricula of performing arts (theatre, dance, and music) in 
addition to sports. Most importantly, Smith cultivated a sense of quality education 
among the girls by taking what each of them did seriously. For example, one 
camper writes, “We worked with silver and good stones in crafts” and “painted in 
oils” and “acted in plays that were worth performing,” led by college educated 
counselors who often came from expert programs in the arts (Gladney “A Chain” 
51). Each camper’s program, Gladney explains, was individualized to the needs of 
the camper, and “no two days were exactly alike for anyone” since each girl’s 
schedule was “made each night for the following day”: “Once a week, each girl 
met with the director and assistant director to discuss her interests and goals for  
 
 
56
the following week,” and carried out her program, learning from any mistakes that 
may have been made in the planning (51).  
What I find most intriguing about this approach are the perceptual 
changes that quickly emerged among the girls’ outlooks toward each other. In a 
letter to camp parents, Smith writes, “We do not find it necessary to use artificial 
awards or any competitive methods” giving instead “natural recognition.” “For in 
treating each girl as an individual we cannot let her achievements go unnoticed” 
and the girls treat one another similarly, noticing each other’s accomplishments. 
Every girl, Smith observes, improves in several areas, and the consequences of 
this focus on personal achievement ironically turned out to be a reduction in 
competition. Several times a summer, Smith also met with girls to discuss frankly 
with them subjects that traditionally were taboo, such as the body, sex, war, racial 
divides, class snobbery and so on. As Gladney explains, even after Smith closed 
the camp to focus on her writing career, Smith continued “her commitment to the 
growth of the individual human being as a primary means of effecting social 
change” (53).  
Smith’s commitment to this philosophy is as evident in her interactions 
with campers as it is in her writings. As Snelling says of Smith, “Life and letters 
were not two separate spheres: her sojourn in both was an unfinished symphony 
of search and revelation, in which the reader (yesterday, today, tomorrow) has a 
vital performing role” (1). Smith understood the role of the reader in the 
construction of any text, writing how “no one—no writer, no painter, no sculptor, 
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no musician ever can perfect his dream or even carry it out or create it in full until 
there is a listener or looker to collaborate with him” (“The Old Days” 679). On 
the reception of Strange Fruit, Smith writes that even as it sold millions of copies, 
“maybe, just maybe, not more than fifty thousand of its readers really collaborated 
with me as listeners on that book” because for most readers, their expectations to 
read something obscene and scandalous usurped their ability to listen to the 
book’s message (“The Old Days” 679-80).  
Conclusion 
Smith’s political analyses continue to be relevant to difference 
scholarship, particularly in their attention to conditions that nominally exist in 
certain contexts but in no large-scale fashion: the right to grow and the right to be 
different. Together, both conditions provide a generative lens of inquiry for future 
scholarship. The implications of Smith’s understanding of the ways that 
“segregation expressed a geography that mapped power and hierarchy through 
bodies” (Boris 2) similarly direct us to take the matter of childhood socialization 
and how to avoid mapping power and hierarchy onto bodies much more seriously 
across the humanities.  
Smith’s work does not, however, explain the hegemonic staying power of 
hierarchically-based systems, a topic taken up in chapters 4 and 5, and many of 
her later speeches often convey a somewhat modern and linear narrative of 
democratic progress in the United States:  
We have two big jobs ahead of us, now that profound changes are 
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taking place in our South, now that segregation is crumbling. The 
first job is to hasten the crumbling, for time is important. Walls are 
not only falling in the South, they are falling everywhere, and 
American democracy can win the imagination of the world only by 
showing the world that within the strongest democracy on earth all 
of its citizens have been accepted and given their rights. (“Ten 
Years” 672)    
Given that this excerpt is taken from a commencement speech, it may be that 
Smith here is strategically mobilizing her audience to claim and act upon their 
democratic ideals. Although she does not theorize how hierarchical thinking 
operates hegemonically, Smith does allude to many of the forces that keep 
hierarchical thinking entrenched, including apathy, fear and greed. 
Smith deserves recognition for taking up the problematic of difference 
before the postmodern critique, postcolonial studies, and feminist scholarship 
brought it to the forefront of humanities scholarship (Crenshaw, Derrida, Harding, 
Said). Smith certainly understood that the difficulty in accommodating difference 
underlies all of humanity’s ills, and she thus arrives, if indirectly, at a major 
premise of this dissertation: Because difference is fundamental to the human 
condition, it will never go away, so how we learn to perceive difference can and 
must change since the hierarchizing of difference that characterizes our 
contemporary global socio-historical time period undermines the very basis of 
democratic engagement. Smith recognized the need to change the way difference 
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is perceived and to embrace it—rather than the illusion of equality—as early as 
1962:  
     So—I threw equal out of my vocabulary. I don’t think it 
matters two cents who is equal to whom. No individual is equal to 
another individual. We cannot be. It is not in our nature to be the 
same… 
     Thinking of these matters and the confusion so many feel, I 
have become convinced that our right to be different is, in a deep 
sense, the most precious right we human beings have, and the one 
most likely, if we hold to it, to ensure the human race a future. We 
need to treasure human differences where they are important (I 
can’t see that skin color is more important than eye color); we 
need to cherish the unique achievements of various groups, to 
protect the unique talents of individuals, to value the various 
beliefs and ideas and abilities that seem to grow more easily in 
one culture than in another. We may need them all for our 
survival—certainly we shall need some of them one of these days, 
and we don’t know which we shall need the most or where they 
come to birth. (“Words” 151-4) 
Here Smith insightfully acknowledges the knowledge constructed by groups, and 
reminds us that group-specific knowledge may at anytime reveal itself as much 
needed (i.e., expert), something we may all need one day for our survival.  
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Moreover, by admonishing us to value group-specific knowledge 
(“various beliefs and ideas and abilities that seem to grow more easily in one 
culture than another”), Smith indirectly attacks an assimilatory model that has 
been advanced by liberal humanism. “Liberal humanism,” Young explains, “treats 
each person as an individual, ignoring differences of race, sex, religion, and 
ethnicity” (166). Smith does not ignore such differences, and she spurned the term 
“integration” for its assumption of an assimilationist ideal, preferring instead to 
characterize herself as anti-segregation. Young’s solution to the assimilationist 
ideal is a “politics that asserts the positivity of group difference.” She writes, “By 
puncturing the universalist claim to unity that expels some groups and turns them 
into the Other, the assertion of positive group specificity introduces the possibility 
of understanding the relation between groups as merely difference, instead of 
exclusion, opposition, or dominance” (166).  
Although Smith would probably not have explicitly disagreed with 
Young’s statement, Smith’s focus is not the reclamation of group pride as an 
emancipatory mechanism that counters group oppression. Rather, as the following 
suggests, Smith bypasses the subject of identity politics altogether: 
Then there are those who think of me as an odd, funny “little rich 
southern woman” who goes out parading around and defending 
Negroes, and tearing down the wall of segregation. There is a tiny 
bit of truth in this stereotype, of course; I am not rich and have 
never been, having been “on my own” without a penny from 
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seventeen on. But I have taken a stand against segregation in all 
my writings, one way or the other, but always in a complex stand, 
a philosophic position that many Negroes do not understand. I am 
not popular with Negroes because I have never been “for” 
Negroes: I am for quality people, regardless of color; I am for 
getting rid of barriers that stunt and dwarf human growth…I am 
deeply concerned about the human race but am for the person, the 
human being; his quality is what I am concerned about; and I don’t 
think organizations can do what must be done by the individual 
himself. (How 236) 
At face value and read out of context, Smith’s focus on the individual could strike 
readers as modernist, but as I hope to have shown in this chapter, Smith’s 
individualism refutes a liberal autonomous conception of the individual and 
discredits the mythic model of a universal subject. While acknowledging the 
group-specific knowledge inherent in any subject position, Smith simultaneously 
avoids advocacy of any specific group because it is not her intent to resolve 
problems that result from difference after the fact. Rather, as I have striven to 
show, Smith takes up the topic of hierarchical politics of difference with the intent 
of exposing it as a dehumanizing cancer blighting human sociality and as the 
culprit that creates identity politics.  
In the next chapter, we will take a closer look at precisely how 
hierarchical politics operates. We will see that, as a metastasized cancer pervading 
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sociality, hierarchical politics structures the macro yet relies upon the micro for its 
continuation and successful performance. In other words, collective hierarchical 
structures rely upon the perceptual training of individuals, each of whom learns to 
think hierarchically prior to developing the capacity to think reflectively.  
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CHAPTER 3 
PERCEPTION AND PRIVILEGE: HIERARCHICAL POLITICS OF 
DIFFERENCE AS WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 
Smith hoped to cut away the cultural logic that hierarchized men and women, 
heterosexuals and homosexuals, whites and blacks, to pressure notions of gender 
and racial authority, to see how the discourse of racism damaged both races by 
binding them together in destructive rhetorical manacles –McKay Jenkins  
 
We need a critique of Western assumptions about knowing the colonized Other, 
in order to uncover their orientalist self-aggrandizing structure, but without 
relying on an unproblematic “authentic” alternative from the colonized, whose 
interpretive horizon is similarly historically dynamic and is undoubtedly distorted 
by colonialism as well —Linda Martín Alcoff 
 
Perception is not a science of the world, it is not even an act, a deliberate taking 
up of a position; it is the background from which all acts stand out, and it is 
presupposed by them — Maurice Merleau-Ponty (qtd. in Visible Identities 187) 
 
As we saw in the last chapter, Lillian Smith was a political philosopher 
and rhetorical strategist who spent most of her adult life attempting to convince 
others that the strife-ridden and socially-inequitable world that she and each of us 
inherits is the manifestation of an underlying socially-constructed and 
constructive “cancer” that could be eradicated if human beings collectively 
embraced their autopoietic nature. Smith was concerned with ferreting out the 
underlying causes of what she called a “dehumanized world” and the conditions 
that would allow a segregated society such as the Jim Crow South of her time. 
Because these causes and conditions are equally relevant to the stratified and 
hierarchized “Jim Crow” of our own time whose zeitgeist some call “a culture of 
death,” I use Smith’s theorizing of difference, introduced in chapter two, to frame  
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my study. Smith insightfully identifies the contextually-dependent inability of 
people to accommodate difference and to live in relations of mutual reciprocal 
respect as a principal underlying cause of societal strife, and she argues that this 
“inability” reflects a ubiquitous and deeply learned praxis of dehumanizing 
others. In short, without access to a postmodern lexicon, Smith advances a 
complex theory of hierarchical politics of difference10 in which humans are 
trained to internalize norms of assessing themselves and others categorically, a 
process that essentializes humans in order to determine their worth. Humans learn 
and subsequently naturalize this assessment system during childhood when they 
are  socialized into hierarchical regimes (e.g., gender, race, class, ability). In this 
chapter, I draw upon Smith’s theorizing of this dehumanized and dehumanizing 
system, particularly the ways in which individuals are trained to disrespect 
themselves and others by deeming themselves and others either inferior or 
superior, in order to examine and extend Iris Marion Young’s discussion of 
hierarchical politics in Justice and the Politics of Difference. 
 A basic premise of hierarchical politics is that the world is violence-
centered. In other words, hierarchical politics direct us to theorize the ugliness of 
the human world, its violent underbelly. As we saw in the previous chapter, Smith 
was disturbed by the pervasive violence and exclusion (e.g., state-sponsored, 
social, economic, gendered and so on) she witnessed in both China and the Jim 
Crow South, and she began to theorize its roots. Despite her frequently expressed 
high regard for human creativity, imagination and potential for self-change, Smith 
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recognized that contemporary culture is essentially underwritten by violence, and 
her writing begins from this basic premise. If we are persuaded by the mass of 
evidence suggesting that her basic premise is true, how then are humans to 
eradicate the socially-constructed violence-centeredness of societal structures and 
culture? According to Smith, we must first root out and analyze the underlying 
causes of societal conflict to eradicate violence. In pursuit of this, Smith 
incorporates both non-ideal and intersectional theory decades before they were 
named. Many contemporary political theorists advocate these two feminist 
theories for effectively theorizing the nexus of interlaced conflict-centered 
“discriminatory” systems that largely constitute contemporary economic, 
political, and social systems. While non-ideal theory endorses “addressing the 
needs and problems of those who are most disadvantaged” by placing them at the 
center of analysis (Crenshaw 167), intersectionality rejects single-axis analyses in 
favor of  multiple-axis analyses that more fully capture the complex phenomena 
of lived experience.11  
Both theories proceed from the understanding that, while all theories 
reduce and frame the world, the more traditional analytical frames of ideal theory 
and single-axis analyses can actually distort and occlude what they purport to 
accurately describe. Political philosophers Charles Mills and Iris Marion Young 
demonstrate, for example, how narratives of democracy (i.e., social and legal 
equity) often work against the realization of social justice. Young relates how the 
rituals of holidays, such as Thanksgiving, the Fourth of July, Memorial Day, 
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Lincoln’s Birthday, and Martin Luther King Day, serve to reinscribe the dominant 
narrative of democracy in the popular imagination, and she describes these 
ritualized performances of holiday practice and the mythos they enact: “we tell 
each other” and “make our children perform” stories of a meritocratic playing 
field in which all people are treated as individuals whose “life options and 
rewards should be based solely upon their individual achievement” and in which 
everyone “should have the liberty to be and do anything they want” (157). Young 
retells these commonplaces of liberal humanism as a preface to her argument that 
“an ideal of justice that defines liberation as the transcendence of group 
difference” is an impossible ideal based upon specious ideas of assimilation and 
equality, neither of which is attainable because neither allows room for nor 
venerates group-specific difference.12  
Mills also critiques democratic narratives as points of invention, 
contending that as heuristics, they occlude the subjects who are purportedly the 
objects of social justice theory—those who are excluded, marginalized, and/or 
otherwise oppressed. Mills refers to the absence of women in the history of 
mainstream philosophy scholarship to illustrate his point: “If it were obvious that 
women were equal moral persons, meant to be fully included in the variable 
‘men,’ then why was it not obvious to virtually every male political philosopher 
and ethicist up to a few decades ago?” (166). Mills criticizes traditional 
scholarship for starting from “ideal theory,” which “tacitly represents the actual as 
a simple deviation from the ideal, not worth theorizing in its own right, or claims 
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that starting from the ideal is at least the best way of realizing it” (166). When the 
“actual’ is grossly over-simplified and represented as a mere “deviation from the 
ideal,” Mills explains, then “racism and sexism are framed as ‘anomalies’ to a 
political culture conceived of as—despite everything—basically egalitarian” 
(168).  
The rampant assumption of Americans that Americans live in a 
democracy, for example, illustrates how inquiry that begins with the ideal can 
distort the truth and deflect attention from where it is critically needed. As Anne 
McClintock explains, “[n]ationalism contains the very real risk of projecting the 
denial of difference onto a conveniently abstracted ‘collective will’” (123). How 
do we prevent this kind of myopia?  
Many feminist scholars advocate starting from the “nonideal,” from 
perspectives of the socially subordinated whose perspectives and experiences 
challenge dominant narratives that in their falsely attributed universality have 
become naturalized. For example, the myth that Americans live in a democracy in 
which the quotidian problems experienced by the majority of people are isolated 
issues unrelated to the otherwise sound structure of its “democratic” institutions 
not only belies the truth of the matter but also cultivates various affective 
climates, such as an air of indifference (an off-shoot of complacency and/or 
denial) or an atmosphere of hostility and defensiveness (in response to any 
critique of the collective national identity). I make this latter claim as a result of 
personal experience. During my youth, whenever I critiqued conditions in the 
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United States, despite my genuine desire to improve the way things were, 
members of my family, I came to understand, frequently perceived my comments 
as a threat to their own nationalistic identity, so I learned to brace myself in 
anticipation of the inevitable familial response: “If you don’t like it, move 
elsewhere, but don’t throw out the baby with the bathwater.”   
Smith certainly recognized the ways in which democratic narratives 
discursively operate to disguise the fact that, to varying degrees, most 
contemporary societies are not structured upon economic and social equality, but 
precisely the opposite. Smith describes this fundamental conflict in Killers of the 
Dream, the “dream” referring to democracy: 
From the day I was born, I began to learn my lessons…I learned it 
is possible to be a Christian and a white southerner simultaneously; 
to be a gentlewoman and an arrogant callous creature in the same 
moment; to pray at night and ride a Jim Crow car the next morning 
and to feel comfortable in doing both. I learned to believe in 
freedom, to glow when the word democracy was used, and to 
practice slavery from morning to night. (29) 
By situating individual human relations within larger systems of domination, 
repression, and oppression, Smith clearly begins her social analyses from the 
theoretical standpoint of the nonideal13 while masterfully conveying one of the 
many rhetorical byproducts that the naturalized ideals of democracy generate—
denial. Denial, for example, of rampant poverty in the United States, 
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unsustainable corporate economic and energy practices, structural racism, or any 
number of undemocratic practices flourishing today.  
Smith also notably forwards a radically nonideal view of contemporary 
democracies by observing that structures of subordination are not anomalous to 
allegedly democratic societal institutions but are, rather, foundational to them. 
Theorizing fifty years before critical race scholars, Smith clearly starts from the 
premise that racism, sexism, and other structures of subordination are not only at 
the root of societal problems, but that they in fact constitute the very ground upon 
which societal structures are predicated. From this perspective, the baby (the 
ideal) and the bathwater (the nonideal) cannot be neatly separated so as to 
conveniently blind us to the latter by exalting the former. Smith resolutely makes 
this point clear when writing to James Dombrowski during WWII to explain her 
resignation from the Board of Directors of the Southern Conference for Human 
Welfare: “I have never been able to follow the line that we must get rid of racial 
discrimination, for instance, or unemployment, for instance, in order to ‘win the 
war.’ I think we must get rid of these evils because they are cancers in human 
culture and bring on wars. A war cannot be ‘won’” (italics mine How 91).  
Borrowing a concept from Young in Justice and the Politics of Difference, 
I suggest that Smith alludes here to “hierarchical politics of difference” as that 
which underwrites a pervasive and global system of sickness that prevents social, 
legal, and political equity. This system is predicated upon various systems of 
violence that structure our most fundamental societal institutions, and these most 
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basic structures constitute a world that individuals are born into and learn, with 
varying degrees of “success” (defined variably) to live in. While this system 
precedes us, it is important to remember that it is, nonetheless, an artificial system 
that, although extremely complex, can be abolished. Hierarchical politics of 
difference represents both collective and subjective hierarchical structuring; both 
rely upon a learned perceptual system that, once internalized and naturalized, 
becomes nearly impossible to un-learn entirely. Nevertheless, it is this perceptual 
system that needs to be tackled, a perceptual system that inhibits the 
accommodation of difference while enabling people to feel justified in their 
abjection of and violence towards others. I think the reader will agree that such a 
system is antithetical to the realization of democratic ideals. Hierarchical politics, 
as I will argue in this chapter, represents the polar opposite of the accommodation 
and expectation of difference, which relies upon genuine mutual respect—a far 
cry from the popularized virtue of “tolerance.” Smith uses the term “segregation” 
to signify hierarchical politics and the learned perceptual system that underwrites 
it, which I refer to throughout this writing as “hierarchical thinking.” She writes, 
“the situation I lived in, and still live in [referring to the Jim Crow South], is one 
of great importance to the earth’s future, because segregation as I knew it and 
others in the South knew it is both symbol and symptom of the deep malaise 
which the human race is suffering from” (How 126). Smith conceives of 
segregation as a controlling metaphor underlying all political and social problems, 
writing in a letter to her Norton editor that “what to do about race is tied up with 
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what to do about EVERYTHING” (How 126). Later in the same letter, she writes 
of the “drug-like habit of White Supremacy” and her belief that “the whole 
problem of the peasant is a world-wide one stretching from Tobacco Road to the 
rice fields of China and the millet fields of India,” a problem not grounded purely 
in economics but, rather, a problem “centered at the core of our culture” (How 
126).  
While Smith respected the need for people to pursue legal and economic 
“rights,” she perceived them as necessary but insufficient components of 
progressive social change. In addition to providing people with basic material 
needs and legal equity, real change, she argues, requires that individuals learn 
how to relate to and truly respect each other, not in spite of, but because of their 
differences. “The South’s major problems,” Smith explicates, cannot be solved 
“by trying to put a loaf of bread, a book, and a ballot in every one’s hand,” for 
“man is not [merely] an economic or political unit” (How 86). To Smith, who 
astutely takes an intersectional perspective of the human condition, human 
problems should not be examined in isolation: “Racial segregation, political and 
economic isolationism cannot be considered apart from man’s whole personality, 
his culture, his needs” (How 86).  
Smith also understood that in order to take all of a person’s needs under 
consideration it is absolutely necessary that we examine the conditions that 
children are given to develop. Overlooking the conditions in which children grow 
(or don’t grow), Smith asserts, is a tragic flaw because children “cannot grow and 
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mature without self-esteem, without feelings of security, without faith in his 
world’s willingness to make room for him to live as a human being” (How 87). 
“Under the segregation pattern,” neither black children nor white children grow 
up with their needs met (How 87). White children suffer as well, Smith claims, for 
they cannot “grow freely and creatively” but, rather, are crippled with “arrogance 
and hardness of heart, and blindness to human need” (How 87). All subject 
positions within such a system, Smith observes with profound wisdom, become 
“dehumanized.”  
In recognition that “segregation is an ancient, psychological mechanism 
used by men the world over” (How 86), Smith does not limit her critique of 
societal conditions to the south or to racial segregation. Segregation, Smith 
understood, is epistemic, “a mechanism so destructive that it, in itself, has become 
a menace to the health of our culture and our individual souls,” a “cultural 
schizophrenia,” similar, Smith says, “to the schizophrenia of individual 
personality” (How 86). We must not “turn away and refuse to look at,” Smith 
implores, the harm enacted by this mechanism.  
I respond in this chapter to Smith’s urgent cry to address this problem that 
is “centered at the core of culture” (How 126), a problem which, I argue, is more 
accurately summed up by the term “hierarchical politics of difference.” 
Hierarchical politics relies upon a deeply naturalized rhetorical and perceptual 
system—the assessment of ourselves and others based upon a “logic of identity” 
(Young 169) that replicates and perpetuates structures of domination and 
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inequality (e.g., gender, race, class, ability) that have become so entrenched as to 
have become naturalized. Hierarchical politics of difference merges the theorizing 
of subjectivity and larger social structures of inequality by making difference an 
analytic frame central to both. Difference in Western14 epistemology is generally 
perceived as deviation from a norm, Young writes, “in which one group occupies 
the position of a norm, against which all others are measured” (169), an act that 
always valorizes and universalizes the norm by defining as “different” (i.e., 
deviant) whatever sits outside the norm. Young elaborates, “the marking of 
difference always implies a good/bad opposition; it is always a devaluation, the 
naming of an inferiority in relation to a superior standard of humanity” (170). She 
observes that perceiving difference “as exclusion and opposition” actually “denies 
difference” by setting the norm as an assimilatory ideal, an act that invalidates the 
worth of that difference. Young suggests that if we are to reconfigure our society 
to be more socially-just, the definition of difference itself must first be 
reconfigured, and she effectively argues “for a politics that recognizes rather than 
represses difference” (10)—an egalitarian politics of difference.  
How do we accomplish this task of reconfiguring difference? Young 
alludes to the need for an ideological shift, but precisely what does an ideological 
shift entail? Such an epistemic turnabout, I argue, requires a perceptual shift that 
addresses the ways in which we are conditioned and pre-disposed to interact with 
each other.  
While Young elucidates the ideological workings of hierarchical politics 
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of difference, she does not examine the interpersonal underpinnings of 
hierarchical politics, which are ideologically based upon disrespect and 
affectively based upon shame and fear. These interpersonal and intrapersonal 
responses are learned during childhood and become naturalized, structured into 
our ordinary responses to and assessments of ourselves and others. Although these 
responses and assessments, depending upon context and individual, sometimes 
surface to the level of conscious attention, most of the time, they do not. This 
deeply internalized perceptual system that I refer to as hierarchical thinking 
structures our intersubjective relationships and orientations. To capture this 
framing of our intersubjectivity, I have coined the term “hierarchical 
dispositioning.”15  
Because hierarchical dispositioning has not garnered the attention it needs 
if it is to be disarticulated, this chapter draws upon scholarship about violence 
(causes and types) and scholarship from moral psychology about interpersonal 
respect to explicate how hierarchical thinking operates as a learned collective 
episteme by which all of us are oppressed. When I use the terms “oppression” and 
“domination” in this chapter, I use them in the sense of Young’s definitions: 
Oppression is “the institutional constraint on self-development” and domination is 
“the institutional constraint on self-determination” (37).16 Scholarship in moral 
psychology (Gilligan, Tangney and Dearing, Young) indicates that hierarchical 
thinking trains individuals to devalue themselves and others—a form of 
dehumanizing of self and other. Since the dehumanizing practices that 
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hierarchical thinking teaches us certainly constrain the subject formation of 
individuals and their subsequent self-development, in my opinion, all who are 
subject to such training are oppressed. I attribute my position on this collective 
oppression to Smith’s influence even though a less well-defined but essentially 
similar position had been fixed in my worldview for many years. This view of 
collective oppression is one of the critical points missing in Young’s discussion of 
hierarchical politics. Collective oppression, however, needs to be fully 
acknowledged if we are to understand hierarchical politics of difference as a 
fundamental obstacle to real egalitarianism and the establishment of flexible 
social, political, and economic structures that conduce to a much better quality of 
life for everyone, not just the few. The affective and ideological mechanisms that 
underwrite hierarchical thinking are learned (and thus preventable), rendering 
hierarchical thinking a cultural and individual dispositioning that perpetuates 
unjust social conditions on both the individual and collective level.  
Project Limitations and Justification 
Before continuing, I feel compelled to add that this is a “bottom-up” 
analysis of hierarchical politics, an examination of the ways individuals have 
learned to function to a large extent by replicating the larger systems in which 
they live. Top-down analyses are of course equally crucial to bringing about 
positive social change, but I do not focus on them, despite their necessity, because 
the rhetorical study of hierarchical regimes (e.g., gendered/raced regimes, 
decontextualized “free-market” economics and corporate militarism17) have 
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received much more attention (much-needed attention) in the field of rhetoric and 
composition than has hierarchical politics of difference. As we saw in the last 
chapter in the parable “Two Men and a Bargain” in which the rich white man 
exploits the poor white man by economically and ideologically pitting him against 
the black man (“divide and conquer”), Smith was also quite vocal about the 
deceptive and exploitative rhetorical techniques deployed by groups motivated 
solely by self-interest, whom she calls “demagogues.” The following excerpt is 
but one of many of Smith’s analyses of the rhetorical techniques such 
demagogues employed and continue to employ:  
 Totalitarianism is an old thing to us down home. We know 
what it feels like. The unquestioned authority of White Supremacy, 
the tight political set-up of one party, nourished on poverty and 
ignorance, solidified the South into a totalitarian regime under 
which we were living when communism was still Russian cellar 
talk and Hitler had not even been born. 
 To keep us that way, our political demagogues used and still 
use the same tricks Stalin uses today: an external enemy to hate 
(the damyankee), and internal enemy to fear (the Negro), an iron 
curtain which was first forged out of the reluctance of the 
democratic few to take an open stand against such powerful forces. 
During those bitter decades  liberalism was driven completely 
underground. Caution was a necessity, temporizing was virtue. 
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This was the only way men could work for human rights under a 
system that exacted such heavy penalties from its ‘deviationists’ as 
did Southern tradition.  
Much of Smith’s analysis resonates today. In the United States, for example, 
internal scapegoats (e.g., “illegal aliens,” “drug-pushers”) and external enemies 
(e.g., “terrorists,” “socialists”) are used to strictly maintain dichotomous two-
party lines and to justify “external” (i.e., taxpayer) funding of corporate 
militarism. Demagoguery constitutes a topic that forms an important narrative 
strand in Smith’s corpus. Despite this much-needed study of various forms of 
intentional deception by those in power (“power” here is not used in a rhetorical 
sense)18 Smith, as do I, considers hierarchical politics of difference a fundamental 
and, consequently, critical issue in dire need of attention. Even though 
hierarchical thinking, as a learned perceptual and rhetorical system, for example, 
enables a comfortable and largely unchallenged place for elite subject positions (a 
topic more fully explored in the next chapter), hierarchical thinking has not 
received the attention it warrants, both generally and in relation to Smith’s work. 
The Convergence of the Macro and Micro: Hierarchy Promotes Violence of 
All Kinds 
Hierarchical politics of difference, I argue in this chapter, underwrites all 
structures of inequality, collective (macro) and individual (micro). On the 
individual level, hierarchical thinking structures the ways in which we relate to 
ourselves and others, and it thus structures both our subjective and intersubjective 
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relationships. Hierarchization is central to hierarchical politics and hierarchical 
thinking, and it is the fundamental basis of disrespect and the grounds for all 
violence. One of Smith’s greatest contributions, as I hope to have shown in the 
preceding chapter, is her attention to embodiment and performance at the level of 
the individual to show how bottom-up practices intersect with top-down practices 
of inequality to perpetuate a “legacy of discursive imprisonment” that structures 
contemporary lived experience (McKay 129). Understanding the nexus of 
overarching social hierarchies and underlying interpersonal mechanisms that 
constitute this imprisonment, then, is imperative to eradicating the hold that a 
historical legacy mired in violence has upon the world. I turn to contemporary 
scholarship concerning violence because hierarchical thinking resides at the core 
of all practices and structures of inequality, individual and collective, all of which 
constitute forms of violence.  
The convergence of the micro and macro is vital to understanding the 
interrelatedness of various types of violence on this planet that plagues not only 
virtually every society on earth, but the planet itself. All of this violence, I 
contend, is underwritten by hierarchical thinking, from genocide, cluster bombs 
and land mines to bullying, alcoholism, and suicide, from corporate greed, 
biopiracy, and agribusiness to prostitution, minimum wage, and poverty. The 
World Health Organization’s first World Report on Violence and Health 
addresses the interlocking structural nature of violence. Violence, according the 
report, can be “threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a 
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group or community” and can result in or is likely to result in “injury, death, 
psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation” (5). Violence, the report 
importantly explains, need not be considered violence by its practitioner since 
what is considered violent varies from culture to culture, so the prevailing 
determiner of violence is whether harm is enacted. That psychological harm, 
maldevelopment, and deprivation are included in a definition of violence is 
important to understanding how hierarchical thinking plays into the larger 
network of violence, which, according to the report, can be reduced to three types 
of violence: self-directed, interpersonal violence, and collective violence (6). 
Collective violence, according to the report, “is subdivided into social, political, 
and economic violence” (6). Macro structures of social inequality—the social, 
political, and economic—thus structure and consistently thwart the very 
conditions of individual development that Smith, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, deems necessary for the realization of social justice: “the right to grow 
and be different.”19 As Smith so accurately observed in the 1940’s, violence is 
endemic to both to the macro and micro—the very structures of our individual 
and social institutions.  
As the director-general of the World Health Organization (WHO), Gro 
Harlem Brundtland, explains in the preface to the report, “Violence is a complex 
problem related to patterns of thought and behavior that are shaped by a multitude 
of forces within our families and communities, forces that can also transcend 
national borders.” “Violence is often predictable and preventable,” she continues, 
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and “[l]ike other health problems, it is not distributed evenly across population 
groups or settings.” “Many of the factors that increase the risk of violence are 
shared across the different types of violence and are modifiable,” Brundtland 
reminds us. Inequity is one of those primary factors, and so in a brief, one-page 
preface, Brundtland extrapolates what she considers to be a most important point 
from the nearly three-hundred-page report: “One theme that is echoed throughout 
this report is the importance of primary prevention.”  
Primary prevention refers to intervention on the macro level, to reducing 
structural inequality within our political, economic, and social structures (i.e., 
collective violence) whereas secondary prevention refers to interventions aimed at 
subgroups and, finally, tertiary prevention targets the individual. Primary 
prevention, however, has the greatest effect on reducing all types of violence. 
Structural inequality has been shown to have a greater influence upon individual 
violence than any other factor, according to James Gilligan, a senior faculty 
member of Harvard Medical School and Director of the Institute of Law and 
Psychiatry, whose various and extensive work with violent criminals in the 
Massachusetts prison systems informs his insightful analysis of violence in 
Preventing Violence. After “[r]eductions in absolute poverty (raising populations 
above the subsistence level)” are achieved, Gilligan writes, “reductions in relative 
poverty (achieving greater equality of wealth and income), have been far more 
responsible for the dramatic decreases in death rates and increases in longevity 
that have occurred over the past two centuries than improvements in medical 
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treatment” (21). The United States, Gilligan notes, has “the largest gaps in income 
and wealth between the rich and poor of any developed country” (21) despite the 
well known fact, he says, that economic equity diminishes the incidence of all 
forms of violence: 
It has been shown throughout the world, both internationally and 
intranationally, that reducing economic inequities not only 
improves physical health and reduces the rate of death from 
natural causes far more effectively than doctors, medicines and 
hospital; it also decreases the rate of death from both criminal and 
political violence far more effectively than any system of police 
forces, prisons, or military interventions ever invented (82). 
It probably comes as no surprise to most people that economic equality reduces 
violence. It may surprise many, however, to learn that it is relative poverty (not 
absolute poverty) that foments violent behavior. Despite social-darwinists’ 
narratives to the contrary, absolute poverty does not necessarily incite mob 
violence.  
Gilligan thus strikingly demonstrates the interrelatedness of violence on 
the micro and macro scale, particularly with respect to the three forms of 
collective violence listed in the World Health report: economic, political, and 
social. For example, the reduction of economic disparity between “the richest and 
poorest groups” in a population has the corresponding effect of “reduc[ing] the 
frequency of interpersonal or ‘criminal’ violence” (83). With respect to political 
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violence, Gilligan draws upon the examples of Germany, Japan and Italy who 
“adopted political democracy” after WWII to argue that political democracy 
reduces “the frequency of international violence, or warfare (including ‘war 
crimes’)” (83). To highlight the cultural variability of violence and the influential 
impact collective violence has on the proliferation of violence in general, Gilligan 
also cites various cultures, including Anabaptist sects (e.g., Hutterites, Amish, and 
Mennonites) and “the Mbuti pygmies of central Africa and the Semang of 
Malaysia,” whose relative social, political, and economic equity manifests itself in 
the relative absence of collective and individual violence (86-91). Hutterites, for 
example, share their wealth, have virtually no class differentiation, and have not 
had “a single homicide” in more than a century in the United States and “only one 
suicide in a population of about 21,000” (Gilligan 87). Although Gilligan proffers 
examples of groups that are fairly homogenous culturally speaking, these 
examples do indicate that the absence of social, political, and economic 
stratification promotes a less violent climate than highly stratified societies do—a 
fact that highlights a human inclination to be perversely troubled by structures 
that are inequitable and, consequently, unfair—at the very least, by many of those 
individuals who are directly experiencing the “less than” side of things.20 
Gilligan’s analyses highlight the relationship between the individual and 
the social, particularly how shame operates to enact harm in highly stratified 
systems. Shame constitutes a primary social causes of violence. Gilligan indicts 
not only what he calls “vertical” division, “hierarchical ranking of upper and 
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lower status groups, chiefly classes, castes and age groups, but also other means 
by which people are divided into in-groups and out-groups,” but also “horizontal” 
division, the social roles “to which the two sexes are assigned in patriarchal 
cultures” (38). All of these hierarchies, Gilligan concludes, cause violence 
because they induce shame. “Men are shamed for not being violent enough 
(called coward or even shot as deserters), and are more honored the more violent 
they are (with medals, promotions, titles, and estates)” whereas women are 
shamed for “being too active and aggressive” (38). While “violence for men is 
successful as a strategy,” Gilligan observes, “violence is much less likely to 
protect women against shame” (39). Therefore, aggression instigated by women 
occurs less frequently than that instigated by men.  
While Gilligan’s overall conclusion that female-generated violence is not 
a successful strategy may be accurate, it neglects to take into account certain 
contexts in which female aggression might be common, as in the case of mothers 
who violently “discipline” their children. Rhetoricians understand, of course, as 
Smith did, that an individual’s subjectivities are multiple and intersecting, an 
understanding that substantiates a basic premise of intersectional theory: identity 
categories are not discrete, summative, or layered (Crenshaw, Brah and Phoenix). 
For instance, while Smith actively attacked white supremacy and understood that 
white supremacy meant “supremacy of the white male, not the white female” 
(Loveland 192), she did not reify such hierarchies, often writing about when and 
where white women, having internalized hierarchical thinking as a part of their 
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patriarchal legacy, exert their dominance to subordinate others. Nevertheless, 
Gilligan’s point that violence is not generally a successful strategy for women 
explains why most institutional and interpersonal violence is indeed propagated 
by men.  
Although Gilligan and I began our research from very different starting 
points and with different goals in mind, his a desire to reduce violence within the 
Massachusetts prison population (a goal he achieves, nearly eradicating inmate 
violence) and mine a theoretical examination of why social justice has not made 
more progress than it has considering the extensive efforts of countless 
individuals and groups during the past century to bring about social, economic, 
and political equality—we both arrive at theories based upon disrespect. Violence, 
Gilligan explains, using a metaphor reminiscent of Smith’s use of “cancer,” is a 
disease built into the very structures of society. It is a disease based upon 
disrespect whose pathogen, he asserts, is shame. That is why, he elaborates, 
relative poverty incites more violence than does absolute poverty because 
“[i]nferiority is a relative concept.” Gilligan elaborates, “When everyone is poor 
together, there is no shame in being poor” (100). Whether violence operates on a 
primary (collective) or tertiary (individual) level, Gilligan argues, shame is the 
“pathogen” by which violence is carried.  
While there are many factors that correlate to violence, including poverty 
and education, the prevailing constant in every situation is shame, Gilligan 
asserts. His interviews with violent criminals substantiate this position: 
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In the course of my psychotherapeutic work with violent 
criminals, I was surprised to discover that I kept getting the same 
answer when I asked one man after another why he had assaulted 
or even killed someone: “Because he disrespected me.” In fact, 
they used that phrase so often that they abbreviated it to, “He 
dis’ed me…” Whenever people use a word so often that they 
abbreviate it, you know how central it is in their moral and 
emotional vocabulary. References to the desire for respect kept 
recurring, with remarks like, “I never got so much respect before 
in my life as I did when I first pointed a gun at some dude’s face.” 
On another occasion, I could not understand why one of the 
prisoners was engaged in a running battle with the prison officers 
that resulted in his finally being sentenced to solitary confinement 
and having every privilege and possession taken away from him. I 
asked him, “What do you want so badly that you are willing to 
give up everything else in order to get it?” In response, this man, 
who was usually so inarticulate that it was difficult to get a clear 
answer to any question, astonished me by standing up tall, looking 
me in the eye, and replying with perfect clarity: “Pride. Dignity. 
Self-esteem.” (29)    
Most individuals don’t resort to criminal violence, Gilligan explains, because they 
have countervailing sources from which to derive self-esteem, such as job/career, 
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family, and education whereas violent criminals frequently receive little 
recognition, are often subject to various stigmas, and most, furthermore, have 
been subject to extremely emotionally and/or physically abusive childhoods, 
which precluded their development of basal security. As Gilligan explains, “the 
purpose of violence is to force respect from other people. The less self-respect 
people feel, the more they are dependent on respect from others; for without a 
certain minimal amount of respect, from others or the self, the self begins to feel 
dead inside, numb and empty” (35).  
Violent criminals thus offer one of the more extreme examples of how 
hierarchical thinking—a system of valuing and devaluing based upon internalized 
norms—underwrites both interpersonal relationships and an individual’s 
intersubjective orientations toward the social. As Gilligan points out, “violent 
criminals are perfectly aware of the difference between right and wrong, and 
justice and injustice” (101). They “are not violent because they are dumb, out of 
touch with reality, or unable to recognize hypocrisy, dishonesty, and injustice” 
(101). To the contrary, they “are violent precisely because they are aware of the 
hypocrisy, dishonesty, and injustice that surrounds them and of which they have 
been victims” (101). They are fully aware of an economic system, Gilligan 
reminds us, in which “some people inherit millions while most people inherit 
nothing,” one of many conditions that obviate any discussion of equal 
opportunity” (101).  
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Gilligan rightfully calls for the abolishment of collective violence 
(economic, social, and political) by which people are assigned an inferior status 
on a collective scale. Yet to disarticulate such hierarchies, it is crucial to address 
hierarchical thinking—the epistemic learning of disrespect and shaming that 
solidifies in childhood—a learned and deeply ingrained perceptual system of self- 
and other-assessment. Interactions based upon disrespect are central to the lived 
experience of most people as evidenced by its ideological sedimentation in 
language. “Language itself reveals the link between shame and rage,” Gilligan 
observes, offering the following example: “People become indignant (and may 
become violent) when they suffer an indignity” (30). This shame-based dynamic, 
however, is not limited to “Western” Latin-based cultures and is as clearly 
evident, for example, in cultures concerned with saving face or honor, indeed in 
all cultures in which naturalized hierarchies exist.  
Such naturalized hierarchies are culturally learned, as the Canadian and 
American Indian boarding school system confirms. As mentioned in the 
introduction, despite subjection to centuries of brutal genocidal violence, self-and 
other-directed violence was uncommon within native American Indian 
communities until the instantiation of the Indian boarding school system in the 
1870s when Indian children were taken from their communities and socialized 
“via white gender norms” (Kitch 192). Such norms included, according to Kitch, 
“chastity, subservience, domesticity, and marriage for women” and “family 
dominance, individualism” (192), “manual labor, warfare, and the elimination of 
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tribal dependency” for men (193). Training into this gendered hierarchichal 
cultural infrastructure was imposed upon Indian children who internalized their 
learning even as many resisted such obvious enforced indoctrination. The 
manifestation of self-directed and other-directed violence that has surfaced in 
tribal communities since the late nineteenth century demonstrates that humans are 
indeed rhetorical beings shaped by their narrative immersions. 
As the Indian boarding school system illustrates, normative training into 
hierarchical regimes inculcates in children a praxis of disrespect and, 
consequentially, shame, which is, I contend, a learned episteme of dehumanizing 
self and others that profoundly changes an individual’s intersubjective orientation. 
The internalization of this episteme by students and descendents of the Indian 
boarding school system illustrates that individuals are social beings who are 
“primordially, ineradicably, connected to the other” and who form multiple social 
identities that emerge via group affiliation (Alcoff 112). Affiliation, in this sense, 
refers to the internalization of a norm, not the assimilation to it. In the case of 
gender identity, for example, individuals can subvert and individuate gendered 
norms, yet their affiliation with gender per se remains, demonstrating that 
“discourses do not merely categorize and rearrange what is in the world but, in 
some cases at least, create things that didn’t exist previously” (Alcoff 170). While 
all of the children and descendents of the Indian boarding school system may not 
be hierarchically dispositioned since many continue to carry a cultural paradigm 
of egalitarianism that is difficult to truly “know” if one is not brought up in a 
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culture steeped in respect for the self, other, and all life (including the planet), 
they are nevertheless encumbered with egalitarianism’s epistemic opposite—
hierarchical thinking—an artificially learned system that was purposefully and 
concertedly imposed upon Native American Indians. Hierarchical thinking relies 
upon the internalization of hierarchical norms (not necessarily the assimilation to 
them), and it constitutes an assessment system based upon the learning and deeply 
imprinting concepts of inferiority, superiority, and disrespect upon the human 
psyche. 
 Because the valuing and devaluing of oneself and others that 
characterizes such an assessment system are learned, they obviously can be 
unlearned. Worldwide, children are immersed in cultures that to varying extents 
instantiate hierarchical thinking; consequentially, these children become disposed 
to assess themselves and others via imprinted hierarchized norms. This 
internalized ideology of superiority/inferiority spawns learned behaviors of 
subordination and domination that engender various emotions, including 
disrespect, shaming, feeling shamed, adoration, fear, xenophobia, feelings of 
entitlement and privilege, and arrogance, and other injurious reactions that 
underwrite collective and individual conflict, strife, and violence. These learned 
self-and-other destructive emotions and behaviors spread like a cancer that 
sabotages the potential for just and egalitarian cultures in which the well-being of 
all is the primary goal. The burgeoning of violence within native communities 
after the establishment of the Indian boarding school system attests to the violent 
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and conflict-centered habits of behavior and mind that hierarchical thinking 
engenders. Hierarchical thinking essentially “writes” the contemporary socio-
economic-political and personal world, producing a toxic text for all, even the 
highly-privileged few, who, in the interest of maintaining that privilege, see little 
reason to revise it.  
Before I continue with further examination of the means by which 
hierarchical thinking is discursively learned and becomes intrinsic to and 
naturalized within much of the collective and individual infrastructure, I’d like to 
first draw upon scholarship in moral psychology that explains why discussion of 
respect is integral to understanding hierarchical thinking. Scholarship in moral 
psychology sheds light on how humans learn not to acknowledge the intrinsic 
worth of each individual, the essence of dehumanization. Learning how to 
dehumanize oneself and others constitutes the essence of hierarchical thinking, 
and is the mechanism by which it is produced and perpetuated. 
Fortunately, the operations of respect direct us toward an alternative 
egalitarian epistemic mode for structuring social, political, and economic 
institutions and for structuring individual mores, beliefs, and behaviors. This 
alternative egalitarian episteme is ideologically based upon the intrinsic worth of 
a living being and what conduces to the well-being of each and everyone of us. 
The affective productions of an egalitarian episteme, while difficult to fully 
imagine on a global scale, effectively promote harmony and cooperation among 
groups and individuals at the most basic interpersonal level. In its fullest 
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extension to include all forms of life, this alternative episteme symbolizes a native 
American Indian worldview that the Indian boarding school system so actively 
tried to suppress and eradicate in its purported mission “to civilize” the already 
civilized. 
“R-E-S-P-E-C-T”: The Basis of Egalitarian Politics of Difference 
Many of us have had the pleasure of experiencing the feeling of 
egalitarian interactions (i.e., non-hierarchical interactions). Young children 
frequently approach each other from a non-hierarchical stance because they are 
not yet fully disposed toward hierarchical thinking; their dispositions have has not 
yet solidified into habituation. In other words, they don’t “know any better” 
because they haven’t yet compiled and catalogued the categorical knowledge 
needed to be hierarchically disposed.  
This absence of categorical knowledge was readily apparent in the actions 
of young children on the resort beaches of St. Thomas, V.I., where I lived for 
three years. At that time, the year-round population was approximately 90% 
black, and it was a common sight to see a white tourist child approach a local 
black child so that they might play together. The subsequent and immediate 
engagement in play usually followed a similar script: no official introduction, no 
names exchanged, maybe a query “What’re you doing?” or “Can I play?” Parental 
response (both black and white) varied widely but still kept to a few scripts: 
happiness to see one’s child interacting with another, an indulgent yet uptight 
smile of tolerance, or, yes, a frantic and horrified parent striding to her/his child to 
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yank the child away from the “offending” (and offensive) playmate. Children who 
were ripped from their absorbed play (sometimes politely, sometimes violently) 
often whimpered or howled in confusion, not comprehending the cause of their 
“transgression.”  
I share this anecdote because I think that people, whether they consider 
themselves liberal or not, may not consider themselves hierarchically disposed 
since they may not be consciously aware of their hierarchical habituation. 
Moreover, their hierarchical thinking might surface, consciously or not, in only 
certain contexts. In certain other contexts, the need or inclination to categorize the 
worth of another may never surface. What is important to highlight, however, is 
that while many individuals may frequently experience non-hierarchical 
interactions in their daily lives, non-hierarchical interactions do not structure 
much of people’s worlds—hierarchical interactions primarily do, individually and 
socially.  
If our goal is to abolish hierarchical politics in favor of cultivating 
egalitarian politics, as Smith would have encouraged, then it is in service to that 
goal to understand what distinguishes non-hierarchical interactions from 
hierarchical interactions. Egalitarian politics of difference acknowledge that all 
parties are similar in most respects, and, sharing the same basic needs and desires, 
each party is intrinsically worthy of being. This recognition of the intrinsic full-
stature worth of another party defines non-hierarchical interactions, which take 
place when an individual neither supersedes nor is subordinated to “the other.” 
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The “other” can encompass another individual, a group, or a social institution. A 
non-hierarchical intersubjective orientation, then, assumes a reciprocal 
relationship of respect between individuals, between groups, and between an 
individual and a collective structure. Under all circumstances, individuals flourish 
in their positioning to others, meaning, everyone has access to “the good life,” 
which, according to Young, is comprised of two values: 1) “developing and 
exercising one’s capacities and expressing one’s experience” and 2) “participating 
in determining one’s action and the conditions of one’s action” (37). Conditions 
that provide everyone with the chance for self-growth and self-determination 
acknowledge the intrinsic worth of every individual and direct us to base our 
interactions with each other upon “personhood” rather than interpellation. When 
“personhood” sculpts engagement, whatever differences emerge exist relationally, 
as variation, not hierarchically within fixed categories that essentialize identity 
and that conceptually organize the worth of a subject—a perspective that directly 
contradicts the naturalized position that ranking the worth of others has achieved 
in most cultures. 
Robin Dillon explains that the recognition of each individual’s 
fundamental worth as an end in itself is intrinsic to moral engagement and is 
termed  “interpersonal recognition self-respect” (201). Drawing upon Kant’s 
views of moral duties in “Kant on Arrogance and Self-Respect,” Dillon remarks, 
“Interestingly, what Kant emphasizes in discussing the duties of respect for others 
is not actions we must or must not perform but attitude” (italics added 194), 
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which, Dillon explains, understands that “The duty of respect is a negative one ‘of 
not exalting oneself above others’” (194). “The duty to respect others thus 
includes,” Dillon adds, “the duty to refrain from anything that would threaten 
another person’s right and duty to respect themselves” (194).  
A hierarchical system of difference, however, intrinsically denies a system 
of exchange based upon interpersonal recognition self-respect. Positions outside 
the norm are stigmatized and threaten individuals’ right to respect themselves. 
Positions occupying the norm which posit the norm as superior to that outside it 
contradict the essence of dignity which is a “noncomparative, nonscalar form of 
worth” since “all persons have it equally and absolutely” (Dillon 201). Dillon 
brilliantly discredits the legitimacy of hierarchical politics as a basis of mutual 
respect: 
The valuation of self at the heart of arrogance is thus much more 
seriously false than a mere measurement error; it manifests a 
warped view of the worth of persons. The only worth he 
understands and values, recall, is scalar—comparative and 
competitive. So the problem is not just that he does not regard 
others as ends in themselves or is motivated by considerations of 
self-esteem to deny that others are his equals in fundamental worth 
and status, making him liable to treat them disrespectfully. The 
deeper problem is that he cannot regard any being as an end in 
itself, as unconditionally deserving of respect, himself included. 
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(italics added 201) 
Dillon’s work importantly demonstrates that such scalar valuing is intrinsically 
damaging to all subject positions, even those occupying the norm since everyone 
in such a field of play are valuing themselves and others via scalar assessment, an 
expression of “a warped view of the worth of persons.” Those who occupy the 
norm (and most of us do at some point or another) have learned to feel superior in 
that subject position, yet, while occupying the privileged subject position of the 
norm, subjects may or may not realize that they are indeed receiving their self-
esteem in a scalar fashion since—as I have been demonstrating—hierarchical 
thinking is an episteme. Superiority, consciously felt or not, is a learned and 
naturalized cultural fiction, one of the rhetorical constructs undergirding 
hierarchical thinking.  
An off-shoot of superiority, arrogance may also not be recognized as such 
by the arrogant, but, as with superiority, it is learned and culturally cultivated. 
Arrogance not only underwrites individual behavior and belief, but it also 
underwrites the inequitable socio-politico-economic institutions that structure 
lived experience. Deconstructing the operations of arrogance encourages us to 
face much more than the problematic issue that we are trained to treat others 
without respect; it encourages us to face the fact that we have been trained to treat 
ourselves without respect, having learned to assess ourselves by the same 
normative system by which we assess others. What does it feel like to be “an end 
in itself, as unconditionally deserving of respect”? While some readers may balk 
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at this question, declaring that they do indeed assess themselves upon non-scalar 
terms, I take the position that most of us base much of our self-esteem upon scalar 
forms of worth since we don’t know what it feels like to value ourselves per se. 
We are rhetorical beings who learn what we are shown, and we learn to substitute 
scalar forms of worth for non-scalar worth, having been trained into a culture of 
violence in which nobody is valued or respected solely on non-scalar terms. It is 
troubling to consider how deeply we learn to de-value ourselves and others 
despite narratives (and occasional personal experiences) to the contrary.  
So, how do we learn to deeply devalue ourselves? 
Scholarship on identity (Alcoff, Smith, Young) and perception (Merleau-
Ponty) helps to explain how hierarchical thinking operates through discourse to 
provide the grounds by which we assess our own and others’ worth and through 
which we learn to attribute our identity. Hierarchical valuing (and de-valuing) of 
human beings relies upon a totalizing notion of identity as intrinsic and 
consequently fixed. Hierarchical valuing and devaluing, the essence of 
hierarchical thinking, is learned during early childhood—prior to sustained 
conscious reflection—when children are forming their social identities. 
Problematically, then, identification and interpellation, both of which comprise 
the formation of social identities (Alcoff) are complexly interlinked with 
hierarchical thinking and the devaluing of self and other. 
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Hierarchical Thinking Is Embodied Knowledge: Learning the Praxis of 
Injustice 
Hierarchical thinking is the perceptual apparatus legitimating inequity. 
Smith insightfully describes how it is learned and embodied before such learning 
surfaces to the level of consciousness or to the level of language, depending upon 
circumstance. Well ahead of current body and performance scholarship, Smith 
understood that the ideologies of privilege and exclusion and their corresponding 
affective counterparts, entitlement and abjection, are learned by rote and ritual 
during childhood and are embodied practices that later become naturalized 
(however individuated) performances: 
From the time little southern children take their first step they 
learn their ritual, for Southern Tradition leads them through its 
intricate movements. And some, if their faces are dark, learn to 
bend, hat in hand; and others, if their faces are white, learn to hold 
their heads high. Some step off the sidewalk while others pass by 
in arrogance. Bending, shoving, genuflecting, ignoring, stepping 
off, demanding, giving in, avoiding….Children, moving through 
the labyrinth made by grownups’ greed, and guilt and fear. 
So we learned the dance that cripples the human spirit, step by 
step, we who were white and we who were colored, day by day, 
hour by hour, year by year until the movements were reflexes and 
made for the rest of our life without thinking. Alas, for many 
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white children, there were movements made for the rest of their 
lives without feeling. What white southerner of my generation 
ever stops to think consciously where to go or asks himself it if is 
right for him to go there! (Killers 96) 
Here Smith not only raises the postmodern issue of the embodied learning and 
practice of interpellation, she also indirectly speaks about received and embodied 
literacies, such as abjection and entitlement, both examples of “literacies” formed 
during childhood that throughout a life inhibit the free play of participatory 
democracy in most purported democracies.  
Problematically, such embodied learning is rarely conscious, acquired 
during the process of learning language, as Smith explains: “We know that racial 
hate is only a way of expressing hate that began to flourish long before the child’s 
mind knew anything about ‘color’” (How 109). Yet children, while they may on 
occasion resist what they may feel is intrinsically unfair, they nevertheless 
internalize the boundaries and norms taught to them. Smith writes, “Southern 
Tradition taught well: we learned our way of life by doing. You never considered 
arguing with teacher, because you could not see her. You only felt the iron grip of 
her hand and knew you must go where all the other children are going” (Killers 
96). 
Logic of Identity Transmitted through Language 
While such ideological assessment of oneself and others may often 
operate below the level of discursive consciousness, hierarchical thinking is 
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definitely encoded and transmitted through language. Smith explains how 
linguistic stereotypes operate as rhetorics of dismissal and as mechanisms of 
disrespect. In “Woman Born of Man” co-authored with her lifetime partner Paula 
Snelling, Smith explores this misogynistic and linguistically-sedimented strategy 
by describing how female stereotypes function to Other women, as projections of 
male self-hate and loathing. “This woman whom man has created,” Smith writes, 
“has haunted us females throughout the ages”:  
For centuries, man has seen us as Something Dreadful and To Be 
feared; and then, unable to live with this terror he has created, he 
turns around and makes Woman into the Pure, the Good, the All 
Loving, into Perfection itself. He has switched this image of 
woman from Madonna to Bitch, and close to both is always the 
Terrible Witch; in Asia, she has been the Goddess of Mercy with a 
thousand hands to carry out her merciful errands, and she has also 
been the Dark Kali, the goddess who in Indian lore throws her 
babies into the burning pit. (202) 
Female stereotypes, Smith observes, function dismissively, denying the lived 
realities of the women they purportedly describe.  
Smith frequently experienced such stereotyping. Her detractors, men and 
women alike, trained into the gendered and raced authoritarian regimes Smith 
deplored, often evoked gendered commonplaces that indicate an incapacity to see 
Smith as she was. After her best-selling novel Strange Fruit was banned in 
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Boston, Smith writes of her notoriety “You are called bitch and saint, whore and 
heroine, you are praised for your courage and sneered at for your obscenity; you 
are made into stereotypes, no one sees you as a person, not even those who 
admire your book most; you are turned into images which please them or appeal 
to their feelings of hate or admiration, to their fears and hopes” (Loveland 72). 
Smith’s analyses and lived experiences trenchantly demonstrate that “woman” 
still operates as the absent Other, that which is not present. The perceptual 
reduction of self or other to a “knowable” subject is an essential component of 
hierarchical thinking, which dismisses the rich multiplicity and uncapturable 
alterity of any person.  
Drawing upon Theodor Adorno’s work, Young calls this learned 
perceptual assessment of self and other a “logic of identity” (98). She writes that 
the logic of identity is a type of reasoning that aims to find unity through 
categorization, the classification of “particulars as inside or outside a category 
(98). It “tends to conceptualize entities in terms of substance rather than process 
or relation” and thus “represses difference” by turning the different into a 
categorical opposition (98). Difference itself, however, “is not absolute otherness, 
a complete absence of relationship or shared attributes,” but, epistemically, 
difference becomes absolute otherness in response to learning the “logic of 
identity” (Young 99). “The irony of the logic of identity,” Young thus explicates, 
“is that by seeking to reduce the differently similar to the same, it turns the merely  
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different into the absolutely other” and “inevitably generates dichotomy instead of 
unity” (99).  
Such “constructions of ‘Otherness’” are “staples” of postmodern thought, 
McKay Jenkins explains: the “Other” is part of a postmodern subject, “something 
on which the subject depends for its very existence” (123). Jenkens provides the 
following example: “Whites define themselves not by what they are but by what 
they are not, that is, black; black is thus construed both as a “lack,” an 
inadequacy, ‘what (white) is not,’ and a ‘loss,’ something that is at once loathed 
and yearned for, reviled, and mourned” (123).21 As Smith’s discussions of female 
stereotypes indicate, gender functions to Other much as race does. Constructing 
Others in this fashion is perceptually learned and is a function of hierarchical 
thinking. In contrast and epistemologically speaking, constructions of others 
based upon personhood do not produce conceptions of self or other based upon 
inferiority or superiority. As we see, however, self and other-definition learned as 
a result of hierarchical thinking relies upon dehumanizing negative definitions of 
disavowal and disidentification—of that which we are not. Disidentification 
renders an object abject (Butler Bodies 112).  
Disidentification and identification are evidence of human sociality, that 
humans are social beings. According to Diana Fuss, identification refers to the 
internalization of narrative norms, “the entry of history and culture into a subject” 
(3) whereas disidentification is “an identification that has already been made and 
denied in the unconscious” (7). In systems of privilege that rank individuals 
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according to pre-fixed values of worth and non-worth, norms are discursive and 
symbolic nodes of power, the means by which individuals are perceptually trained 
into systems of domination and oppression. Consider for instance, what 
constitutes “good taste,” “appropriateness,” or “beauty.” What defines good taste 
or gender-appropriate actions or any other number of “natural” responses to 
Others should be understood as socially-conditioned responses, the values of 
which were learned via group affiliation and narrative immersion. Young draws 
attention to the “scaling of bodies,” for instance, to illustrate these operations of 
hierarchical thinking: “While a certain cultural space is reserved for revering 
feminine beauty and desirability, in part that very cameo ideal renders most 
women drab, ugly, loathsome or fearful bodies” (123). Those who are visibly gay 
or lesbian, or old, disabled, or fat, Young notes, risk similar interactive 
dynamics—all based upon hierarchical thinking.  
 Hierarchical thinking, based upon the internalization of norms, clearly 
structures decision-making processes and interpersonal interactions. Although in 
the United States it is quite common to hear a narrative of progress when speaking 
about interpersonal communication across differences, that is, how much more 
progressive the public is with respect to race and sex than it was a few decades 
ago, I would argue that, rhetorically speaking, the U.S. remains mired in violence, 
poverty, and social inequity because hierarchical thinking, the progenitor of 
virtually all human strife and conflict, has not yet been sufficiently attended to. 
Young similarly lambasts the “common conviction that ideologies of natural 
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inferiority and group domination no longer exercise significant influence in our 
society,” as well as its counterpart that “the aversions and stereotypes we claim 
perpetuate oppression today” are weakened, merely extensions of the grosser 
xenophobia of the past” (130). She uses the Adrian Piper phenomenon to debunk 
such illusions:  
Through a phenomenon that Adrian Piper calls higher-order 
discrimination, people frequently disparage attributes that in 
another person would be considered praiseworthy, because they 
are attached to members of certain groups... Aversion to or 
devaluation of certain groups is displaced onto a judgment of 
character or competence supposedly unconnected with group 
attributes. Because the judger recognizes and sincerely believes 
that people should not be devalued or avoided simply because of 
group membership, the judger denies that these judgments of 
competence have a racist, sexist, or homophobic basis (135). 
The Adrian Piper phenomenon clearly suggests that identification, the 
internalization of history and culture, is deeply learned below the level of 
consciousness.  
Identification, whose definition, according to Fuss, encompasses 
disidentification (i.e., abjection) reflects the process of hierarchical thinking. 
Identification, Fuss explains, “is not only how we accede to power, it also [is] 
how we learn submission” (qtd. in Ratcliffe 60). Fuss’s discussion of 
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identification reinforces Young’s assertion that hierarchical thinking engenders 
“social relations [that] are tightly defined by domination and oppression” even in 
“contemporary welfare corporate societies,” ironically flourishing amid the 
diffusion and dispersion of power wielded by “widely dispersed persons [who] 
are agents of power without ‘having’ it, or even being privileged” (Young 32-3). 
We can see, then, that hierarchical thinking is unconsciously internalized and 
perpetuated at the level of the individual. Pierre Bourdieu makes a similar 
contention: “Symbolic power relations are perpetuated through knowledge and 
recognition, which does not mean through intentional acts of consciousness” 
(198). For symbolic domination to occur, “the dominated have to share with the 
dominant the schemes of perception and appreciation through which they are 
perceived by them and through which they perceive them; they have to see 
themselves as they are seen” (198).  
That the internalization of privilege (normative knowledge) occurs within 
all subjects is important for several reasons. For one, understanding how norms 
operate turns us to see that privilege is a rhetorical construct internalized and 
performed by everyone. Seeing privilege as a fluid and rhetorical construct is 
vital to difference scholarship because doing so un-tethers privilege from specific 
contexts (e.g., white privilege), a theoretically important move that enables social 
justice scholars to bypass the conflicts presented by identity politics, which focus 
on group-specific identities rather than the underlying reasons for group conflict. 
Seeing privilege as a rhetorical construct, then, directs us to address the 
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underlying cause of group privilege—hierarchical thinking.  
Secondly, recognizing that hierarchical thinking is internalized by 
everyone suggests that hierarchical thinking is a cultural fiction that has achieved 
“thing-hood.” As many theorists have already demonstrated with race and gender, 
discursively constituted regulatory norms can create real “things” that structure 
our lived experiences and are means by which we learn to assess ourselves and 
make life choices, yet despite concerted efforts to expose such cultural fictions 
for what they are (culturally-constructed and constructive) in order to disrupt their 
hegemonic status, they largely remain reified as Alcoff explains:  
If race is a structure of contemporary perception, then it helps 
constitute the necessary background from which I know myself. It 
makes up a part of what appears to me as the natural setting of all 
my thoughts. It is the field, rather than that which stands out. The 
perceptual practices involved in racializations are then tacit, 
almost hidden from view, and thus almost immune from critical 
reflection. (188) 
If gender and race remain perceptually backgrounded, consider the extent to 
which hierarchical thinking is habituated. Alcoff explains that habitual perception 
“is so attenuated as to skip the stage of conscious interpretation and intent” (187), 
and although it may be visible, as with gender and race, hierarchical thinking 
constitutes a part of “the horizon of our cultural tradition” and thus “is not a mere 
instrument of vision, but the condition in which vision occurs” (Gadamar qtd. in 
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Alcoff 95). If the conditions necessary for the instantiation of social justice are 
indeed “the right to grow and the right to be different,” as both Smith (“Ten 
Years” 672) and Young (37) suggest they are, and, if, as I am arguing, 
hierarchical thinking constitutes the background from which we assess ourselves 
and others and comprises the fundamental condition from which we relate to each 
other, then we must face the fact that hierarchical thinking presents an immense 
obstacle to establishing the fundamental conditions for a socially-just world.  
While hierarchical thinking is visible in scholarship on many fronts, 
especially with respect to how individuals are complicit in maintaining and 
perpetuating regulatory norms that work to exclude, marginalize, and oppress 
those who do not meet those norms, the full weight of hierarchical thinking as a 
collective and oppressive episteme that circumscribes and prescribes human 
intersubjectivity has not been sufficiently addressed. The cultural-constructedness 
of subjectivity, which has been amended to acknowledge the influence of 
biology, is well accepted within the humanities whereas the cultural-
constructedness of human intersubjectivity has not yet been sufficiently plumbed. 
Even as the postmodern critique invokes its epistemological and historical roots 
of “modernism,” and even as rhetorical discussions of identification and 
disidentification acknowledge the violence such processes enact, postmodern 
discussion of identification and disidentification has so far accorded these 
processes an unequivocal status as givens when they are no more than cultural 
fictions, productions of hierarchical thinking. If hierarchical thinking is also a 
 
107
pervasive cultural fiction, as I contend it is, the epistemological and experiential 
constraints that hierarchical thinking imposes upon human relationships have not 
been adequately explored. When humanities scholars refer to “Western 
epistemology,” a label that I learned to wield as a derisive moniker describing all 
that is inherently wrong in the world, including atomistic selves, the mind/body 
split, and the objectification and degradation of life itself, I think that many 
scholars actually are referring to hierarchical thinking and dispositioning.      
Western Epistemology (WE): An Experiential Not Geographical Boundary 
What is generally referred to as Western epistemology (We) is more 
accurately described by the term hierarchical dispositioning. One reason is that we 
cannot discern the origins of Western epistemology although many feminists 
attribute the codification of gender hierarchy to its instantiation. To avoid the 
frustrations associated with origin myths, I have relied upon the concepts 
underlying Western epistemology, such as the logic of identity. In a redaction of 
Jacques Derrida’s contributions to poststructuralist theorizing of the relationship 
between language and consciousness, Sharon Crowley traces the privilege 
afforded to identity back to Aristotle: 
Aristotelian logic is based on two concepts directly borrowed from 
the grammar of simple sentences—categories and predicables, 
classes of things and the possible relations between them. The 
basic assumption of this logic—the law of identity and 
contradiction—posits that either a thing is or it is not. Of course 
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this law presumed presence, and the entire logical system awarded 
privilege to identity, rather than to contradiction. (3) 
Taxonomies have logical uses. However, as this chapter argues, essentialism (the 
tendency to epistemologically reduce humans categorically into rankings via a 
logic of identity) has unfortunately become imbricated with human 
consciousness.22 
The “West,” however, does not hold a monopoly upon this type of 
thinking. There are many cultures whose dominant narratives privilege the social 
over the self that nevertheless are predicated upon assessing self and others on the 
basis of hierarchical norms that “defin[e] difference as deviance in relation to a 
norm and “freeze some groups into a self-enclosed nature” (Young 171). Most 
contemporary cultures (to varying degrees contingent upon context), socialize 
individuals to hierarchical dispositions predicated upon arrogance and shame (or 
superiority and inferiority, if you will). Despite variegations among cultures and 
within cultures, hierarchical arrangements based upon domination occur. Within 
hierarchical interactions, we might say that at one end of the spectrum, the 
individual denies/is ignorant of her relationship to the social, and at the other, the 
individual subordinates herself to the whole. Yet in both of these scenarios, 
mutual reciprocity of respect does not occur. In this context, the classical 
epistemological opposition between “West” and “East” thus loses significance in 
the light of the fact that hierarchical thinking pervades most contemporary 
cultures, even those that prioritize the group over the individual.  
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While the terms “West” or “Western tradition” may have lost their charge 
as a geographical distinction, their ideological implications evoke a long tradition 
of hierarchical politics of difference. In The Specter of Sex: Gendered 
Foundations of Racial Formation in the United States, Sally Kitch uses 
“Western” to be “understood as a political rather than a geographic location and 
as a term that connotes arrogance about cultural superiority that fueled the 
ideology of white supremacy” (7). Despite my agreement with Kitch’s association 
of “Western” with cultural superiority, I hope to make clear that the underlying 
cause of such arrogance is, in fact, due to the toxic effects of hierarchical 
thinking. Hierarchical thinking fuels feelings of superiority—any feelings of 
superiority—and it is therefore reified hierarchization, not cultural imperialism, 
that more accurately demarcates the problem space that demands our immediate 
and critical attention.  
Yet, even as an ideological distinction, hierarchical thinking does not 
convey the overwhelming experiential constraints it imposes. I turn to a passage 
from Young’s Justice and the Politics of Difference to begin discussing 
hierarchical thinking’s impact upon our lived experiences. Young writes that 
essentializing others via a logic of identity expresses “a fear of making permeable 
the categorical border between oneself and the others” (170). This fear, she notes, 
“is not merely intellectual and does not derive only from the instrumental desire 
to defend privilege” (170). Rather, this fear “wells from the depths of the Western 
subject’s sense of identity, especially, but not only in the subjectivity of privileged 
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groups” (170). Young concludes this passage by claiming that “the politics of 
difference confronts this fear, and aims for an understanding of group difference 
as indeed ambiguous, relational, shifting, without clear borders that keep people 
straight—as entailing neither amorphous unity nor pure individuality” but as 
entailing “relations of similarity and dissimilarity that can be reduced to neither 
coextensive identity nor nonoverlapping otherness” (171).  
Although I wholeheartedly agree with Young’s analysis and her claim that 
egalitarian politics reside in acknowledging groups’ and individuals’ 
“nonoverlapping otherness”(another way of expressing interrelations based upon 
personhood), her discussion of how “hierarchical politics of difference confronts 
this fear” (171) is sorely lacking. By focusing on the need for group-specific pride 
and coalition-building, Young’s discussion does not confront the issue of fear 
itself as much as it attempts to contend with what fear produces: its aftermath. 
Coalition building in itself does not resolve the difference constructed via 
hierarchical thinking. While I do not contest the need for building coalitions 
across difference, a much more robust discussion of fear needs to be developed to 
attend to the epistemological effects of such a deep-seated fear. Despite Young’s 
move to ask readers to consider what interactions based upon “non-overlapping 
otherness” entail, her discussion does not address the experiential effects that 
internalizing a pervasive and unshakable fear has in structuring our 
intersubjectivities. My argument that follows merely scratches the surface of what 
I think is a profoundly significant and largely ignored area of inquiry. Although 
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this area of inquiry has been broached by various scholars, as the following 
discussion indicates, it requires considerably more attention. 
Fear resides at the heart of identity formation within systems underwritten 
by hierarchical politics of difference as evidenced in Gilligan’s discussion of 
violent criminals whose lack of basal security can drive them to respond to the 
slightest threat, indeed, any perceived slight, with unadulterated rage. The 
scholarship gathered for this chapter has inclined me to think that hierarchical 
thinking depends upon a deeply learned and solidified fear that disposes humans 
to dehumanize themselves and others while masquerading as autonomy. In 
addition to hierarchical gender training, narratives of individualism and the 
importance of disavowing tribal affiliation, I remind readers, were deployed 
within the Indian boarding school system in the United States and Canadian 
governments’ efforts to make Indian men “white.” Linda Martín Alcoff, a 
professor of philosophy, political science, and women’s studies at Syracuse 
University, attributes the establishment of hierarchies and the “construction of a 
generalized other” to the modern ideal of autonomy in which self-reliance and 
disengagement are valorized, and, like Young, she attributes this epistemological 
tradition to the West. Alcoff writes that “autonomy understood as disengagement 
assumes as a default or general starting position that the other is hostile, 
oppressive, or at least less rational,” and she claims that this assumption underlies 
the “Western resistance against the dependence on and constitution of the self  
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within a social domain” (122). Fear is a fully rational response to a hostile and 
oppressive social domain.  
Hierarchical Dispositioning 
This sense of self as independent, autonomous and distinct from the 
social, however, is merely a perceptual production, learned and developed in 
childhood. In truth, humans are always already intersubjective beings. 
Postmodern epistemology has fully demonstrated the mythic nature of the 
categorical borders between oneself and others and has already accomplished the 
intellectual work of demolishing modernist orientations to subjectivity. At issue, 
however, is that we have not sufficiently considered the degree to which our 
epistemological conditioning sculpts our intersubjectivity. That we are 
intersubjective beings is a given. But what kind of intersubjective beings are we? 
Since we are rhetorical beings, conceivably, there is an endless array of flavors.  
I wish to make clear that hierarchical dispositioning is a specific flavor, a 
specific historical and cultural fiction that has been around for so long as to have 
become nearly imperceptible. If consciousness is an embodied mode of being-in-
the-world, as Smith’s, Young’s, and Merleau-Ponty’s scholarly contributions 
suggest, and if hierarchical thinking scripts contemporary consciousness (and sub-
consciousness), as I have been arguing, then hierarchical thinking 
overwhelmingly shapes our being-in-the world, particularly our orientation to 
ourselves and others.  
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Hierarchical thinking imbues us with a deeply learned fear, fear of being 
devalued and, possibly, fear of witnessing (and feeling) similar disregard for 
others. Of course, I cannot speak for everyone, but when I feel fear, I seize up, my 
boundaries solidify, and I am overly concerned with myself and those whom I 
care about. In this system underwritten by fear, self-esteem, or what we know as 
self-esteem, is garnered by assessing our own worth by comparing ourselves 
against others according to pre-set scales of human worth. It’s an all out, me-
against-you scenario, except for those times when “you’re like me,” in other 
words, my equivalent.  
This process teaches us to dismiss and disregard the feelings of those who 
are “categorically different” as a means to value ourselves, a form of 
aggrandizement that becomes naturalized, a position of privilege that endorses 
arrogance, entitlement, and a general disregard for others. This chapter’s earlier 
discussion of interpersonal recognition self-respect, however, reminds us that this 
disregard for others conceptually rests upon a fundamental disregard for oneself, a 
epistemological foundation that is undeniably fear-inducing.  
In distinct contrast, in non-hierarchical interactions, there is a noticeable 
absence of fear, which enables those moments I previously referred to as non-
hierarchical interactions. But do these non-hierarchical interactions really convey 
what a non-hierarchical consciousness as mode of being-in-the world would be 
like? What if we were to seriously consider what human subjectivity would be 
like if we grew up in non-hierarchical systems? If we really are the intersubjective 
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beings that postmodern theory tells us we are and our boundaries really are 
permeable, as the study of rhetoric suggests, I ask readers to consider what 
cultivating those permeable boundaries would feel like, what literacies and 
capacities would we develop? Perceptually, if we were not awash in fear when 
forming our identities, what would our intersubjective experiences entail if “the 
social,” that is, our institutions and collective narratives acknowledged, 
legitimated, and valorized the permeable boundaries of humans? Frankly, we 
cannot know. The moments afforded by our non-hierarchical interactions, the 
moments when we belly laugh, love, and feel carefree together rely upon the 
extent to which we can disconnect ourselves from hierarchy and are limited 
generally to interpersonal interactions that do not include our collective social 
institutions, such as economics. They thus provide merely a glimmer of an altered 
human intersubjectivity. 
With these questions in mind, I suggest that while we have theorized 
subjectivity, we have not made much headway theorizing intersubjectivity beyond 
merely realizing and acknowledging that humans are indeed intersubjective 
beings.  
So, to conclude this discussion, which is actually the beginning of a 
discussion, I return to the idea of shame to make the point that children’s fear of 
being devalued, along with its accompanying sense of either shame or self-
aggrandizement that comes from devaluing Others, is learned via endlessly 
repeated cultural performances that instill a fear so profound that it produces a 
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kind of narcissism, an absorption with protecting the self against assaults upon 
one’s dignity or from feeling another’s pain. This intersubjective conditioning 
structures us and becomes a hierarchical dispositioning, an arrangement that we 
have not yet learned how to shake. Hierarchical dispositioning thus represents a 
“terministic screen” oppressing us all, a dispositioning that constrains our “right 
to grow” and “right to be different,” two fundamental conditions for social justice.  
Shame on You and Me 
As I’ve argued so far, in systems underwritten by hierarchical politics, 
identity construction acts as a damaging conceptual frame that organizes 
difference, thus Others, categorically. This mode of perception undergirds 
hierarchical dispositioning and enables individuals and groups to feel superior to, 
to stigmatize, and, consequently, to justify violence against Others, all of which 
composes and arranges the basic backdrop of the global theatre into which each of 
us is born. 
Nevertheless, each of us struggles within our given circumstances to 
discover strategies that provide us with respect. While much more could be said 
here regarding Young’s work, which urges us to consider how normative 
standards constitute an assessment system by which individuals and groups feel 
worthy or unworthy, superior or inferior to others, I’d prefer to finish with a brief 
discussion of shame that not only reinforces the fact that humans intrinsically are 
social beings but that suggests that it is in our best interest to cultivate a 
cooperative-based intersubjectivity that acknowledges the self-worth of everyone. 
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In “Shame and Stigma” Martha Nussbaum examines the origins of shame. 
Drawing upon the work of Silvan Tomkins and Aristophanes, Nussbaum traces 
the emergence of shame to infancy during the time when “the infant realizes that 
it is dependent on others, and is by this time aware of itself as a definite being 
who is and ought to be the center of the world” (181). Shame emerges when the 
infant realizes her own inadequacy and weaknesses, for, according to Nussbaum, 
“shame involves the realization that one is weak and inadequate in some way in 
which one expects oneself to be adequate” (183). Shame, then, Nussbaum 
explains, “requires self-regard as its essential backdrop” (184), evidencing an 
individual’s early disposition to conceiving herself as a being who has intrinsic 
worth, a condition of interpersonal recognition self-respect. If self-regard 
constitutes a basic human characteristic, then being treated with disregard (by 
oneself or others) breaches a basic human tendency, an incongruity that accounts 
for, among other things, violent criminals’ economic and social rage (Gilligan).  
In “An Apology for Moral Shame,” Cheshire Calhoun elaborates upon the 
connection between self-regard and shame and explains how someone who has 
autonomy and self-worth can still be shamed despite confidence in her own 
evaluative capabilities. Calhoun explains that even when being knowingly 
misjudged, the shame of those who are shamed “signals their capacity to take 
seriously fellow participants in their social world,” an indication of their 
recognition that others interpellate them, thus giving the others what Calhoun 
calls “practical weight” (138): “The power to shame is a function of our sharing a 
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moral practice with the shamer and recognizing that the shamer’s opinion 
expresses a representative viewpoint within that practice” (141). Theoretically, 
the shamed, who is cognizant of “representative viewpoints,” nevertheless 
respects her own evaluative stance and, thus, cannot respect the shamer. The 
shamer, on the other hand, respects and assertively performs those “representative 
viewpoints” and, thus, disrespects the viewpoints of the shamed. Shame thereby 
functions to “track social stratifications” (Calhoun 144) and reproduce them. 
More importantly, Calhoun notes, the inspiration for this kind of shame is 
intersubjective; the shamed see themselves through the shamer’s eyes. This is a 
painful and limiting subject position given that, as moral agents, the shamed are 
inextricably bound to engage with the shamer yet are forever excluded from  
reciprocal engagement with the shamer due to the absence of interpersonal 
recognition self-respect on the part of the shamer. 
Shame certainly points to the intersubjective nature of humans and 
illustrates our interconnectedness by showing how individuals serve as mirrors to 
each other, reflecting how individuals are being perceived by another. Shame, 
then, can be a useful tool for self-growth, as Gilligan says: shame “warns us that 
there is something lacking in our repertoire of social or cognitive skills and 
knowledge, some failure of development and maturation that needs further work” 
(80). The human ability to mirror each other has scientific support. Human brains 
contain “mirror neurons” that respond to the emotional states and activities of 
others, precisely mimicking the cell activity and neural response of those others. 
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Mirror neurons help to explain empathy and sympathy, why we might cry at a 
stranger’s pain or feel joy at a group’s triumph. The existence of mirror neurons 
suggests that if we are to be truly content, everyone around us must be content 
too—that we are essentially cooperative beings who are actively participating in 
and feeling what others are doing and feeling.  
We can draw several conclusions from a discussion of mirroring. For one, 
cooperation and self-regard are basic human inclinations that are thwarted by 
hierarchical politics of difference. Understanding this helps to explain the rage 
that individuals sometimes exhibit when these two basic needs are not met, when 
their need for cooperation and regard are absent. They are, in effect, denied their 
own sociality, and responde by becoming, in varying degrees, “socio-pathic.” 
Secondly, the existence of mirroring and an intrinsic self-regard provides 
evidence that children feel hurt when they and others are dehumanized. It would 
follow, then, that children learn to protect themselves by isolating themselves 
emotionally from themselves and others, constructing self-enclosed egos that 
likely mirror those of the adults around them. In addition, if self-regard and 
cooperation are indeed natural backdrops of human intersubjectivity, then shame 
that is based upon hierarchical knowledge (which “un-naturally” adjudges human 
worth based upon artificial categories) must strike individuals as extremely unfair. 
This brief examination of shame and arrogance reveals a deeply-rooted 
defect underlying the ways in which people are socialized to interact with each 
other, a flaw that impedes our purported social aim to live together in harmony. 
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Because respectful engagement requires that respect for oneself and for the other 
are of equally paramount importance, the absence—or diminishment—of either 
prohibits respectful engagement, producing a less-than-mutual engagement. In 
this sense, hierarchical thinking may be understood as a socio-pathogen that 
interferes with the human inclination to uphold regard for oneself while also 
caring about the well-being of others, and it thus represents a no-win situation that 
inhibits the fundamental basis of moral engagement: mutual respect. In addition, 
deconstruction of the binary of shame/superiority brings to the fore the 
inescapable truth that a hierarchical politics of difference not only inhibits mutual 
respect but also replicates a never-ending cycle of negative affect.  
Conclusion 
Hierarchical dispositioning may have historically served the self-interests 
of select individuals and groups, but it clearly does not serve everyone in any 
given context. If democracy is a purported societal goal, than I hope to have 
sufficiently shown that hierarchical thinking offers a perceptual grounding that 
undermines that possibility of establishing a socially-just world because 
hierarchical thinking contradicts the concept of inclusivity. Within hierarchical 
politics, as a fundamental human condition of difference, some subjects have not 
choice but to occupy marked positions outside the norm. 
 I also hope to have effectively argued that hierarchical thinking traverses 
most contemporary cultures, thereby revealing that more cross-cultural similarity 
exists than most scholars of difference acknowledge.23  Critiques of the modernist 
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ideals of universality and neutrality have rightfully deconstructed any unified 
notion of a “we” in the public sphere (Young, Fraser). The concept of a “we,” 
Nancy Fraser explains, “assumes that a public sphere is or can be a space of zero 
degree culture” (121). Fraser’s articulation exemplifies the social turn in the 
humanities, which has thoroughly trounced ahistorical conceptions, such as “zero 
degree culture,” exposing them as mythic modernist ideals. In Kuhnian fashion, 
thousands of scholars have zealously fleshed out the nuances of this intellectual 
paradigm shift, focusing on the ways in which modernist and Enlightenment 
epistemologies are value systems that underwrite and justify systems of 
oppression and exclusion (Butler, Crowley Toward, Fraser, Harding, Smith and 
Young). 
Ironically, however, this postmodern turn has overlooked a “nonideal” 
(Mills) aspect of culture to which everyone is subject—a brutal and violent world. 
All of us live in a world where suffering and oppression are common material 
realities, accepted by many as inevitable. There is then, arguably, a subjective 
“we.” Despite our group-specific differences, as members of a world and as 
receivers of its representations, few individuals (if any) know what it is like to 
“not know” a discourse of discord in which war, strife, rape, torture, subjugation, 
fear, shame, contempt, arrogance, racism, sexism, classism, humiliation, and 
degradation circulate, whether or not these items regularly occupy our conscious 
thoughts and whether or not we have directly experienced them.  
 
 
121
I do not mean to trivialize or deny here the lived experiences of those who 
have directly experienced horror and have had the psychological and sociological 
stability of their lives and livelihoods wrenched from them by any number of 
brutal practices, as is the case for those civilians who have, say, survived a 
military attack that destroys their home and maims and/or kills their family 
members, or, for example, those individuals who have endured various physical 
and psychological abuses that greatly reduce their capacities for developing basal 
security and the ability to trust others.  
Rather, I wish to draw attention to a privileged position—a Western 
disposition—that valorizes ideals of freedom, individualism, and “happiness” but 
that is imbued with a colonial and hierarchical orientation to difference 
underwritten by a sense of entitlement that enables it to achieve its self-interested 
ends at the expense of Others.  
Thus, each of us who has internalized norms of privilege (and who 
variously occupy positions of privilege) is forced to learn in varying degrees to 
accept and become inured to suffering and oppression to such an extent as enables 
us to “function,” a term loosely used here. Such “acceptance” does not necessarily 
indicate an intellectual acceptance of the status quo, but it does suggest that a 
significant part of our maturation process involves expending significant effort 
devoted to developing affective ways to filter out and make sense of an arbitrarily 
brutal world, essentially a lot of energy that most certainly could be re-directed 
toward more worthwhile pursuits than numbing ourselves. Full attention to the 
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nonideal, then, is imperative. Our failure to address hierarchical thinking as the 
driving force behind this nonideal world serves, I argue, to cohere past and 
present. The perpetuation of a brutal historical legacy reinforces “the given” as a 
kind of norm that precludes, or at least severely inhibits “the possible.”  
 I have drawn from Smith’s work to a large extent because she focuses on 
the individual as that which replicates the larger social organism and foregrounds 
performativity of doxa, particularly during childhood socialization, to demarcate 
a place for intervention. By doing so, Smith delineates an area of inquiry that, in 
my opinion, needs to be taken up more fully by scholars. Given that the “personal 
is political,” the socialization of children is undeniably central to positive social 
change, as Smith repeatedly reminds us, yet the topic of how children are raised 
remains somewhat untouchable. As a topic of public debate, the rights of children 
remain more in the private than public realm (as the lives of women historically 
did and do in varying degrees, depending upon location). The vital importance of 
how children are socialized constitutes a subject to which Smith consistently 
returns and comprises a topic scholars would do well to heed because it 
emphasizes the importance of individual agency. It is individuals who negotiate 
multiple identities and mediate various schemes of perception when interacting 
with others. It is individuals who perform multiple and various subject positions 
that at times coincide with the unmarked position of the norm, and at other times 
don’t, and at still other times operate outside the normative scheme of 
hierarchical thinking (at least somewhat), for instance, when reciprocal respect 
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occurs. Hierarchical thinking operates at the level of the individual, 
unconsciously or not, and it is my argument that we must therefore address and 
transform such thinking at the level of the individual as well as at the level of 
systems. 
In the next chapter, we will examine additional affective modalities of 
being (other than shame and arrogance) generated by hierarchical thinking to 
understand why hierarchical thinking has had such staying power, especially after 
the widespread public embrace of democratic values.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE CULTURAL CONSTRUCTION OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY 
The question of how ignorance is sustained, cultivated, or allowed is one that 
must be asked explicitly and without assuming that the epistemic tools cultivated 
for understanding knowledge will be sufficient to understanding ignorance.  
—Nancy Tuana 
 
A critical reading of whiteness means that white ignorance must be 
problematized, not in order to expose whites as simply racist but to increase 
literacy about their full participation in race relations.                –Zeus Leonardo 
 
The imperviousness in the West of the many branches of knowledge to everything 
that does not fall inside their predetermined scope has been repeatedly challenged 
by its thinkers throughout the years. They extol the concept of 
decolonization…Yet they do not seem to realize the difference when they find 
themselves face to face with it—a difference which does not announce itself, 
which they do not quite anticipate and cannot fit into any single varying 
compartment of their catalogued world; a difference they keep on measuring with 
inadequate sticks designed for their own morbid purpose. When they confront the 
challenge ‘in the flesh,’ they naturally do not recognize it as a challenge. Do not 
hear, do not see. They promptly reject it as they assign it to their one-place-fits-all 
‘other’ category…They? Yes, they. But, in the colonial periphery (as in 
elsewhere), we are often them as well.                               —Trinh T. Minh-ha 
  
So, one can imagine—as Paul Gilroy would say (and has for years)—you don’t 
get rid of black people by getting rid of race. You get rid of racism and you 
reconstruct the ecology of belonging. It looks like a different modality of 
belonging because it won’t be built upon notions of individuated identity, 
difference, and negativity.                                                —Lawrence Grossberg 
 
Everything is here except that which is missing.                 —Richard Brautigan 
 
 
In the previous chapter I argued that the problem of “difference” with 
which humanities scholars have wrestled for the past few decades essentially 
stalled out with identity politics. While identity politics undeniably has 
contributed much to minority and difference scholarship by having directed  
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attention to difference as an intrinsic element of the human condition and by 
having raised awareness of the epistemological value of group-specific 
standpoints as democratizing resources, difference scholarship nonetheless  
stalled with identity politics, I suggest, because identity politics largely proceeds 
from the consequences, not from the causes of the problematic of difference. 
Identity politics essentially deals with the aftermath of discord created by 
difference and thus does not offer a resolution to politics of difference. That’s 
why I have been arguing for an epidemiological approach to the problematic of 
difference, which addresses its causes rather than endlessly treating its symptoms.  
Does difference per se cause discord, strife, and violence? While it is 
commonplace to think so, I have made clear that it is hierarchical thinking—not 
difference itself—that requires our primary attention. My intention in this project 
is to highlight the danger of the commonplace that difference is a problem that 
cannot be overcome and to demonstrate the damages this belief authorizes as well 
as the material practices it engenders. Difference currently causes discord but 
need not do so. As I hoped to show in chapter 3, the problems that difference 
presently causes are largely attributable to a historical transcultural legacy of 
perceptual training that teaches us to dehumanize ourselves and others by 
appraising the value of individuals and groups based upon categorical knowledge, 
memes, and norms. Founded upon hierarchies, this dehumanizing system teaches 
us to compare the worth of subjects, including ourselves, upon cultural norms that 
are learned and internalized, norms that privilege a central position (that 
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corresponds to the top of a hierarchy) and that thereby devalue positions outside 
the norm as inferior. I use the term “hierarchical thinking” derived from Iris 
Marion Young’s term “hierarchical politics of difference” to describe this 
perceptual system,24 which underwrites the interlocking of what Peggy McIntosh 
calls “privilege systems” (66).25 Gender represents a privilege system, and gender 
norms provide ubiquitous examples of hierarchical thinking. Given the tide of 
globalization and the hybridity of culture, even if there had been cultures in which 
gender hierarchies were absent (i.e., not underwritten by hierarchical thinking), by 
now, nearly everyone has at the very least been exposed to gendered hierarchies, 
often in the form of racism (Fanon, Kitch). That is, it is likely that nearly 
everyone has performed and been subject to gendered norms despite their 
variations synchronically across cultures and diachronically across time.  
Despite the seeming intractability of hierarchical systems via which we are 
trained to think hierarchically, in the previous chapter I argued that hierarchical 
thinking is a fear-based social fiction that can and must be abolished if humans 
are to accommodate and incorporate our present knowledge of what is required 
for the health and well-being of individuals and societies, natural ecosystems, and, 
indeed, all life on the planet. Such a dramatic change, however, requires a 
fundamental shift in the way people are trained to think about themselves and 
others. As I have been arguing, this shift requires that we learn to appraise each 
other and other forms of life based upon non-scalar worth. Although this may 
seem unfeasible to many readers, I argue it is well within the realm of possibility 
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when we consider the cultural variability of hierarchical thinking and its variable 
valencing; that is, some cultures are imbued with more hierarchical practices and 
institutions than others. For example, there are presently cultures that have 
actively eschewed economic and educational stratification (stratification that in 
extreme instances countenances starvation of members of the underclasses), 
opting instead for various forms of socialist democracy. If culture is variable, as it 
certainly is (e.g., Saudia Arabia v. Finland) and if we acknowledge the evident 
hardship and suffering experienced by individuals who occupy the lowest rungs 
of most hierarchies, then it would serve the common good to speak about the 
abolition of hierarchical thinking as a social goal.  
I’d like to make clear, however, that I am not arguing for the instantiation 
of tolerance (i.e., cultural relativism) which requires a suspension of judgment. 
Judgment is intrinsic to the human, a component of invention (Aristotle). For 
example, neither the fact that the United States prison-industrial complex profits 
from the imprisonment of human bodies nor the fact that self-immolation is 
valorized in certain cultures makes either practice worthy of our “tolerance.” Both 
practices are productions of hierarchical politics of difference and are enabled by 
hierarchical thinking. I’d also like to make clear that I don’t wish to efface 
difference and call for any sort of universality because, again, neither is humanly 
possible. Were they possible, there would be no rhetorical invention, no human 
plasticity. Furthermore, in light of the deep pleasure and inventional possibilities 
difference affords (Atwill), effacing difference is not desirable. 
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What I am arguing for is the purposeful abolishment of hierarchical 
thinking. Hierarchical thinking is a dangerous and counterproductive social 
fiction, and, as with all social fictions, despite their materiality, they do not have 
to exist. Humans can instantiate other fictions, for example, non-hierarchical 
appraisal systems that don’t rely upon reductive thinking that devalues people 
according to categorical worth. Transforming the perceptual dispositioning 
structured by hierarchical thinking, however, is a complex task that could not 
happen overnight but would take successive generations of evolving 
disarticulation and reflexive praxis.26 
As I have suggested, at issue is the virility of hierarchical thinking: its 
hegemonic and largely naturalized place, its facile adaptability to new contexts 
(i.e., its inventional potential),27 its historical use as a colonizing force (see 
chapter 1), and its part in sustaining the status quo (not only Eurocentric status 
quos, but oppression wherever it occurs). While I certainly do not wish to 
reinscribe eurocentrism or obviate the power of resistance to instantiate 
significant change, I do want to highlight hierarchical thinking as a narrative 
frame and as a disciplinary framework. As a narrative history, like all histories, 
hierarchical thinking is hermeneutic and reductive, yet with real and serious 
material consequences. As a disciplinary frame, hierarchical thinking, as shown in 
chapter three, functions similarly to gender and thus serves as a framework in 
which an individual “develops a discourse of self-reporting and self-
understanding” (Butler 67).  
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Although such deeply ingrained epistemes seem intractable, as inheritors 
of polyphonic and pluritopic histories that demonstrate the dynamism and 
hybridity of groups and cultures, humans clearly have alternative options to 
hierarchical thinking—alternative modes for being in the world. The difference 
between “self-esteem” and “self-respect,” for example, illustrates the difference 
between hierarchical thinking and non-hierarchical appraisal—what we might call 
“egalitarian thinking” (for a fuller explanation of this, see chapter 3). Self-respect 
is non-scalar and acknowledges the intrinsic worth of each individual. Self-
esteem, on the other hand, relies upon scalar worth, with “one’s merits and self-
valuation,” frequently determined by “the standards of value in one’s society and 
how one compares oneself with other members of that society” (Neu 169). Jerome 
Neu insightfully concludes, “of self-respect one cannot have too much, of self-
esteem one obviously can” (169). If indeed self-respect is such a good thing and 
we cannot have too much of it, why is there so little of it? 
While non-scalar appraisal is not unknown to most people, its minority 
standing evidences the narrative hegemony of hierarchical thinking.28 Cultural 
practices and social institutions in much of the world are based upon notions of 
self-esteem, not self-respect, and they thus reinforce hierarchical thinking,29 
which forms the basis of both self-and other-disesteem—the motor that drives 
strife and violence. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, most interpersonal, 
intrapersonal and collective lives are structured by scalar valuing more than non-
scalar valuing, creating invidious cultural complexes that impede, and possibly 
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prevent, the large-scale changes that humans need to make in the next thirty years 
if we are to sustain ourselves and the planet. That some cultures exhibit practices 
or systems based upon respect (i.e., the non-scalar acknowledgement of the 
intrinsic worth of a being) should encourage us to imagine that hierarchical 
thinking can be overcome.  
I am not suggesting that humans should, even if they could, stop 
categorizing, being critical, or prioritizing—that is, stop being hermeneutic beings 
who make meaning (salience) in a given situation. Construing the relative worth 
of something in a given situation (i.e., hierarch-ing) is inevitable, for example, 
ranking places to search for wild mushrooms or choosing candidates for a 
particular endeavor, but such critical thought can take place contingently, in a 
non-scalar perceptual frame that does not rely upon hierarch-ing the worth of 
living subjects according to the normative valuing scripted by privilege systems. 
Hierarchical thinking, then, does not refer to the critical capacity to compare items 
but refers to a deeply internalized assessment system based upon de-valuing the 
intrinsic worth of self and other. It is the antipode of a system based upon human 
dignity.  
Furthermore, I am not necessarily rejecting the concept or development of 
self-esteem since comparative difference is an intrinsic attribute of the human. 
But self-esteem produced in a system based upon human dignity and self-respect 
and in which the feeling of belonging is felt by everyone would look very 
different from self-esteem as it is currently experienced.  
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Toward the end of chapter 3, I arrived at the conclusion that hierarchical 
thinking represents a ubiquitous (albeit individuated and individuating) colonizing 
force that overdetermines contemporary intersubjectivity. Furthermore, I 
suggested that what has been perceived as the theorizing of intersubjectivity in a 
universal way has instead actually been a thick description of hierarchical 
thinking, what many refer to as “Western” epistemology (see chapter three) and 
what critical race theorist Zeus Leonardo characterizes as “white epistemology,” 
whose “history is filled stories of genocide, enslavement, and the general process 
of othering,” a “regime of knowing that is inherently oppressive” and that 
“partitions the world for racial domination” (“The Myth of White Ignorance” 
108). Leonardo isolates domination as “a process that that establishes the 
supremacy of a racial group,” and while I respect his distinctions between 
“minority-to-majority attitudes” and white supremacy as necessary distinctions in 
anti-racist pedagogy,30 as well as his distinctions among patriarchy, gender, and 
industrial capitalism as distinct regimes whose processes of domination produce 
differing epistemologies and material practices, my work highlights the 
underlying invidious foundation for, and cause of, the process of domination in 
any form—hierarchical thinking. I am saying that while there are many different 
regimes of domination that vary in time and place and that also produce distinct 
and disparate embodied knowledges and practices, all of them describe variations 
on the cast and hue of a particular intersubjectivity, a specific socio-historical  
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epistemology that has been around for so long that its originary cannot be readily 
discerned.  
Homi Bhabha attributes the cohesiveness of this historical narrative of 
modernity to “a past whose iterative value as sign reinscribes the ‘lessons of the 
past’ into the very textuality of the present” (354). “To take this perspective,” 
Bhabha rightfully observes, “would mean that we see ‘racism’ not simply as a 
hangover from archaic conceptions of the aristocracy, but as part of the historical 
traditions of civic and liberal humanism” (354). (See chapters 2 and 3 for more on 
this position.) Because of the protracted entrenchment of hierarchical thinking, 
which has spun many new hierarchical regimes (e.g., racism, disaster capitalism) 
and variations upon and productions of them (e.g., child sex industry, “honor” 
cultures, the prison-industrial complex), the postmodern critique has 
understandably linked hierarchical politics with intersubjectivity.  
This association between hierarchical politics and intersubjectivity, 
however, has tended toward conflation. For example, far too often in the field of 
rhetoric and composition, “the social” and “the political” are often shorthand for 
the intersubjective, but both terms actually refer to hierarchical politics of 
difference and hierarchical thinking, not to intersubjectivity per se. This, then, 
suggests a need for theorizing intersubjectivity in ways that do not signify 
hierarchical politics. Doing so may lead us to cultivate alternative modes of 
interaction and engagement that lead us out of the morass of violence produced in 
the wake of hierarchical thinking.  
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This chapter contributes to the theorizing of intersubjectivity as a 
rhetorical construct, as a means of leading us beyond the constraints of 
hierarchical thinking. I hope that others will take up this thread and pursue its 
leads, as well as fill in the inevitable blind and vacant spots of my theorizing. 
Although there has been noticeable philosophical (Buber, Heidegger, Levinas, 
Sartre) and psychoanalytic (Freud, Kristeva, Lacan) theorizing of intersubjectivity  
and more recent theorizing with respect to child development, emotion, affect, 
and the “posthuman,”31 the theorizing of what is possible with respect to 
intersubjectivity has received too little attention. While there has been some 
rhetorical scholarship concerning the role of “recognition” (Bourdieu, Hyde, 
Watkins) and “acknowledgement” (Hyde) in self-development and in the 
cultivation of intersubjective awareness (Flower, Holiday, Ratcliffe, Young 
“Assymetrical”), it seems to me that the majority of scholars who do take up “the 
possible” are difference scholars, and they either work to imagine ways to cross 
the lines of difference already instantiated (Higgins, Long, and Flower; Ratcliffe; 
West; Young), or they theorize subversion (Butler) and interruption of the 
iterative (Bhabha, Derrida) or training our rhetorical capacities for intervention 
(Atwill).  
I attempt here a different tack, one that directs attention to how 
hierarchical thinking shapes one’s orientation to the intersubjective realm itself.32 
I argue that in many ways, hierarchical thinking erodes empathy/sympathy and 
thereby attenuates forward-looking engagement with “the social.” Consequently, 
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hierarchical thinking diminishes the human capacity to embrace the potential 
pleasures difference offers as vitally stimulating resources for invention.33 
Furthermore, I argue that the ways in which hierarchical thinking shapes both 
externally-directed and internally-directed behaviors, thoughts, and feelings 
prohibits possible “affordances” (Gibson) of being. I finish the chapter by 
theorizing a potential affordance that goes uncultivated, in an attempt to give a 
sense of the vastness of human intersubjective potential possibly available to 
humans. Needless to say, it is difficult to glimpse what is possible when the 
possible remains largely untapped.  
I open the present chapter with several epigraphs that invoke theorizing 
the possible, including Richard Brautigan’s declaration of the ineffable, 
“Everything is here except that which is missing” and Trinh T. Minh-ha’s 
observation that when faced with difference, “Western” minds cannot see or 
experience its specificity (facticity), having learned “to promptly reject it as they 
assign it to their one-place-fits-all ‘other’ category” (196). My own life 
experiences have shown me that what was once indiscernible to me can become 
discernible, so with that conviction, I attempt to push the envelope of what can be 
said about intersubjective possibility. To that end, I briefly review what difference 
scholarship advocates for expanding intersubjective understanding. I then adopt 
McIntosh’s theoretical approach to analyzing privilege systems: “To redesign 
social systems we need first to acknowledge their colossal unseen dimensions” 
(68).34 While the “unseen” generally refers to that which is unseen by those who 
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occupy positions of privilege (their unearned privileges), this chapter examines 
other unseen dimensions to depict how hierarchical socialization operates as a 
disciplinary framework that structures individual orientation toward the 
intersubjective, operating conatively to reduce volition and to produce mental 
states that frequently mitigate engagement with the social, including 
complacency, denial, and entitlement.  
In many respects, my argument complements recent critiques of the 
hegemonic positioning of late-market capitalism. I do not think as some do, 
however, that the disestablishment of the current economic system subscribed to 
by most of the developed world (referred to by many who would seek to abolish it 
as “crapitalism”) is enough to bring about egalitarianism institutionally and 
interpersonally and that everything will fall in place as soon as the network of 
corporate-capitalist structures (underwritten by neo-liberal economics and neo-
conservative discursive practices) tumbles. Even in flourishing socialist 
democracies, such as Sweden, Denmark, and Finland, that evince significantly 
more care for the material well-being of its inhabitants than do nations like the 
United States, Saudi Arabia, or North Korea, hierarchical thinking persists. Forms 
of social violence underwritten by hierarchical thinking manifest themselves (e.g., 
homicide, suicide, gendered inequality of income, immigration/minority 
population “issues”), demonstrating that hierarchical thinking is as much of an 
elephant in the room as is late-market capitalism. In this regard, I support 
Lawrence Grossberg’s contention that, while “we have to follow Foucault to see 
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the economic…as a condition of possibility of other practices,” we must also 
recognize that “culture is also a condition of possibility of the economic” (323-4). 
Grossberg additionally recommends that “the concept of ‘condition of possibility’ 
should be further explored in terms of articulation” (325).  
This chapter explores the relationship between conditions for possibility 
and articulation. It examines the ways in which hierarchical thinking selectively 
tunes individual attention away from the intersubjective realm to focus on the 
subjective, thereby enabling many of us (to varying degrees and varying contexts) 
to overlook, disregard, dismiss or be stymied by the need establish the conditions 
for human flourishing that were discussed in the previous two chapters. The 
writings of Lillian Smith (1897-1966) initially directed me to think about the 
relationship between privilege systems and conditions for individual and 
collective development because of Smith’s rich intersectional analyses of race, 
sex, gender, and class. Smith recognized that conditions circumscribe articulation, 
particularly with respect to human development.  
Generally speaking, Smith considered the conditions offered to children 
and adults in privilege systems as damaging to all concerned, and she identified 
two necessary conditions for fostering human well-being, writing that “the two 
most fundamental rights of mankind [are] the right to grow and the right to be 
different” (“Vital” 672). As we saw in the previous chapter, oppression occurs 
when either of these conditions is absent, repressed, or oppressed.35  I therefore 
argued in the previous chapter that, since most everyone in contemporary 
 
137
societies is denied both of these fundamental rights, everyone is oppressed (see 
previous chapter for argument). The World Health Organization’s first World 
Report on Violence and Health substantiates this viewpoint in that, according to 
the report, psychological harm and maldevelopment are considered violent acts by 
health practitioners.  
Although it may seem obvious that oppression is violent, it is less obvious 
to argue that those in privileged positions are also oppressed, subjects of abuse. 
Yet as early as the 1930s, Smith (a white woman who grew up in an affluent 
southern household) took this position, arguing that the perception of difference 
structured by hierarchical thinking is embedded in our psyches during childhood, 
damaging everyone, even those in the most privileged subject positions. As I 
mentioned in the introductory chapter, despite my having been raised in what 
would be generally considered a loving home (i.e., absent corporal punishment, 
physical violence, abusive language and so forth and filled with opportunities for 
learning and interaction with a wide variety of others) and despite my having 
attended well-funded public schools in Delaware (where corporal punishment was 
legal until my 4th-grade year),36 like Smith, I too have felt since childhood that 
everything was “awry,” that much of what I was exposed to in school 
(pedagogically and curricularly) and out of school was twisted, but I could not 
articulate my reasons for feeling that way.  
For example, even something as simple as reading groups in my second 
grade class somehow felt injurious. By ranking ability, reading groups reinforced 
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each child’s incipient hierarchical thinking and further taught acceptance of any 
discomfiting feelings children felt by being ranked. Members of each reading 
group were fully aware of and felt their social interpellation even though they 
would not have been able to say that they were learning to esteem and dis-esteem 
others or that they were developing their habitus (Bourdieu) with respect to such 
performances. Despite the efforts of teachers in my elementary school to efface 
hierarchy by assigning each reading group the name of a songbird, every student 
knew the implicit ranking of each group as well as the fact that he or she was 
being ranked. Members of the “Bluebirds,” for example, felt superior to their 
classmates while “Robins” often felt frustrated and inferior, degraded by what 
they perceived as their lack of ability and intelligence.  
As I hoped to show in the previous chapter, scholarship in moral 
psychology explains this discomfort, why all subject positions suffer within 
privilege systems: For one, because to devalue others, one must first learn to 
devalue oneself. Secondly, since witnessing abuse also constitutes abuse (see 
chapter 1), such a dehumanizing and violent basis for learning must, among other 
things, be fear-inducing (see chapter 3). As foundational conditions for 
interpersonal and intrapersonal development, self and other devaluation are more 
than merely symbolic; they have significant debilitating material effects.  
In understanding that the symbolic and the real are interrelated, I argue 
that learning self-devaluation (and, consequently, other-directed devaluation) 
constitutes a psychological harm that not only inhibits “the right to grow” but also 
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engenders epistemic modes that generally do not serve the common or individual 
good (e.g., denial, fear, valorizing self-esteem rather than self-respect and so on). 
Hierarchical conditioning and hierarchical conditions clearly shape articulation, 
manifested in innumerable ways.  
But before we look at some of these articulations, I’d like to first turn to 
difference scholarship for extant suggestions regarding changing those conditions 
currently structured by the problematic of difference.  
Co-opting the Master’s Tool: Difference as a Transformative Tool 
In deference to the fact that this project is largely a historiography of 
Lillian Smith, I frame the following brief literature review on the politics of 
difference with Smith’s contributions to difference scholarship so that I may give 
her credit for her remarkable insight into “the problem of difference,” which 
persists as a social plague. Smith’s analyses in many ways predate and predict 
contemporary scholars’ work concerning politics of difference. For example, 
Smith identified difference as the master’s tool (Lorde)—as a means to maintain 
dominance and privilege through “divide and conquer” (see her “Two Men and a 
Bargain” discussed in chapter 3). Smith also articulates a version of standpoint 
theory (Harding). In her recognition of the value of group-specific knowledge, she 
implicitly predicts epistemic privilege as the following excerpt illustrates:  
I have become convinced that our right to be different is, in a deep 
sense, the most precious right we human beings have, and the one 
most likely, if we hold to it, to ensure the human race a future. We 
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need to treasure human differences where they are important (I 
can’t see that skin color is more important than eye color); we need 
to cherish the unique achievements of various groups…to value the 
various beliefs and ideas and abilities that seem to grow more 
easily in one culture than in another. We may need them all for our 
survival—certainly we shall need some of them one of these days, 
and we don’t know which we shall need the most or where they 
come to birth. (“Words” 151-4)  
That “we may need them all [group-specific differences] for our survival,” never 
knowing in which culture a strategy may come to birth, also depicts Smith’s 
understanding of the potential for difference to be used as a feminist resource 
(Lorde, Ratcliffe, and Young).  
Smith can also be considered the mother of whiteness studies.37 At a time 
when it was common to read of “The Negro Problem,” a phrase that blamed the 
victims of race segregation, not its progenitors, Smith repeatedly reminded her 
readers of the sickness of privilege systems—the problem was not “a Negro 
Problem” but, rather, a problem of privilege—white supremacy. Smith writes, 
“The white man himself is one of the world’s most urgent problems today; not the 
Negro, nor other colored races. We whites must learn to confess this” (How 86). 
And elsewhere, “There is a problem facing all of us, black and white, but it is not 
the Negro Problem.” Rather, “[i]t is the problem, for Negroes, of some way to live  
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a good life with white people,” and “for each white the problem of learning to live 
a good life with himself (“There are Things to Do” 137).  
Forecasting contemporary whiteness studies, Smith unpacks the “Negro 
Problem” ideograph (McGee) in understanding that ideographs “are not full 
arguments…but ideological icebergs: the visible bump of what lies beneath” 
(Coogan 670); ideographic analysis is one way to expose how commonplaces 
operate discursively to conceal history, obscure difference, and constrain change. 
Fiercely and vocally opposed to segregation, in Killers of the Dream Smith uses 
structural analyses of white supremacy, including narrative analyses of the 
“sanctity” of white womanhood, the hyper-sexualization of African American 
men and women, the narrative exploitation of the white underclass, the historical 
and socially-constructed roots of Jim Crow, and the imbrication of the church and 
state, to expose how whiteness kept the southern economic and social power 
structures intact during its transition from chattel slavery to the post-bellum south. 
Smith clearly believed in the power of “transformed understanding” (Flower) and 
“demystification” (West) to bring about social-justice, and, to do so she enacted 
Cornel West’s “prophetic criticism,” which “begins with social structural 
analyses” [but] also makes explicit its moral and political aims” (23).  
Smith also advocated substitutive behavior (Roth, Tatum) as a means of 
transforming both individual habitus (Bordieu) and social norms. In “There are 
Things We Can Do” and, later, in Now is the Time, a handbook for racial 
integration, Smith lists specific practices that whites can undertake to facilitate 
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desegregation. In essence, in these works Smith “disclose[s] options and 
alternatives for transformative praxis,” an approach, according to West, that 
upholds “the central role of human agency” (23). Additionally, Smith recognized 
the affectual constraints of habitus. She consequently hosted interracial gatherings 
for children and adults in understanding that purposeful intermingling could help 
individuals overcome the internalized abjection that results from racial 
segregation. For example, many people felt sick and vomited the first time(s) they 
ate together at interracial gatherings. Importantly, bodies are retrainable and such 
violent physical responses became quickly unlearned. Smith also advocated a 
pedagogy of play (Lugones, Tax), jouissance (Kristeva, Rickert), and prefiguring 
(Roth) as a means to alter habituated praxis.  
While Smith often spoke of the material consequences of what she called 
“the mythic mind,” thus referencing symbolic violence, and while she advocated 
subversive practices as a means to enact positive change similar to Judith Butler, 
one area of difference scholarship that Smith did not anticipate pertains to 
language philosophers’ poststructural critiques of language that ground invention 
in the indeterminancy of language. Even though Smith may not have understood 
the postmodern theoretical precepts underlying change—differánce and alterity—
she nevertheless employed deconstructive analyses and obviously theorized 
possibility and social transformation, calling for radicalism, teleological hope 
(Mathieu), substitutional behavior (Tatum), the prefigurative (Roth) and play 
(Lugones, Tax).  
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Smith also neglected to explicitly embrace conflict as an important 
resource for change and invention, but she did so implicitly. While Smith did not 
articulate the technique of rivaling (Flower, Long) or the role of 
acknowledgement (Hyde) in expanding rhetors’ perspectives, she did embrace 
storytelling and literature as a means to bridge assymetrical positions (Young 
“Assymetrical”) and as a means to increase empathy (Bracher). Smith clearly 
opposed the idea of homogeneity and consensus, explicitly opposing the 
colonialism inherent in the idea of assimilation, which explains her dislike of the 
word “integration.” Disensus as a productive process has a long history in 
composition, cultural, and community studies (Bizzell, Clifford, Malinowitz, 
Pratt, Ryder, Smitherman).  
Smith did, however, embrace oppositional discourse and took it as a 
matter of course to not only practice it herself but also to encourage others to do 
so. For this express purpose, Smith and her partner Paula Snelling started 
Pseudopodia, a journal of literary and social criticism that was successively called 
The Georgia Review and South Today. As both editor of and frequent contributor 
to the journal, which had more than 25,000 subscribers by the end of its decade-
long existence, Smith’s 1942 “Portrait of the Deep South Speaking to Negroes on 
Morale” demonstrates the rhetorical tactics of trickster consciousness (Branch) 
and métis (Atwill) deployed in the service of opposition. As Phyllis Mentzell 
Ryder explains, “rhetors who practice oppositional discourse do so in order to 
intervene in the stories that the dominant culture tells itself—to force the 
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dominant culture to see how its own myths of success, tolerance or benevolence 
cover over oppression” (520).  
In “Portrait of the Deep South Speaking to Negroes on Morale,” Smith 
exposes the racial hypocrisy of the majority of southern whites who, during the 
Second World War, expected African American men to fight abroad for racial 
equality while lacking it at home. Despite its title, “Portrait” is clearly intended 
for a white audience, particularly in its mimicry of commonplaces voiced by 
whites. The following excerpt is a highly redacted version that omits the poetic 
layout of the six-page original; the excerpt nevertheless conveys Smith’s belief in 
the transformative and politically subversive power of art: 
Begin on an indulgently friendly tone: Listen, colored folks, listen 
to me: This is a time for unity! This is no time to be raising your 
hand with questions about our native land!... Chest tone will give 
throbbing effect: You ought to be thankful you live in a place 
where folks can talk of God and democracy and freedom and 
liberty and—(let’s see, what’s another? Yeah, that thing about 
brother—) Yeah, you oughta be thankful just to hear the white race 
talk of brotherhood—you oughta be thankful—and stay in your 
place!...Put iron in voice and jut out jaw: Don’t you know defeatist 
talk about Jim Crow is exactly the kind of talk that pulls morale 
down-low? Speaker’s voice should rise hysterically and his face 
should flush deep purple: And for God’s sake, stop asking us to 
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call you mister!  (You think I’d want a nigger to marry my 
sister?)…Sensible , sane commonsense inflection: All you gotta do 
is fight for what I hold dear. I can’t see what’s so hard for you to 
face! Do what you’re told to do and stay in your place. Leave 
everything else to the dominant race. Voice soothing and softly 
southern: Now how about a little singing? Huh? How about some 
of your good old songs? Nobody can sing like a darky …great 
singing yeah/ I never hear it  [that it] don’t make me think of my 
old mammy singing to me when I was a kid… God bless her… 
nothing like those old mammies… God bless ‘em all…Voice 
booms and booms more and more and more victoriously: Yeah, 
we’ll fight and we’ll fight to the last Jim Crow drop to rid the 
world of Hitlerism and Nazism and all them OTHER ISMS and 
save the American Way so that things can go on forever and ever 
and ever and ever just as they are down here today. (110-15) 
While all of Smith’s writings could be characterized as oppositional, “Portrait” 
clearly illustrates Ryder’s description of oppositional discourse as a “rhetoric that 
is used to attack the benevolent self-image of those who are complicit in 
oppression” (521). According to my research, as I hope to show, that includes 
virtually everyone. 
 
 
 
146
Complicity 
In addition to attacking demagoguery, particularly the collusion between 
“free” media and demagogues, a position strikingly reminiscent of the critiques of 
media control expressed by many journalists and scholars today,38 Smith 
recognized the immense and complicit role individuals play in the maintenance of 
multiple and interlocking hierarchical systems that underwrite violence and 
misery. While Smith smartly identified privilege operating within groups, as in 
white privilege, her rich descriptions of interlocking privilege systems in the Jim 
Crow South evidence her recognition that privilege operates at the level of the 
individual as well. Much as with gender, privilege circulates within every 
individual who grows up within privilege systems, surfacing within the individual 
periodically and depending upon context (and in various forms, including esteem, 
dis-esteem, hate, entitlement, contempt, shame and so on). As discussed in 
chapter two and three, Smith spoke about the indoctrination that takes place by 
rote and ritual during childhood before reflexive practice even emerges as part of 
an individual’s cognition. Smith therefore encouraged her adult readers to 
contemplate their unchallenged assumptions and their unearned privilege, and she 
further called upon them to radicalize.  
Given on the anniversary of the Montgomery bus boycott, Smith’s 1956 
speech “The Right Way is Not a Moderate Way” exemplifies Smith’s call to 
radicalize. Angered by Mark Ethridge’s speech in which he “equated the NAACP 
and Senator James Eastland by labeling both ‘radical’” (Loveland 137), Smith 
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critiques such fallacious thinking. She argues for discrimination among kinds 
(quality), asking “Would you place the thief and the honest man in the same 
moral category?” Advocating the quality of extremism as that which has 
historically promoted positive social change, Smith remarks, “Moderation is the 
slogan of our times,” but it has “never made a man or a nation great” (68). 
“Moderation never mastered ordeal or met a crisis successfully,” nor did it 
discover or invent anything, or “dreamed a new dream” (Smith 68). Smith raises 
the subject of extremism to counter the force of Ethridge’s remark, which 
disparaged the efforts of African Americans to achieve their constitutional rights 
and additionally accomplished the rhetorical work of inscribing fear in those 
whites who might otherwise actively speak out against segregation (Loveland 
152).39 Smith thus uses the ideals of extremism to mobilize her listeners to social 
action. To add momentum and to further her rhetorical purpose, Smith then 
analogizes cancer to the sickness of race relations, which “metastasize[s] 
throughout our country—and indeed, throughout the whole earth” (70) and 
thereby adumbrates the escalating urgency of dealing with global social problems 
that have since reached critical mass fifty-five years later. Smith incisively asks: 
“The question in crisis or ordeal is not: Are you going to be an extremist? The 
question is: What kind of extremist are you going to be?” (68).  
Sadly, Smith’s question would still strike the general U.S. public as 
radical, as a query of a radical extremist rather than a concerned citizen. For 
example, the scientific community projects a thirty-year window in which humans 
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must reduce carbon emissions to 350 parts per million, “the safe upper limit for 
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere” if humans are to survive (350.org). Currently, 
carbon emissions exceed 388 parts per million (350.org). Yet despite the evidence 
that humans are now facing critical global social problems of epic proportions, we 
can see from the fact that whether or not “climate change” is human induced is 
still hotly contested among the public indicates Smith’s call for incisive human 
intervention would be dismissed as radical rather than logical by many. While this 
shrinking from a reality that clearly needs facing may be explained, in part, by 
media misinformation, lack of information, and dissemination of the belief that 
human-induced climate change is “a theory” (i.e., as disprovable), I am convinced 
and hope to show that hierarchical conditioning contributes to a seemingly and 
overwhelming social torpidity, even among individuals who recognize climate 
change as a serious and urgent issue.  
Hierarchical conditioning represents an invidious threat in that it pervades 
human existence and traverses domains, but it also presents an even greater threat, 
I argue, by serving as an overarching system in intersubjective training, much of 
which contributes to the maintenance of hierarchical structures. This 
intersubjective training interferes with the development of collective social 
consciousness in several ways that I show. For one, hierarchical thinking 
influences cognition by working ideologically, culturally delineating import and 
value, for example, training attention toward individualism and endless economic 
growth, interlocking ideologies that work against goals of collective well-being. 
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Secondly, as the previous chapter made clear, hierarchical politics are essentially 
shame-based and shame-producing systems. Shame, as we will see, is generally a 
debilitating emotion that inhibits empathy and thus positive other-directed action. 
Lastly, hierarchical conditioning produces additional socially-averse affects, such 
as denial and complacency, that vitiate thinking about humans as social beings, as 
parts of a social organism whose preservation and well-being are collective 
interests. Overall, hierarchical conditioning thus operates conatively, enervating 
individual motivation to improve collective well-being. Hierarchical conditioning 
can thus be seen as a process of disaffection that erodes moral engagement  
Self-Contained Egos and the Training of the “Self” 
The incredible degree to which humans are social beings who internalize 
and perform their narrative immersions has been a recurring theme throughout 
this work. The rhetorical human capacity to uptake the social is most noticeable 
during childhood when an individual’s openness to social resonance is most 
pronounced. That children are “like sponges,” picking up even the most intangible 
of primary and secondary literacies in their first few years of life suggests the 
porous and permeable nature of human boundaries and the social nature of the 
individual.  
Although this openness to the intersubjective nature of the human may 
have a biological component that affects how porous we can be as we mature, 
how we learn to view ourselves, others, and how we learn to conceptualize the 
social realm are rhetorically influenced. Ironically, the innate human propensity 
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toward the social and the collective is paradoxically subverted through 
hierarchical conditioning, which teaches what Smith calls a dehumanizing vision 
of life. To highlight this dehumanizing vision of life, I use the term “autistic” as 
Jacques Derrida does in Limited Inc. (46) when he critiques the linguist John 
Searle’s reading of Derrida’s work. As a frame for social analysis, “autistic” 
moves beyond “narcissism” (self-absorption) to include emotional detachment, 
impaired communication, and excessive emotional rigidity according to the 
definition of “autism” in my Webster’s Dictionary: “1. Psychology. A pervasive 
developmental disorder of children, characterized by impaired communication, 
excessive rigidity, and emotional detachment. 2. a tendency to view life in terms 
of one’s own needs and desires” (139). If the hierarchical conditioning that Smith 
describes as intrinsic to privilege systems holds, then children immersed in these 
hierarchical systems learn through normative acculturation to be rigid assessors of 
ourselves and others (see chapter 3).  
 Hierarchical conditioning sculpts what I am calling an “autistic” 
intersubjectivity in several ways. Since, as I have been arguing, hierarchical 
thinking is a fear-based perceptual system in which human worth is continually 
assessed according to normative context, to function “successfully” in this fear-
based system, one must learn, to some extent, to close oneself off from threat, 
which can be accomplished in part through emotional detachment. Emotional 
detachment explains my earlier mention of “skin thickening” and my adult ability 
to function in a world filled with suffering. Function, here, refers to more than 
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survival but also to the capacity to be “carefree,” to, say, take vacations and to 
enjoy my daily life, indicating a learned capacity to dismiss and disregard what I 
know about the world (e.g., rare minerals from the eastern part of the Congo that 
are used in all cell phones, computers, and many other electronic products are 
currently funding a war in the Congo where, in the past seven years, more than 
5.5 million people have been murdered and more than 300,000 women brutally 
raped (“Conflict Minerals”) or that many California prisoners, many of whom are 
in jail for life for the possession of small quantities of illegal drugs, are currently 
waging (September 2011) a hunger strike against inhumane treatment riddling the 
California prison system.  
Examples of suffering among humans and other living systems are 
virtually endless, and the complacency that most individuals evince with respect 
to such widespread misery indicates a learned disengagement and a training in 
self-interest. Social praxis that is characterized by “view[ing] life in term’s of 
one’s own needs and desires” is indeed autistic from a rhetorical perspective. If 
autism is a developmental disorder characterized by excessive rigidity, emotional 
detachment, and a self-centered perspective on life, then we might say that 
hierarchical dispositioning represents a developmental disorder among humans 
that registers on a global scale. 
What I am calling “autistic” intersubjective training is largely 
accomplished through the learning of devaluation of human worth that was 
extensively discussed in chapter 3. Learning self-devaluation trains the self to 
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protect itself against threat, which can be accomplished variously: through 
emotional detachment, by acquiring “value” through the eyes of others or oneself 
(i.e., self-esteem), by domination and feelings of power (see chapter 3), and by 
learning to place more importance upon the self than the social, upon “one’s own 
needs and desires.” Even under circumstances that teach subordination to the 
social in which the worth of the individual often goes unrecognized (e.g., 
martyrdom, motherhood, military service, Confucianism), the first three items in 
the preceding list offers individuals protection from the pain that accompanies 
self-devaluation.  
Hierarchical thinking thus represents a training that paradoxically 
constricts the human capacity to interpersonally engage in modes of reciprocal 
self-respect by shoring up the boundaries of the self. In chapter 3 we saw that Iris 
Marion Young refers to this learned solidification of boundaries between the self 
and the social as a “non-overlapping otherness” that “wells from the depths of the 
Western subject’s sense of identity, especially, but not only in the subjectivity of 
privileged groups” (170). Teresa Brennan refers to this shoring up of boundaries 
as the “self-contained ego” (95), which she explains, “maintains itself by 
projecting out the affects that otherwise interfere with its agency (anxiety and any 
sense of inferiority)” (113). The resultant emotional detachment that self-
containment affords individuals, Brennan terms “sealing of the heart.” However 
named, this deeply-felt sense that each of us is self-contained is learned and so 
naturalized that it is difficult to imagine a world in which non-self containment 
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were cultivated. At the end of the chapter, I briefly expand upon the idea of 
cultivating non-self containment.  
This deeply-learned autistic focus on “one’s own needs and desires” is 
further solidified ideologically through the cultural construction of the sovereign 
self, the apotheosis of which has been reached in the American stereotype. Fueled 
by intertwined beliefs in endless growth, profit, individualism, equal opportunity, 
and competition within a meritocratic playing field, the modern self-contained 
subject (whose perceives feelings and beliefs as being generated internally) has 
received extensive attention from scholars to numerable to enumerate. Their work 
underscores the need to alter such narrative training of the self if we are eradicate 
the autistic tendencies to view life through the lens of myopic self-interest that 
accompanies the formation of the self-contained ego, the sense that the self is 
atomistic.  
Michel Foucault promotes destabilizing and subverting “the government 
of individualization” that constructs contemporary subjects. He writes, “the 
government of individualization is comprised of the forms of power that both 
subject us to control by others and those that subject us to ourselves via self-
identification” (331), and he advocates understanding the multiple interlocking 
narratives by which we define ourselves and others as a means by which we can 
challenge such power. Heeding Foucault’s advice, I hope to show in the next 
section that, while each of us identifies with multiple yet varying narratives, many  
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narratives, even care-based, socially-minded, and maturation (self-development) 
narratives, can work in service of the metanarrative of privilege. 
The Hegemony of Privilege 
The question of how aporetic narratives co-exist (e.g., democracy and Jim 
Crow) framed chapter two, as this question drove Smith to theorize difference. 
Smith was understandably baffled by the ability of people to integrate Christian 
and democratic values into a segregationist (Jim Crow) worldview as well as by 
the learned ability of white children in the Jim Crow South to simultaneously love 
and dis-esteem their Black nannies, servants, and friends. Sharon Crowley coins 
the term “ideologic” to refer to the interlocking nexus of narrative beliefs in 
service of an ideology, and she suggests the “concept of ideologic may serve 
rhetorical criticism insofar as its analysis can demonstrate how beliefs connect to 
one another” (77).  
That seeming disparate and contradictory narratives work in tandem to 
support an ideology is quite evident in the case of hierarchical thinking, which, as 
I have been arguing, operates as an underlying perceptual scheme, a metanarrative 
so inventionally flexible and productive that it can accommodate a seemingly 
endless variety of narratives that ultimately reinforce the ideology of hierarchy 
and privilege. The myths of meritocracy, capitalism, and the sovereign self 
represent some of the more well-known interlocking narratives that are deployed 
in the service of privilege systems, but even the most benign narratives and 
literacies can serve an ideologic of privilege. The following anecdote illustrates 
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how our childhood experiences sear those hierarchical values of privilege deep 
into our very selves.  
Apparently I was already instilled with a work ethic when I asked my 
father if I could help him work in the yard one summer when I was five or six. As 
I don’t remember a single instance when my father refused my company, he 
enthusiastically agreed and opted to teach me to weed, probably thinking that 
weeding would be an age-appropriate task for me. Ultimately, he was right. 
Weeding might seem like an easy task for a young child, but my recollection of 
events indicates that even the simplest tasks teach much deeper lessons. Along 
with having to learn to classify plants, I had to learn a much more difficult lesson 
to successfully weed. I had to learn that some life was more valuable than others. 
Although I can now think of weeding in utilitarian terms of sacrifice, I distinctly 
remember feeling when I was first shown how to weed, as I stared at the exposed 
roots of a rapidly wilting plant lying deathlike in the full rays of the sun, that I had 
to learn to kill in order to weed. The thought of killing was agitating (my initial 
descriptor “disturbed” leaves out the melodramatic and turbulent feel of the 
experience). Why did I have to yank out my favorite flower, the dandelion, but 
not its neighbor, a similar looking plant? 
To calm my evident dismay, I now realize, my father moved me from a 
flower bed to the vegetable garden where he introduced two additional literacies 
that would not supplant my rapidly-consolidating hierarchical awareness but 
would, at least, provide possibilities for tempering it—utilitarianism and 
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expertise. Taking me by the hand, my father patiently gave me a tour of the 
vegetable garden, showing me and naming the plants that we would eat, each of 
which needed room to grow. By teaching me to distinguish between edible plants 
and non-edible weeds (a distinction that itself was probably spurious since many 
of the weeds were likely edible plants), my father imbued me with a sense of 
expertise through taxonomy. Expertise augmented my self-esteem, for which I 
had already developed a seemingly endless desire. In addition, by situating 
weeding within a frame of utilitarianism, my father also taught me a kind of 
“enlightened,” albeit Machiavellian, paternalism. “See?” he said, as he 
demonstrated. “By thinning out the lettuce, we make room for some of the lettuce 
to live and grow big. If we don’t weed it, the lettuce will become overcrowded 
and all of it will die.” Expertise quickly supplanted my sense of egalitarianism, 
and soon after I could as easily weed a flower bed as a vegetable patch.  
While expertise and utilitarianism are clearly not narratives that are 
damaging in and of themselves,40 they can be, when used, as they frequently are, 
in the service of hierarchical systems. Milton Freedman’s free-market economic 
theory for which he won a Nobel Prize is a prime example of how a narrative of 
expertise was consciously deployed and cultivated in service of corporate 
privilege with severely damaging consequences worldwide (Klein). The discourse 
of utilitarianism has also operated similarly, as in the example of “gradualism” 
(see chapter three) which was circulated to purposefully diffuse the momentum of 
both the suffrage and Civil Rights movements. Narrative intersection and 
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integration to support various ideologics offers an endless source for rhetorical 
analysis, but for my purposes, the relevance of how narratives operate rests in 
showing how aporetic narratives can work in the service of privilege systems to 
teach acceptance of a dehumanized and dehumanizing status quo.  
As Smith understood, immersion in and performance of dehumanizing 
privilege systems takes place during childhood when children learn a sense of 
self. The first epigraph to this chapter refers to the sustenance of ignorance, and 
one of the primary ways by which we learn to ignore the truly intersubjective 
nature of the individual is through, as mentioned, the training of the self-contained 
ego during childhood when the illusion of opposition between the individual and 
the social is learned and solidified. While that illusion may vary according to 
nation, ethnicity, and family, hierarchical thinking works to make the boundaries 
between the individual and the social more pronounced, strengthening the 
inside/outside dichotomy. In chapter three, I argued that hierarchical 
intersubjectivity can be seen as a distinct historical phenomenon, the abolition of 
which can only be glimpsed more than felt. Moving beyond this “zeitgeist” is 
hampered, however, by its hegemonic positioning (and our “dispositioning”).  
Sharon Crowley succinctly explains how hegemonic assumptions work: 
“[h]egemonic discourses construct and inform community experience to such an 
extent that their assumptions seem natural, ‘just the way things are’” (12). The 
“self-contained” ego exemplifies hegemony as defined by Crowley: “any set of 
signifiers and practices that achieves a powerful, near-exclusive hold on a 
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community’s beliefs and actions” (63). Hierarchical politics also maintains 
hegemony through its naturalization of human violence and suffering as intrinsic 
to the human condition. It is important to remember that hegemonic, as Eduardo 
Bonilla-Silva explains, “means that domination is achieved more through consent 
than by coercion” (27 N21). As schemes of perception, hierarchical (privilege) 
systems predispose individuals to naturalize values and concepts, such as war and 
capitalist economics that trump other “universal” values, such as life and liberty, 
with the common sense discourse of human nature. The hegemony of hierarchical 
thinking is equally invidious in its ability to accommodate narratives and daily 
praxis that contradict it, including narratives that build self-confidence and a sense 
of belonging (e.g., self-esteem and expertise) as well as praxes of democracy, 
empathy, and cooperation. 
Eroders of Empathy  
The hegemonic positioning of hierarchical thinking is further maintained 
through the circulation of shame, which as we saw in chapter 3, is a common 
epistemic production of hierarchical systems and hierarchical thinking, the 
“pathogen” by which the pandemic of violence is circulated (Gilligan). In Shame 
and Guilt, the authors, June Price Tangney and Ronda L. Dearing, both clinical 
psychologists who review recent research as well as conduct several clinical 
studies of their own, explain that, while shame and guilt are both self-directed 
attributions of blame, shame erodes empathy whereas guilt motivates “other-
oriented empathy” and thus other-directed reparation (87): “[R]ather than 
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promoting other-oriented empathic concern, the acute self-focus of shame is 
likely to foster self-oriented personal distress responses” (83). “When people feel 
shame over a particular failure or transgression, they are berating themselves not 
just for the specific event; rather they are damning themselves—the core of their 
being—as flawed, useless, despicable” (92), which again evokes the correlation 
between shame and the hierarchical learning of self-devaluation of which I have 
been speaking. This correlation also speaks to the need to broadly cultivate self-
respect (c.f. self-esteem) as a foundation for the development of socially-just 
societies.  
Interestingly, guilt operates much differently than shame. Guilt emerges 
from a focus on a specific behavior rather than the entire self, thereby de-
centering the behavior from the self. The separation of behavior from the self, 
Tangney and Dearing note, most often results in a person considering the effects 
of his or her behavior on others rather than, as in the case of shame, “others’ 
evaluations of the self” (82). Unlike shame, guilt is other-directed and thus likely 
leads to empathy, according to the authors. The importance of empathy, they 
claim, should not be underestimated in moral affairs: “Researchers and clinicians 
alike would readily agree that the capacity for empathy” not only “facilitates 
positive, mutually rewarding interpersonal relationships” but also “inhibits 
aversive destructive behaviors toward others” (89). Empathy, then, is integral to a 
well functioning society.  
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Beyond eroding empathy and attention toward the social, shame also 
engenders other destructive social behaviors, including rage and withdrawal. 
Tangney and Dearing were surprised to find that, contrary to their hypotheses, 
shame does not “curb socially unacceptable impulses such as anger and 
aggression” as was previously assumed (90). Previously, psychological research 
had assumed that a preoccupation with one’s own blame would make “the 
question of others’ blame moot.” (91). Recent research, however, demonstrates 
that blaming others “can serve an ego-protective function” (92). Hence shamed 
people, especially those who have few or no avenues for developing self-esteem 
as was discussed in chapter 3 (Gilligan), resort to anger and aggression quickly, 
developing a “shame-to-anger” response that often projects blame inaccurately 
upon anyone that the shamed person perceives as disapproving:  
A shamed person is acutely conscious of what other people might 
be thinking about them. From there, it’s a short step to attribute the 
cause of painful feelings to others who are perceived as 
disapproving…Feeling shamed, feeling diminished in comparison 
to others, and simultaneously scrutinized and evaluated by 
others…The point is that the phenomenology of shame itself 
involves a heightened awareness of others’ presumed evaluations. 
(Tangney and Dearing 94) 
The shame-to-anger response well illustrates the internalization of hierarchical 
thinking and the appraisal of human worth upon which it relies. But more to the 
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point of this chapter, we can see that processes of shame often result in inaccurate 
externalizations of blame—material manifestations of a denial that protects the 
ego but inhibits self-reflection and, consequently, self development and self 
repair. Overall it seems that shame deflects attention away from the collective 
good and away from ourselves as intersubjective beings.  
Withdrawal is likewise an internalized shame-producing strategy that also 
trains attention away from engagement with others. According to Tangney and 
Dearing, “Research has consistently shown that feelings of shame are associated 
with a desire to hide and escape” (92). While withdrawal constitutes an avoidant 
behavior, as a strategy it is not a very effective option because withdrawal leaves 
the shamed “saddled with a loathsome self” (Tangney and Dearing 92). 
Contrasted with externalized blame (manifested via aggression), withdrawal does 
not enable an individual to deny his or her “badness” (Tangney and Dearing 92). 
Nevertheless, both strategies erode empathy, detract from interpersonal and 
intrapersonal well-being, and divert individual attention from reflecting upon 
individual and self-development, upon who and what we’d like to become. 
Furthermore, shame further enervates attention toward and motivation to 
contributing to social well-being because it “evokes such strong feelings of anger 
and hostility toward the self” that shamed individuals “may feel overwhelmed and 
paralyzed by it” (Tangney and Dearing 97)  
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So Where Does This Leave Us? 
In short, what I have been arguing as an autistic orientation toward the 
social (intersubjective) realm leaves individuals alienated from themselves and 
each other, creating conditions that unfortunately vitiate social awareness and 
social action. Scholarship on alienation still largely draws upon Melvin Seeman’s 
1959 article, “On the Meaning of Alienation,” in which he lists five classical 
dimensions of alienation, all of which remain “essential in a wide variety of fields 
(e.g., in studies of work, health, collective behavior, and political life)” (783): 1) 
powerlessness (vs. personal mastery) 2) social isolation and loneliness (vs. 
community) 3) intrinsic engagement in work (vs. extrinsic, self-estranged 
activity) 4) distrust, meaninglessness, and 5) cultural estrangement (vs. shared 
values). The list is striking in that it describes much of what is wrong in people’s 
lives. Most individuals have experienced one or more of these at some point in 
their lives while many experience alienation from others or from their work 
regularly. Assuming that one accepts the validity of the listed items as indicators 
of sociality, then alienation remains a prevalent and disturbing social issue. 
Periodic alienation may, of course, produce occasional psychological and social 
benefits (e.g., renewed appreciation of one’s friend or of one’s work), but 
occasional benefits do not outweigh its costs on the whole. Generally speaking, 
most individuals are not afforded meaningfulness throughout the domains of their 
existence. The fact that a lack of meaningfulness (in at least one or several of  
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these five indices) can be attributed to most individuals in the world is an 
indicator that we live in a sociality that accepts alienation as a given. 
Lauren Berlant terms this network of widespread alienation “political 
depression.” Political depression, she writes, “persists in affective judgments of 
the world’s intractability—evidenced in affectlessness, apathy, coolness, 
cynicism, and so on—modes of what might be called detachment that are really 
not detached at all but constitute ongoing relations of sociality” (97). At issue, 
Berlant continues, is “the difficulty of detaching from life-building modalities that 
can no longer be said to be doing their work” (97). In other words, if I understand 
Berlant accurately, the sociality that alienation engenders, even for those who are 
purportedly living “the good life,” actually “wears out the subjects who 
nonetheless, and at the same time, find their conditions of possibility within it” 
(97). It becomes imperative, then, that we interrogate these modes of alienation as 
forms of attachment that constrain intersubjective engagement.  
The concept of alienation invokes outsider/insider knowledge that, I 
argued in chapter three, forms the basis of learning to devalue oneself and others 
that underwrites hierarchical politics and hierarchical thinking. Learning to 
devalue oneself, I explained, must engender a deep-seated fear, a mistrust of 
people centered at the core of our intersubjective experience. Although we may 
have learned to naturalize that fear, depending upon context, naturalization merely 
obscures a fear that is so deeply learned as to be “forgotten.” Brian Massumi 
defines fear as “the anticipatory reality in the present of a threatening future,” a 
 
164
“felt reality of the nonexistent” which, despite being nonexistent is always present 
(54). I hope to make clear that the always present fear that underwrites and 
catalyzes hierarchical appraisal represents a real threat to individual and collective 
well-being, particularly since this fear operates at the level of perception. 
Recently, the neurophysiologist Joseph LeDoux has found evidence of an 
appraisal system that sounds much like what I have been talking about. LeDoux 
has located “a fear circuit in the brain that operates very fast and without 
awareness” and that is capable of “comput[ing] the affective significance of a 
stimulus without the organism’s being able to recognize what the stimulus is” 
(35).  
Given these circumstances, we must take the fear-based and shame-based 
system of hierarchical thinking into consideration if we expect to make any 
significant change in the realm of social justice. I therefore suggest that we heed 
McIntosh’s advice that if we are to redesign social systems, “we need first to 
acknowledge their colossal unseen dimensions.” This chapter has reviewed some 
of the unseen dimensions of hierarchical politics and hierarchical thinking: 
widespread alienation and its many facets and epistemic and affective modalities 
that enervate social inclination. While tackling such an enormous task is beyond 
my reach, I can at least point us in a direction to begin. That space of inquiry, as I 
have hoped to make clear, is intersubjective training, specifically moving away 
from autistic intersubjectivity (based upon fear) toward a cultivation of 
intersubjectivity that is not based fear-based. Collectively speaking, however, to 
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cultivate such intersubjective knowledge we must foray into fairly unexplored 
terrain throughout the disciplines. 
The Role of Rhetoric and Composition  
Having drawn from Marxist and sociological discussions of alienation to 
promote student engagement (e.g., student-centeredness, mutual recognition, the 
construction of non-hostile learning climates), the combined fields of rhetoric and 
composition as a whole have insightfully recognized and eagerly taken up the 
subject of fostering inclusive and cooperatively-oriented engagement. In fact, 
since the “social turn,” so many scholars have taken up the subject that it is 
impossible to choose a representative sample. While the original focus of 
scholarship about fostering engagement may have generally been directed toward 
the underprivileged and the traditionally disenfranchised, more recent feminist 
work, however, has recognized that student engagement entails more than 
opening spaces for those who have been silenced but also entails getting students 
from privileged groups to engage with their own privilege, for example white 
privilege, hetero-normative privilege, and gender privilege. Queer studies, gender 
studies, whiteness studies and even general ethnic studies programs, however, are 
often resisted and dismissed by students and the public as unworthy curricula 
forwarded by left-leaning ideologues. Nevertheless, many scholars within the 
field of rhetoric and composition have attempted to counter this trend.  
Resistance to such socially relevant topics, however, reinforces the point 
that privilege operates as a rhetorical system that often blinds people to their own 
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positions of privilege. One’s context(s) of privilege is obviously important to an 
individual’s social awareness. For example, hearing people who have lived with 
(or spent a lot of time with) a deaf person are more likely to perceive their own 
hearing privilege than do those uninitiated to deafness. The “initiated” have more 
access to comparison, to witnessing and experiencing the exclusion frequently felt 
by their deaf companions.  
Group-specific privilege is an extremely important topic, yet as I hope to 
have brought to light in this and preceding chapters, the topic of privilege as an 
extremely complex system that inhibits social progress deserves and needs much 
more scholarly attention than it has received, particularly because as an 
arrangement (disposition), privilege (hierarchical thinking) virtually stifles social 
invention.  
We need, then, to invent. While it may seem strange at first, and while 
many of us will start out upon what will ultimately turn out to be dead-ends, 
especially since there is no full-scale non-hierarchical system in place, we must 
work to un-do hierarchical thinking, which is, as I have been arguing, an 
internalized episteme that affects and is performed by everyone. Taking up Judith 
Butler’s term “intelligibility,” which is “that which is produced as a consequence 
of recognition according to prevailing social norms” (3), we must figure out how 
to make non-hierarchical thinking and systems based upon non-hierarchical 
thinking intelligible.  
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Postmodern theory has opened the door for work on interconnectivity and 
more detailed studies of humans as social beings. Brennan claims that “The ego, 
in turn, at least in part is a vehicle for distorting our place in the scheme of things, 
and it does this most effectively when we have no idea any longer of what that 
place is” (157). We may not know “of what that place is” and we may not yet 
have all of the epistemic tools needed to counter our ignorance, as the epigraph to 
this chapter by Nancy Tuana indicates. Nevertheless, I hope that discussion of 
hierarchical thinking and its influence upon contemporary intersubjectivity and 
intersubjective knowledge-making may direct our attention away from the 
atomistic self and toward the tremendous importance of the social—particularly 
the human making of it as well as its inventional potential. Attention to the human 
social body—as a corporeal collective body—is as yet largely untheorized. 
Human interconnectivity is, however, theoretically tenable. Like all concepts, it 
must first be noticed in order to be cultivated and made “intelligible” (Butler). As 
Brennan once powerfully remarked, “Of that we cannot speak, thereof we must 
learn” (164).    
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CHAPTER 5 
RHETORICAL IMPLICATIONS: PERSONS INCORPORATED 
We saw only—though we could not yet admit it—that our burden, that burden 
which our fathers had believed to be the “colored races,” was our own past, that 
the heavy weight that lay on our hearts was our own childhood, that the change 
we felt unable to make was a change in ourselves. —Lillian Smith (Killers of the 
Dream 234) 
 
Community lives on difference, on the touch of difference of other bodies that 
cannot be assimilated to mine…A politics of exclusion presents a picture of 
community with which community cannot live. —Rosalyn Disprose qtd. in 
Bertelsen and Murphie 152) 
 
I would like to imagine that we could approach the social world the way Aristotle 
did the natural world, believing that the delights of the senses bear witness to our 
desire to know, and that our desire to know consists in the pleasure of bringing 
differences to light. —Janet Atwill  
 
 
Most people with a sense of aesthetic appreciation would agree that 
difference is a beautiful thing. Apples will never be oranges, nor would it be in 
our best interest to make them so. Any modern day biologist will attest to the 
supreme importance of difference (diversity) in the natural world for creating and 
maintaining healthy and balanced ecosystems. Similarly, difference is a crucial 
and inescapable element in building and maintaining healthy human societies. 
Difference is the fly in the ointment whose presence there is necessary and 
essential to the ointment’s healing properties.  
Since the 1990’s, difference scholars have been urging humanists to 
reframe difference, to reconfigure it. As Janet Atwill explains, “difference can no 
longer be the anomaly, the enemy, or the problem to be solved. Difference is the  
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condition” (212). Despite their understanding that a global perceptual change 
must occur if difference as an intrinsic underlying condition of human existence is 
to be universally accepted, welcomed, and embraced, difference scholars have not 
sufficiently attended to how such a dramatic epistemic shift might be 
implemented. What are the most efficacious strategies that we might undertake to 
bring about such a dramatic epistemic shift?  
This dissertation provides a point of departure from which to begin 
answering this question. Difference is an intrinsic and immutable condition of 
humanity. If we humans are to overcome obstacles to social equality and justice, 
we must not make difference itself an obstacle to overcome, but a thing to be 
cherished. I have argued that if the idea of difference is to be perceptually 
reconfigured as such, it must first achieve epistemic acceptance by becoming 
commonplace. Scholars therefore need to turn their attention away from 
difference, which in itself is not the underlying cause of societal problems. How 
could difference be the problem if it is a given of the human condition?  
Instead of taking up the problem of difference, I have argued that scholars 
need to take up the problem of hierarchical thinking, which, as the previous 
chapters show, is the predominant underlying cause of societal failures. 
Hierarchical thinking derails well-intentioned efforts toward a just and equitable 
human society at all levels, to say nothing of its deleterious effects on the quality 
of human life and the health of environmental ecosystems. As that which 
instigates, legitimates, sustains, and perpetuates violence of all sorts and at all 
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levels (e.g., intrapersonal, institutional), hierarchical thinking is the substructural 
prime mover of a violent world whose brutal practices and legacy seem too 
durable and too concatenated to untangle. Taking on the problem of hierarchical 
thinking as a mode of intervention provides just the means to begin undoing the 
damage hierarchical thinking has done.  
This work has so far demonstrated that hierarchical thinking is a deeply 
learned and internalized appraisal system based upon the devaluing of self and 
others (extendable to non-human life as well). Not to be confused with the human 
propensity to make sense of the world through the ranking of objects, hierarchical 
thinking relies upon the callous ability to see ourselves and others as “less than” 
fully human, or less than sentient or feeling (as is most often exhibited where non-
human life is concerned). Learned and naturalized by individuals prior to their 
development of conscious reflection and metacognition, the cross-cultural 
prevalence of hierarchical thinking described in foregoing chapters indicates that, 
despite commonplaces that suggest that life is ideologically valorized as sacred in 
many cultures (via frequent lip-service, literature, and ceremony devoted to the 
importance of, e.g., democracy, individuality, and/or collective well-being), 
hierarchical thinking represents an invidious self-generating system that 
counteracts ideologies that esteem the intrinsic worth of life. Practically speaking, 
reverence for human dignity and the worth of living beings cannot fit within the 
parameters of a system that rejects the intrinsic worth of self and other.  
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Since social justice progress depends upon a conception of life as 
intrinsically worthy, hierarchical thinking, then, presents the problem space 
scholars need to take up, and soon. While the preceding chapters demonstrate the 
value of discussing hierarchical thinking and the need to establishing equity 
institutionally, for example educationally and economically,41 this chapter focuses 
on the rhetorical implications of my project: 1) privilege as a rhetorical construct 
and 2) the untapped inventional potential of the postmodern understanding of 
intersubjectivity. A thorough and ongoing examination of these two concepts 
reveals a significant relationship between hierarchical thinking (i.e., the epistemic 
reduction of others) and the postmodern understanding of embodiment. This 
relationship suggests that deliberate collective attention to the problem of 
hierarchical thinking will provide a mode of intervention that is productive, in the 
sense that Atwill uses the term, as a means by which we may change “what is” to 
“what can be otherwise” (173) to create “new versions of the real and valuable” 
(206).  
Privilege as a Rhetorical Construct 
Discussed earlier, Lillian Smith’s vivid descriptions of Jim Crow serve to 
show how privilege is a damaging construct that operates fluidly, internalized by 
all and performed by individuals depending upon situation, much as power or 
gender operates. For example, Alma, the stern mother of the white male 
protagonist in Strange Fruit, wields power and privilege by reinscribing the mores 
of southern tradition upon her children (thus exerting a hold over her son’s 
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thoughts and actions even when he is not in her presence). Yet the very same 
character, Alma, in another scene abdicates that privilege when cowed by her 
husband’s harsh criticism of her. As with gender, Smith’s characters (both black 
and white) are variously beneficiaries and agents of an exploitative social order 
while being bound by the constraints of that same order.  
Chapter two demonstrated why Smith deserves recognition for articulating 
a comprehensive rhetorical theory that alludes to and describes large systems of 
privilege of which Jim Crow is merely representational, systems that enable 
people to feel intrinsically superior or inferior to others, not merely along the lines 
of white superiority, but by any terms of normative judgment. Delineating the 
contours of this networked system of privilege provides several rhetorical lessons. 
But before I discuss the rhetorical implications of my reading of Smith, I 
would like to defend my use of the term “privilege.” Zeus Leonardo cautions 
against using the term “privilege” in a way that conceals the exploitation of 
underclasses by the dominant majority. He writes, “Instead of emphasizing the 
process of appropriation, the discourse of [white] privilege centers the discussion 
on the advantages that whites receive” (“The Color of Supremacy” 38). “As a 
result,” he explains, “the theme of privilege obscures the subject of domination, or 
the agent of actions, because the situation is described as happening almost 
without the knowledge of whites, rather than on the backs of people of color” 
(“The Color of Supremacy” 38). Admittedly, this project does sketch a politics of  
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privilege that precedes and exceeds its practitioners and that could, therefore, be 
critiqued for obscuring the “subject of domination.”  
My hope, however, in using the concept of privilege is not to minimize 
the suffering felt around the world but to emphasize it, to show that a world 
underwritten by hierarchical thinking (whose reliance upon the concept of 
privilege is key) is a roiling networked disaster. I use the term because this 
complex network, constituted by the “macro” (hierarchical systems) and the 
“micro” (individual performance/hierarchical thinking), relies upon the concept of 
“privilege” to function, I use the term. Additionally, privilege as a rhetorical 
construct provides the added benefit of conveying a notion of distributed agency 
that supports a network model of systems of domination. That is, hierarchical 
politics relies upon the participation and performance of every-body. Virtually 
everyone is a victim of the colonizing force of hierarchical thinking. Ironically, 
then, the material and symbolic violence inflicted by becoming hierarchically 
dispositioned ironically turns the very victims of hierarchical thinking into its 
perpetrators via narrative immersion. 
An additional benefit of seeing privilege as a rhetorical construct is that it 
conceptually enables rhetoricians and other scholars to capture the 
intersectionality of critical lenses (e.g., race, nationality, sex, class, ability) as well 
as its productive power (dynamis). Unyoking privilege from group privilege in 
this fashion does not mitigate the importance of scholarship about group privilege 
that has been undertaken in critical race theory (CRT) (Hill-Collins, Leonardo), 
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political philosophy (Alcoff, Young), or education (Kozol, Prendergast) but rather 
should be seen as an additional theoretical lens that enables a more accurate 
hermeneutic of individual performance. Depicting privilege as a rhetorical 
construct permits a vision of performance that is neither over- nor under-
determined yet that nonetheless exhibits the effects of narrative immersion, how 
narratives of privilege (categories of difference) “live through individuals who 
interpret [them] and operationalize [them] into a set of social practices” (Alcoff 
114). Privilege as a rhetorical construct can thus explain variance within an 
individual, who might adopt normative privilege depending upon context, feelings 
of agency, and identification. We see such individual variance, for example, in 
Smith’s characters, such as the figure of Alma who was described earlier.  
Because a rhetorical perspective of privilege acknowledges both the 
multiplicity of an individual’s group memberships as well as her agency, it also 
accounts for variance within a group, for instance, why some members of a group 
might recognize their position(s) of privilege and consciously work to resist the 
normative force of privilege by interrogating its assumptions and by making the 
normative position transparent rather than universalized.  
Lastly, privilege as a rhetorical construct acknowledges the force of 
multiple oppressions (categories of difference) and explains the epistemic 
productions and material practices such overlapping oppressions (or privileges) 
produce. Un-tethered from group identity, privilege as a rhetorical construct thus 
offers a means to speak about the articulation of multiple categories of difference 
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(or normative positions) within an individual. It thus does not flatten out the lived 
feeling that privilege systems generate. Whereas the unearned advantages that 
come with group-specific privilege (McIntosh) are often spoken about as 
intangible assets that are separate from the individual who benefits from them, my 
findings suggest that, just as the accumulation of oppressions is not merely 
additive (Crenshaw, Lugones), the amalgamation of privilege can be 
epistemically productive, producing hybrid subjectivities as well. 
Hierarchical Thinking as Poesis 
Many examples of the productive and mutable nature of hierarchical 
thinking and hierarchical systems have been discussed in previous chapters, for 
instance how the outlawing of chattel slavery in the United States prompted an 
equally brutal, widespread system of convict leasing that lasted until World War 
II (Blackmon). That perhaps a hundred thousand African Americans were 
enslaved after slavery was officially abolished in the U.S. (Blackmon) attests to 
the productive and, maybe more importantly, naturalized nature of hierarchical 
thinking and the systems it produces. Seeing hierarchical thinking in the 
productive sense (Atwill), as an interpretive scheme that structures perception and 
material practices helps to explain its vitality and persistence, as well as 
humanity’s socio-historical legacy of inequity and social stratification that has 
been around so long, we do not know its origins. The seeming permanence of a 
violent inequitable world works to engender its hegemonic positioning, according 
to Pierre Bourdieu, by “inclin[ing] agents to make a virtue of necessity, that is to 
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refuse what is anyway refused and to love the inevitable” (qtd. in Atwill 159). We 
can see, then, that hierarchical thinking and privilege systems operate plastically 
and productively, as poesis, making.  
Yet, as I argue in the next two sections, while the poesis of hierarchical 
thinking may be endlessly generative (as humanity’s sustained socio-historical 
“moment” of social stratification, inequity, and violence would suggest), 
hierarchical thinking “places” us physically (and historically), limiting our 
intersubjective potential in ways that call in question our understanding of 
invention, particularly what constitutes “available means” (Aristotle).  
“Embodiment of Limits”: Marks in a Con Game  
As we saw in chapter two, Smith exposes individuals’ complicity in 
perpetuating larger systems of inequity by describing the ways in which 
exclusionary boundaries are learned by the body, etched and re-etched by 
individuals daily. Smith shows how privilege and exclusion are learned by rote 
and ritual to become naturalized performances:  
What white southerner of my generation ever stops to think consciously 
where to go or asks himself it if is right for him to go there! His muscles 
know where he can go and take him to the front of the streetcar, to the 
front of the bus, to the big school, to the hospital, to the library, to hotel 
and restaurant and picture show, into the best that his town has to offer its 
citizens. These ceremonials in honor of white supremacy, performed from 
babyhood, slip from the conscious mind down deep into muscles and 
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glands and on into that region where mature ideals rarely find entrance. 
(Killers 96)  
Well ahead of current body and performance scholarship, Smith understands such 
performances as cultural fictions that nevertheless become corporeal and “real,” 
sedimented and naturalized over time through repeated practice.  
The beauty of Smith’s work here resides in her ability to highlight how 
hierarchical systems of injustice (the “macro”) rely upon “the micro”—individual 
performance—for their perpetuation. She helps us see ourselves as marks in a 
field of play, much as words function in language to cohere meaning. In symbolic 
systems, meanings are constructed within fields of difference so that, like words, 
each mark contains no essential meaning, yet collectively agreed upon 
meanings—often with slight alterity—take up residence in the mark.  
While Jacques Derrida reminds us that contexts are unsaturable, an idea 
pregnant with hope and inventional possibility—“the capacity to be otherwise” 
(Atwill 175)—Smith’s work has urged me to instead reflect upon the “relative 
stability of the dominant interpretation” (Derrida Limited 143), what Atwill refers 
to as “the embodiment of limits” (160). My project suggests that social and 
political intransigence (which is underwritten by hierarchical thinking i.e., the 
ability to reduce and dehumanize ourselves and others)—is not only embedded 
within our language but is embodied within our very selves, poised to be passed 
on to the next generation. 
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We are the marks of a larger symbolic system underwritten by 
hierarchical thinking and privilege, and as I argued in chapter three, each of us has 
been constrained by the limitations imposed by our becoming hierarchically 
disposed. In fact, if we take up the metaphor of cancer that Smith uses for a 
politics of exclusion, we might say that we are not only diseased, but actually 
nourishing the disease that debilitates us by way of our learned capacity to 
dehumanize ourselves and others. Our learned capacity for “symbolic” (read: real) 
violence, however, circumscribes and constrains our very beings because, as 
chapter three explicates, hierarchical thinking solidifies boundaries epistemically 
and ontologically, particularly the boundaries of the self. The perceptual 
foundations of hierarchical thinking, which are learned by nearly everyone on the 
planet, are based in fear and loathing of ourselves and others, or put more gently, 
in learning to perceptually “place” ourselves and others in relation to each other 
via interpellation, and as a result, we physically become what we are taught— 
having learned to embody a politics of exclusion, we withdraw from ourselves 
and others. As we grow up, we learn to “toughen our skin.” Drawing upon the 
work of phenomenologists, Alcoff explains that “it makes more sense to think of 
the body as, oddly enough, a kind of mind, but one with physical appearance, 
location, and specific instantiation” (114). If indeed, as I suggest, hierarchical 
thinking serves as “the mind” of our corporeal selves, then we have learned—at 
the very deepest levels—to shrink away from intimacy with ourselves and others 
(and with the natural world). We learn to perform what, Atwill explains, is the 
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most serious injustice, according to Jean-François Lyotard, “the failure to address 
or to be addressed by the other—a failure that amounts to the refusal of a 
relationship” (212). In other words, because each of us has internalized 
hierarchical thinking, each of us is a both victim and perpetrator of this “mind.”  
The Untapped Inventional Potential of the Postmodern Understanding of 
Intersubjectivity    
A postmodern understanding of intersubjectivity provides us with a means 
to think about what a differently embodied “mind” might look like, a “mind” that 
doesn’t refuse self-other relationships. While the postmodern critique has 
theoretically, at least, fully demonstrated the mythic nature of the categorical 
borders between oneself and others, I want to point out that our perceptual and 
lived experiences remain modern, not postmodern. Our understanding of the 
porous nature of human existence is far more intellectual than embodied, and, as 
scholars, we haven’t sufficiently delved into the inventional potential of our 
understanding that human boundaries are indeed porous.  
How do we make those porous boundaries “real,” ontologically speaking?  
I believe Smith understood the need to make our intellectual work corporeal, and I 
ask readers to imagine what the world would look like were we to stop 
incorporating—in the truest sense of incorporate as “embody”—embodied 
practices of exclusion. What would it feel like for people from anywhere and any 
culture to meet without being constrained by their affective knowledge of being  
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boundaried?42  None of us can presently know what that would feel like. It is 
difficult even to imagine.  
I suggest, however, that a good place to begin is to explore our 
intersubjective potential as social beings who are as capable of embodying the 
epistemology of porous boundaries as we are of embodying our present practice 
of strict boundary patrol.  
Concluding Discussion: A Way Out of Our Discursive Imprisonment 
One of the conclusions of this project concerns how hierarchical thinking, 
embodied and performed by our very selves, impedes our good efforts to bring 
about a more socially-just world. I take from this that, as rhetoricians, we must 
attend to how arrangement constrains invention. Genre studies have shown that 
meaning is both constrained and enabled by discourse communities, and one of 
the objectives of this project is to present humans as marks comprising a larger 
social organism that is having difficulty making the significant strides it needs to 
for the sake of social justice because each individual has internalized and 
variously performs privilege (or the lack thereof). Truly different—and better—
ways of being and relating are precluded by hierarchical dispositioning, which is 
why I draw upon the term “disposition” for this project. “Disposition” is the 
Latinate term for the second canon of rhetoric and refers to arrangement. If we 
consider humans as embodied texts of multiple discourses, and if we think of 
rhetoric as not only the study of the known and knowable, but also as the study of 
the knower, then humans are subject to arrangement, in this case, a hierarchical 
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ordering that shapes the ways in which we interact with ourselves and others. 
Clearly, intersubjectivity is as much a social construct as is subjectivity. 
Therefore, intersubjectivity is available for epistemic reframing, and as I have 
been arguing, it is crucial that we reframe it. This could be a wonderful collective 
project. I hope to have shown that despite variation in degree, in essence we are 
all members of a discourse community whose narrative immersion in hierarchical 
thinking prevents us from establishing a different gestalt (Smith) upon which we 
might build social systems and epistemologies based upon reciprocal respect (See 
chapter 3).  
My study thus calls into question what we mean by “available means.” A 
vision of a world based upon non-hierarchical thinking necessitates a gestalt that 
is, as I have argued, currently unknowable to us, so in that sense, knowing what 
cooperation and community are like within that gestalt is not available to us. We 
have been truly in-corpora(ted) otherwise. 
Yet we do have glimmers of non-hierarchical thinking, for instance, 
moments of mutually reciprocal respect and feelings of lightness and laughter. 
Also, many of us can recall childhoods filled with the liberated feeling derived 
from egalitarian relationships, the tenor of engagement in which we didn’t worry 
about the past, present, or future, yet were alert and capable of responding to new 
situations as circumstances changed. Our physicality had not been solidified and 
we had not been fully incorporated into our historical time period. Drawing upon 
childhood memories of being relaxed and at play conveys an inkling of the  
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dramatic epistemic shift that would end the socio-historical “moment” that, I 
contend, remains more intellectual than embodied. 
To conclude this project, I would like to leave readers with a brief 
discussion of a mode of intervention that I believe can provide a path to a more 
socially just world. I hope to persuade readers that Atwill’s discussion of the 
normalizing force of description, her theory of productive knowledge (technē) and 
my articulation of a problem space (hierarchical thinking) provide the tools to 
dismantle the master’s house (Lorde).  
In “Arts of Virtue and Democracy,” Atwill uses Bourdieu’s discussion of 
“theory effect” to explain the coherence of past and present, in other words, the 
prescriptive force of description. She writes, “‘Theory effect’ refers to the 
rhetorical force inherent in any socially authorized account of ‘what is’”: 
“[d]escription not only creates the world but also who we are engaging that 
world” (207-08). Narrative immersion thus shapes who we become and what is 
possible for us to achieve. I have drawn upon the work of Smith whose emphasis 
on the impact of individual performativity upon the communal demonstrates why, 
as Atwill contends, “Description may even be more powerful than prescription in 
eliciting compliance to limits of behavior and desire” (208). Focusing on how 
description limits what is available to us as human beings is important because, as 
I have been arguing, the world as description (i.e., a violence-ridden world), 
which is underwritten by hierarchical thinking, structures our perception and thus  
 
183
 
prescribes our reality. In other words, hierarchical thinking dominates the 
narrative fabric of the real. 
When combined with Bourdieu’s theory effect, Atwill’s theory of 
productive knowledge (of which rhetoric is a prime example) helps to explain 
how hierarchical thinking is perpetuated through description. An important aspect 
of productive knowledge (technē) it that a technē has no end in itself. Rather, as 
an art, productive knowledge, according to Atwill, “is defined by an act of 
exchange” because “[a]n art’s source of change or motion is always different and 
always split between producer and user; in other words, neither producer nor user 
is capable of determining productive knowledge” (175). A technē thus has the 
potential to influence any and all aspects of a rhetorical situation: user, producer, 
text, and context. The permutations are endless. Hierarchical thinking thus 
illustrates how rhetoric epitomizes a productive art. By permeating the weave of 
the narrative fabric of the real, hierarchical thinking operates as a structuring 
structure malleable to situational change (e.g. how convict leasing easily replaced 
chattel slavery. See Blackmon). Because hierarchical thinking can respond to 
contingency while maintaining its structural force, we can see how hierarchical 
thinking proscribes the real while simultaneously permitting change within the 
narrative fabric.  
The point here is that change fundamentally operates within the narrative 
fabric. As an example of rhetoric as a technē, hierarchical thinking adjusts 
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situationally to cultural influence, which, then, creates the semblance of historical 
and cultural change. Certainly, people’s lived experiences (depending upon place) 
look dramatically different from those a hundred years ago. Such evident change 
in the narrative fabric (i.e., description) might be taken as sign of significant 
progress, but my work suggests that we need to ignore such ostensible change. 
The profound change we need is being thwarted by the narrative hegemony of 
hierarchical thinking. As a structuring schema that can potentially shape any 
aspect of a rhetorical situation, hierarchical thinking not only adjusts to new 
situations but it also generates material, symbolic, and affective behaviors and 
practices (see chapter 4), making it a prime example of how productive 
knowledge works. Yet this is not the type of productive knowledge that serves the 
best interests of humanity and all life. Hierarchical thinking heavily constrains the 
profound epistemic change that this project calls for and that must be enacted at 
the level of the underlying substructure of human perception. 
We can see the power of this constraint in the commonplace acceptance of 
human violence. As I mentioned in chapter 1, each of us has been trained and 
learned to train ourselves to function in an extremely violent world. For instance, 
we may know that more than a quarter of the children in the United States live in 
poverty and face hunger, many daily, yet we nevertheless learn how to continue 
on with our own lives with little or no daily grief over the fact. The consequence 
of learning to live relatively distress-free in a world of wide scale quotidian 
suffering, from animal rendering to systematic rape of Congolese women, I hope 
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to have shown, indicates a ubiquitous compliance that goes largely 
uninterrogated. Whether we like it or not, as an organism of marks, we contribute 
to the making of the world (poesis). Smith was right—privilege as a rhetorical 
construct is a cancer that affects all of us.  
Privilege is not a free-floating signifier that offers absolute freedom to 
those in privileged positions. Rather, hierarchical thinking, both the engine and 
the fuel of privilege systems, is a damaging colonizing force that needs to be 
recognized, at the very least, as being a really bad idea that took hold and 
flourished. Yes, hierarchical thinking has served pragmatically for purposes of 
domination and control, but it has proven itself impractical for purposes of 
establishing social economies that value diversity and equity. More than it does 
anyone else, hierarchical thinking serves the most privileged—the very top of the 
hierarchical pyramid, namely, a handful of corporations (“persons,” according to 
the U.S. Supreme Court) that largely determine everything from healthcare, the 
environment, how children are educated, what we read, how we are entertained 
and informed to who governs us and how we are governed. Of course, 
hierarchical thinking simultaneously operates as a colonizing episteme that 
colonizes not only those who garner corporate profit. As a darkly substantial part 
of our individual cultural and social construction, hierarchical thinking 
extensively constrains everyone’s perceived needs, desires, thoughts, and 
behaviors. From any angle, hierarchical thinking exemplifies poesis in the worst 
possible way. 
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But poesis as a descriptive, prescriptive, and productive force provides us 
an exit from this mess. If the poesis of the current world is derived from 
hierarchical thinking as I have argued, than the cultivation of non-hierarchical 
thinking—learning to perceive all life as intrinsically worthy—offers us not only 
the means to rebuild our attenuated empathy but also a foundation and a start in 
constructing truly new versions of the real. I have drawn upon Smith’s attention to 
the individual because the need to enact change at the level of the individual 
directs us to understand that systemic change relies upon epistemic change, and 
epistemic change requires change at the level of each individual body. I elucidate 
and build upon Smith’s work to emphasize the importance of attending to bottom-
up processes with at least as much attention as top-down systems currently 
receive.  
So I conclude this project with a look at contemporary educational policy 
in Finland because it demonstrates how attention to non-hierarchy—or equity—
can serve as a structuring structure that bridges the micro and macro and that 
counters the structuring structure of hierarchical thinking. According to Anu 
Partanen in “What Americans Keep Ignoring about Finland’s School Success,” 
Finland restructured its schooling system in the late 1980’s with only one 
objective: equity for all. Partanen explains that “since the 1980s, the main driver 
of Finnish education policy has been the idea that every child should have exactly 
the same opportunity to learn, regardless of family background, income, or 
geographic location. Education has been seen first and foremost not as a way to 
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produce star performers, but as an instrument to even out social inequality.” So all 
schooling is free. There are no private institutions, including university, and all 
students are fed for free and receive free counseling as they wish it. Furthermore, 
there are no standardized tests throughout the grades (except one national exam 
that takes place during what would be considered the equivalence of high school 
in the United States); report cards are individualized by teachers, and there are no 
accountability rites for teachers. Pasi Sahlberg, director of the Finnish Ministry of 
Education's Center for International Mobility explains that "There's no word for 
accountability in Finnish” because "[a]ccountability is something that is left when 
responsibility has been subtracted."  
While the objective of educational reform in Finland was equity, the 
unanticipated result of the reform was excellence. Since 2000, Partanen informs 
readers, Finnish students test as well as or better than Chinese and South Korean 
students. Yet, “compared with the stereotype of the East Asian model—long 
hours of exhaustive cramming and rote memorization—Finland's success is 
especially intriguing because Finnish schools assign less homework and engage 
children in more creative play” (Partanen). Furthermore competition is not 
valorized, Partanen explains: 
 While Americans love to talk about competition, Sahlberg points 
out that nothing makes Finns more uncomfortable. In his book 
Sahlberg quotes a line from Finnish writer named Samuli 
Puronen: "Real winners do not compete." It's hard to think of a 
 
188
more un-American idea, but when it comes to education, Finland's 
success shows that the Finnish attitude might have merits. There 
are no lists of best schools or teachers in Finland. The main driver 
of education policy is not competition between teachers and 
between schools, but cooperation. 
Reminiscent of the educational innovations that Smith implemented in her 
summer camp (see chapter 2), Finnish educational policy illustrates how the force 
of description is a technē, a mode of intervention that theoretically supports a 
view of rhetoric as productive knowledge.  
Janet Atwill argues that “One of the most important dimensions of ancient 
conceptions of technē is its complex relationship to subjectivity,” and that the 
roots of the verb refer to fabrication, production and construction while the roots 
of the noun refer to instrument or tool as that which is both manipulated by 
humans and as that which is intrinsic to humans (53-4). Atwill claims that “both 
descriptions suggest that technē is inseparable from the subject it enables, and 
reciprocally, the intervention enabled by technē redefines the subject” (54). 
Equity may have been the goal in Finnish educational policy but excellence was 
the unanticipated by-product. 
Clearly, the Finnish educational model does not make the comprehensive 
descriptive changes that undoing hierarchical thinking would require. For one, the 
Finnish model merely provides the first of two conditions that this book has used 
as necessary conditions (the right to grow, the right to be different) for the 
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abolishment of hierarchical thinking. The second condition, the right to be 
different, is not addressed in the Finnish model. Without wishing to diminish the 
importance of equity to emotional and physical health (see chapter 3 for a 
discussion of absolute vs. relative equity), just imagine what might happen were 
both conditions implemented! That such significant and productive change was 
brought about by minimally satisfying only one condition (the right to grow) 
augurs hope for the immense potential for positive change were both conditions to 
be implemented and nurtured. If, along with equity, difference itself became 
welcomed and embraced at level of perception, the narrative fabric of reality 
might indeed shift.  
The Finnish model does, however, suggest that Lacan’s claim that desire 
is constantly deferred needs to be challenged if hierarchical thinking is to be fully 
addressed. Clearly, we literally embody and become “what is” since we actualize 
(learn, embody, and perform) those narrative structures that structure our 
perception. Deferral of desire, then, does not account for embodiment and lived 
experience.  
Furthermore, the concept of lack both underwrites and serves privilege 
systems. If we are to embody truly new ways of being, then it is imperative to 
disavow hierarchical thinking and its underlying epistemology, which is based 
upon “lack” (Lacan). To do so, we must purposefully provide children conditions 
of equity that respect difference so that the dominant epistemic weave of the 
narrative fabric shifts from hierarchy to egalitarianism or, in terms of the worth of 
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a life—a shift from reductive interpellation (even in the case of identification, see 
Fuss) to personhood. As we saw in chapter 3, the logic of identity is based upon a 
learned and naturalized assessment system in which individuals learn to assess 
their own and others’ self worth based upon normative knowledge. That which 
sits outside a norm is deemed deficient or inferior and is stigmatized. 
Conceptually, lack (lack of oneself and lack of the Other) underwrites this 
assessment system. Assessing ourselves and others from a perspective of lack, 
clearly teaches fear and invites shame and arrogance, two of the socio-pathogens 
that drive the epidemic of violence that this work interrogates. The concept of 
personhood opposes the concept of lack and provides an alternative episteme 
upon which to base self- and other- assessment. Given that children learn to 
embody what is via “theory effect” (indeed the “personal is political”), clearly the 
socialization of children is central to positive social change, as Smith’s summer 
camp and Finnish educational models demonstrate.  
Yet the topic of how children are raised continues to be largely ignored, as 
somewhat of an untouchable subject—at least in the United States—as long as 
adults don’t egregiously transgress certain visible taboos of violence or sexual 
perversion.43 As a topic of public debate, the rights of children remain more in the 
private than public realm (as the lives of women historically did and do in varying 
degrees, depending upon location). The vital importance of how each of us 
learned to embody “the social” and “the political” prior to our development of 
conscious reflection provides all the lessons we need to see precisely where we 
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can successfully intervene, and a comprehensive examination of the damage 
inflicted by hierarchical thinking as well as the rhetorically productive force of 
description provides the blueprints for how we can successfully intervene.  
The current state of global civilization prevails upon us to undertake a 
serious study of the phenomenon of hierarchical thinking immediately, especially 
since we are living in a time when an international community, it would appear, is 
increasingly impotent with respect to putting an end to global atrocities and 
human rights violations. Eventually (and the sooner the better) we must all 
become consciously and acutely aware of the great harm that hierarchical thinking 
does to ourselves, our planet, and our potential to become social beings with an 
embodied sense of responsibility for taking care of each other and our world. To 
the extent that we do not, we shall never know what kind of world we’re missing.  
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NOTES
                                                 
1(see Kitch for a fascinating examination of the “gendered foundations of racial 
formation in the United States”). 
  
2 Of course, individuals may willingly collude in unjust systems. Such collusion 
may range from conscious exploitation advantage to a less conscious performance 
of advantage. See, for example, Zeus Leonardo’s discussion of the latter in “The 
Myth of White Ignorance.”  
 
3I use “patriarchal regimes” here as a shorthand for all systems based upon 
domination in the assumption that gender hierarchy came first. See Kitch for a 
similar argument. 
 
4For example, Smith’s fervent belief that the field of psychology was an emerging 
science whose findings would transform societal ills or her assertion in the 
chapter’s epigraph that the U.S was “the first nation” to embark upon democracy.  
See Johansen regarding the Iroquois confederacy’s democratic precedence and its 
influence upon the founding of the U.S. constitution.  
 
5 Lillian and Paula kept their relationship closeted.  For discussion of why, see 
Margaret Rose Gladney, “Personalizing the Political, Politicizing the Personal: 
Reflections on Editing the Letters of Lillian Smith.”  
 
6 How am I to Be Heard?, a collection of Smith’s letters with supplementary 
biographical information from Margaret Rose Gladney, From the Mountain (Sugg 
and White), an anthology of selections from Snelling and Smith’s literary journal, 
and The Winner Names the Age, various notable speeches and essays by Smith. 
 
7 See Margaret Rose Gladney’s “A Letter from Lillian Smith” for details about 
the 1944 bannings of Strange Fruit that took place within a couple of months of 
its publication in Detroit, Boston, and by the U.S. Postal Service. The United 
State Postal Service lifted the ban after Delano Roosevelt lifted the ban at the 
request of Eleanor. There was also a “gentlemen’s” ban in Detroit and a legal ban 
in Boston. The Massachusetts Supreme Court upheld the ban.  Never overturned, 
the ban remains on the books today.   
 
8 I draw here, from Janet Atwill who contrasts “ancient logōn technē tradition” 
with “the normalizing tendencies of the Western humanist tradition of the liberal 
arts,” arguing that “this ancient rhetoricial tradition was far more concerned with 
challenging and recalculating standards of value than with protecting” them (2).  
  
9 As one of my reader's astutely pointed out, “That’s Smith’s genius—that she 
didn’t distinguish between the psychological and political.” Precisely.  Smith 
understood that the “personal is political.”   
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10 This is Young’s term. In this chapter I analyze “hierarchical politics of 
difference.”  
 
11 As Leslie McCall notes in “The Complexity of Intersectionality,” the concept 
of intersectionality has been recognized as perhaps the most significant 
contribution to feminist theorizing (1771) since Kimberle Crenshaw introduced 
the term in “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex” in 1989. 
Crenshaw reviews discrimination suits in which the plaintiffs are groups of black 
women who lose their cases because discrimination claims are based upon single-
axis frameworks of either race or sex. In one case, the court dismisses the black 
women’s claim because the black women  neither represent their “sex” (since the 
white female co-workers claimed to suffer no discrimination) nor their “race” 
(since black male co-workers also claimed to suffer no discrimination).   
 
12 In Justice and the Politics of Difference, Young offers a penetrating analysis of 
how the trope of assimilation “structure[s] privilege and oppression” (164-165). 
Young writes that “ignoring difference has oppressive consequences in three 
respects.” First, while “the strategy of assimilation aims to bring formerly 
excluded groups into the mainstream,” those groups enter “the game after it has 
already begun” and thus do not define the standards and rules of the game, which 
are always “culturally and experientially specific,” thereby placing those groups 
always at a disadvantage. Secondly, “blindness to difference perpetuates cultural 
imperialism” of the privileged social group, and thirdly, the “denigration of 
groups that deviate from an allegedly neutral standard often produces an 
internalized devaluation by members of those groups themselves.”  
 
13 Although Smith’s affluent white background suggests that materially, if not 
theoretically, Smith proceeds from a standpoint of privilege, several scholars have 
argued that Smith’s lesbianism provided her with a non-dominant subject position 
from which to extrapolate other subordinated subject positions.  
 
 Many scholars, including Brinkmeyer, Lewis, and O’Dell refer to Smith as a 
lesbian. Gladney’s research indicates that, with respect to practice, Smith was 
bisexual, according to Snelling. It is difficult to attribute “political” lesbianism to 
Smith who never publically acknowledged the intimate nature of her relationship 
with Snelling. 
  
14 Young uses the term “Western,” a designation that I discuss later in the chapter. 
 
15 Disposition is the Latinate term for the second of the five classical Greek 
“canons” of rhetoric and is most commonly referred to as “arrangement.” 
 
16 While I find the distinction between oppression and domination useful in many 
contexts and discussions, particularly with respect to the cultivation of cultural  
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capital and the ability to be heard, I disagree with Young’s assertion that “not 
everyone subject to domination is also oppressed” (38). If oppression refers to 
constraints on self-development, then, as Lillian Smith’s and my works 
demonstrate, everyone in contemporary societies is indeed oppressed. Each of us 
is socialized into systems underwritten by hierarchical politics of difference that 
constrain our self-development with respect to how we perceive and relate to 
others. Hierarchical thinking structures individuals’ intersubjective relationships 
variously, yet situates everyone within the realm of the nonideal. 
  
17 See The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism by Naomi Klein for 
an excellent discussion of the relationship between free-market capitalism and 
corporate militarism. 
 
18 A rhetorical view sees power as relational and not fixed. 
 
19 The necessity of a climate of respect (“the right to be different”) for unhindered 
development (“the right to grow”) has long been acknowledged within the fields 
of education and psychology. Yet discussions concerning social justice commonly 
take two very different approaches, both of which I briefly review below. Neither 
approach takes into account the rhetorical (plastic) nature and autopoietic 
possibilities of humankind. 
 
The first approach, while still common popularly in the guise of “social 
darwinism,” has been discredited in the academy. Social justice from this 
perspective argues that greed, self-interest at the expense of others, and the 
devaluing of others via ranked hierarchies is “hardwired” into the human 
“animal,” an inevitable aspect of human nature. In the academy, however, such 
commonplaces have been challenged, and greed, war, poverty, and even gender, 
are understood by many to be learned concepts, part of a historical legacy that has 
permeated human institutions for millennia. 
 
In contrast, a traditional distributive model of justice recognizes the historical 
dimensions of social inequity and attempts to restore “equilibrium” to this 
historical inbalance through an equitable distribution of resources and capital. 
Young, however, explains why such models fail to bring about social justice, and, 
interestingly, draws upon the same conditions Smith does—“the right to grow and 
be different”—to explain that distributive models neglect to account for the issue 
of difference underwriting societal injustice. Young writes that “social justice 
concerns the degree to which a society contains and supports the institutional 
conditions necessary for the realization of” the good life, and the good life “can 
be reduced to two” general values: (1) developing and exercising one’s capacities 
and expressing one’s experience… and (2) participating in determining one’s 
action and the conditions of one’s action” (37). Fifty years after Smith, Young 
lists virtually the same conditions for social justice that Smith’s does. “The right  
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to grow” involves the free development and exercise of one’s capacities, and “the  
right to be different” concerns having equal participatory access “in deliberation 
and decisionmaking” (Young 37). Therefore, while a traditional distributive 
approach rightfully underscores the need to meet the material and social needs of 
every individual, it nevertheless proves untenable because the equal distribution 
of capital, even cultural capital offers an impossible and unrealizable ideal that 
denies the actuality of difference, culturally and individually. As Nancy Fraser 
puts it, the public sphere cannot “be a space of zero degree culture” (121), an 
ahistorical space that offers equal participatory access to everyone. 
  
20 Humans are not alone. Numerous studies indicate that dogs and other mammals 
recognize when they are being treated unfairly in comparison to the others in their 
group. 
 
21 See Sally Kitch’s The Specter of Sex: Gendered Foundations of Racial 
Formation in the United States for a detailed exposé of how Othering was 
deployed in the U.S. legal system to construct race and was a concerted but 
imperfect process that took years in the making.  
 
22 Categorical knowledge, however, does not automatically instantiate the ranking 
of those categories. Although language categorizes and organizes thought, it does 
not automatically set those categories in play against each other, nor does it set 
those categories into a fixed relationship. While taxonomies allow humans to 
draw similarities and differences among categories, humans have developed them 
into pre-fixed hierarchies that rank its constituent categories against a norm. 
Hence, hierarchical thinking. While group difference (among humans) is 
fundamental to the human condition, hierachically ranking those groups into pre-
fixed categories is not. To recognize difference as a fundamental human 
condition, then, does not automatically render difference itself the problematic at 
hand, as evidenced by the fact that hierarchical systems based upon the ranking of 
Others are culturally variable. Historically, for example, skin color did not 
indicate “race” and ranking of individuals based upon skin color has been clearly 
shown to be a historical process. See Sally Kitch’s The Specter of Sex: Gendered 
Foundations of Racial Formation in the United States for a detailed exposé of the 
construction of race in the United States.  
  
23 Edward Said does acknowledge, however, a shared history, broadly speaking. 
Writing that “far more than they fight, cultures coexist and interact fruitfully with 
each other,” Said argues that cultures are intertwined and, over history, mingle 
more than clash (qtd. in Alcoff 97). Whether hierarchical conditioning emerged 
within cultures or as a result of cross-pollination, I do not know. Probably a 
combination of both. 
24 Although some readers may argue with the term “thinking” as something that 
must occur on the conscious level, as a rhetorician, I view decision-making as a 
 
196
                                                                                                                                     
complex undertaking that may occur on several “levels,” often involving  
conscious deliberation but also often involving memory, affect, and emotion. 
 
25 Although she uses the term “privilege,” McIntosh dislikes it, rightfully 
critiquing its connotations, which are “too positive to fit the conditions and 
behaviors which ‘privilege systems’ produces.” She writes “privilege confers 
dominance,” and the “kind of privilege that gives license to some people to be, at 
best, thoughtless and, at worst, murderous should not continue to be referred to as 
a desirable attribute” even though “widely desired” (68). 
 
26 In “The Ontology of Whiteness,” Zeus Leonardo takes a similar developmental 
stance with respect to the eradication of racism. Speaking of the value of 
whiteness studies for white students, Leonardo argues that whites must first face 
up to their participation in the maintenance of white supremacy—“white racial 
ownership” (105)—before abolition can take place since “opting out of whiteness 
is a racial privilege that people of color cannot enact (99).  
  
27 For example, although chattel slavery was outlawed in the U.S., the 
enslavement of minority populations has nevertheless continued by morphing, 
first in the instantiation of “convict leasing” prior to World War II (see Blackmon 
Slavery by Another Name) and contemporarily within the prison-industrial 
complex (see Alexander The New Jim Crow). These examples indicate, as I argue 
in chapter 5, that hierarchical thinking is malleable and can be construed as a 
productive art (technē).   
 
28 See chapter one for a discussion of how hierarchical thinking operates as a 
colonizing force, which always requires partial assimilation. Eduardo Bonilla-
Silva puts it succinctly: “Hegemonic means that domination is achieved more 
through consent than by coercion” (27).  
 
29 I imagine that narratives of self-esteem are not damaging in themselves, 
especially when grounded in cultures based upon self-respect. Narratives of self-
esteem, however, can unfortunately reinforce hierarchical thinking because it 
constitutes an overarching framework. 
 
30 In “The Myth of White Ignorance,” Leonardo comments upon these distinctions 
as particularly useful for those students whose “white racial knowledge seduces 
[them] to equate these historical forms.” He explains that they are quite distinct in 
that supremacy invokes institutionalization and control of “apparatuses of power” 
(119). 
 
31  There are many additional scholars who deserve mention, so the following is 
by no means a comprehensive list. With respect to child development, see Megan 
Watkins who theorizes the role of “mutual recognition” in pedagogy and Carol 
Gilligan whose “ethic of care” reveals the role of gender influence upon moral  
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development. Regarding affect, see Teresa Brenan on “entrainment,” Alison M. 
Jaggar on the social construction of emotion, and Lawrence Grossberg, Brian 
Massumi, Robert Solomon in The Affect Theory Reader. For a review of cognitive 
theories of emotion see Jesse J. Prinz’s Gut Reactions. Posthumanism extends the 
intersubjective to the non-human. See Cary Wolfe’s What is Posthumanism for a 
good overview. 
  
32 Intersubjective refers not only to the way subjects learn to interact with and 
interpellate themselves and others but also refers to how subjects learn to imagine 
sociality and themselves as social beings. 
 
33 Janet M. Atwill argues for the pleasures difference provides in Rhetoric 
Reclaimed. 
 
34 In “The Color of Supremacy,” Zeus Leonardo insightfully cautions against 
teaching about those “colossal unseen dimensions,” that is, the unearned 
advantages of whiteness [privilege] in ways that downplay white agency or 
obscure the subject of domination. The “theme of privilege” is often “described as 
happening almost without the knowledge of whites,” an “image of domination 
without agents,” which “conjures up images of domination happening behind the 
backs of whites, rather than on the backs of people of color” (38). 
  
35 In chapter three I used Iris Marion Young’s definition of oppression: 
Oppression is “the institutional constraint on self-development” and domination is 
“the institutional constraint on self-determination” (37).  I argued that “ If 
oppression refers to constraints on self-development, then, as Lillian Smith’s and 
my works demonstrate, everyone in contemporary societies is indeed oppressed. 
Each of us is socialized into systems underwritten by hierarchical politics of 
difference that constrain our self-development with respect to how we perceive 
and relate to others. Hierarchical thinking structures individuals’ intersubjective 
relationships variously, yet situates everyone within the realm of the nonideal” 
(7n). 
 
36 Corporal punishment remains legal in 22 states in the U.S.  
 
37 According to Eileen Boris, “A 1994 conference on Smith’s life and work at 
Georgetown University” revitalized Smith and “marked her arrival as the white 
woman commentator on whiteness and race” (13N 6). 
 
38 See critiques of media control and the illusion of a free media in the U.S. by 
Bill Moyers, Amy Goodman, and Noam Chomsky. 
 
39 See Brian Massumi’s, “The Future Birth of the Affective Fact: The Political 
Ontology of Threat,” and Kyle Jensen’s,  “A Matter of Concern: Kenneth Burke, 
Phishing, and the Rhetoric of National Security,” for illuminating discussions 
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about how fear is used to maintain a rhetoric of terror to justify rescinding  U.S. 
civil liberties and increasing militarism.   
   
40 I also imagine that narratives of self-esteem are not damaging in themselves, 
especially when grounded in cultures based upon self-respect. 
41 For discussions of educational equity, see Kozol, Prendergast, and Sahlberg. 
For a wonderful critique of the myopic economic vision of traditional capitalistic 
models, see Manfred Max-Neef’s discussion of “barefoot economics.”  
 
42 Boundaries certainly serve important protective functions, particularly in a 
world in which domination, exploitation, and oppression thrive, and an aspect of 
maturation is learning how to “be good to oneself” by establishing boundaries. It 
would seem, however, that if a world gestalt based upon reciprocal respect and 
the intrinsic worth of life were to exist, the acquisition of self- and other-respect 
would automatically lead to subjectivities who would already be bounded in such 
fashion, suffused with an understanding of self-worth.   
 
43 For example, what constitutes “discipline” remains vague. Many of the students 
in my classes have fiercely argued for the type of discipline they received as 
children, for example, being whipped with a belt. In an altogether different vein, 
many states (e.g.,) still legally permit child farmworkers to work alarming hours. 
According to a Human Rights Watch report, “Fields of Peril,” “child farmworkers 
risked their safety, health, and education on commercial farms across the United 
States.” According to the author of the report, Zama Coursen-Neff, “The United 
States spends over $25 million a year — more than all other countries combined 
— to eliminate child labor abroad, yet is tolerating exploitative child labor in its 
own backyard…I saw kids as young as 7 picking blueberries. Eight-year-olds 
shucking peas in Virginia. Children picking strawberries at 9 in North Dakota” 
(qtd. in Nikolchev) The report, Alexandra Nikolchev explains, “found children as 
young as 12 legally working more than 10 hours a day.”   
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